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ABSTRACT 
Given what happened in South Africa in support of apartheid, this dissertation 
explores the various approaches to justice that have been, and might be employed to deal 
with the enormity of the crimes committed. The notion of universal jurisdiction is 
explored as a way of expanding the discussion to include not just actions to be taken in 
South Africa but also possible action that could be taken by other countries. 
The dissertation looks at what was done and not done, particularly by the United 
Nations and Canada during the apartheid era and after and as well in South Africa after 
the ending of apartheid. In this context it discusses the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, its structure, actions and shortcomings. It looks at the United Nations 
efforts, analyzing the genesis and import of the various declarations, principles and 
conventions that deal with either crimes against humanity in general and apartheid 
related crimes in particular. In this context, it also looks at the various war crimes/crimes 
against humanity trials that have been or are in progress. Finally, it looks at Canada as a 
case study. The focus is Canada's various responses to crimes against humanity. The 
dissertation discusses not only what Canada has done and not done, but what it could 
and might do. 
In each case, South Africa, the UN and Canada, an historical account is presented. In 
the Canadian case, this is followed by a discussion of case law relevant to any future 
prosecution, deportation or extradition. The dissertation then looks at the reasons for 
action and inaction by Canada on various war crimes/crimes against humanity. It draws 
11 
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attention to the importance of political pressure, and m this context considers the 
implications of moral panic. 
The dissertation concludes by pointing out the lack of adequate response to the crime 
of apartheid, notwithstanding developments in South Africa and the United Nations. In 
the Canadian case, it concludes that there is ample precedent for using universal 
jurisdiction. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation addresses the long-standing and vexmg problem of calling 
apartheid criminals from South Africa to account for their actions 1• Given that there 
have been no prosecutions of those who have committed the crime of apartheid, defined 
as a crime against humanity and a war crime in the Apartheid Convention and the ICC 
statute, this dissertation focuses on the concept of universal jurisdiction in making the 
argument that there is much Canada could and should do in this regard even today. 
This is regardless as to whether universal jurisdiction is supported by state practice. 
There is much discussion about international justice and holding accountable those who 
have committed crimes against humanity and war crimes which raises the following 
question: What is the responsibility of foreign states when the states in which the crimes 
occurred, are unwilling, unable, incompetent or otherwise to prosecute the perpetrators 
of the crimes? The case of the crime of apartheid and the possible application of 
universal jurisdiction by Canada is a good case study to explore these questions. 
Even before the twentieth anniversary of its freedom from apartheid, South Africa is 
already mired in the scars of its "unfinished business" through the injustices of the lack 
of prosecutions of and reparations for apartheid-era crimes. There are already signs that 
1 
"Apartheid criminals" are those individuals who committed the "crime of apartheid" as defined in the 
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, UN GA Res. 
3068 (XXVIII), 30 Nov. 1973, (1974) 13 ILM 50 [Apartheid Convention]. These individuals committed 
crimes against humanity and war crimes, practices which will be dealt with in Chapter One. Fuller 
definitions of what constitute crimes against humanity and war crimes with regards to apartheid are given 
in Chapter Two. Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court lists the "crime of 
apartheid" as one of the examples of"crimes against humanity" alongside murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportations, torture, persecution on racial and other grounds and so on and so forth. Article 
8 of the ICC statute defines "war crimes" to include grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, other serious violations of the laws and customs of international armed conflict and so on. 
Please see Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court of 17 July 1998, (1998) 37 ILM 999. 
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"where injustice goes unpunished, old conflicts keep flaring up again"2• A series of 
"moral panics" (which will be defined in Chapter Six) have been bedevilling South 
Africa precisely because of the unresolved conflicts of apartheid. A few examples will 
suffice here. The liberation song of "Shoot the Boer" (farmer) had been made popular 
again by Julius Malema, an African National Congress (ANC) youth leader, in the early 
2000s. This song panicked the white population because it was accompanied literally 
with the killings of several white farmers. Julius Malema was sued for promoting hate 
speech and possibly genocide. Judicial intervention was critical in reducing the moral 
panic unleashed by the continued singing and possible consequences of this song. The 
ruling African National Congress apparently supported the singing of that song. Judge 
Collin Lamont issued an injunction prohibiting the singing of that song3. 
Another moral panic that gripped South Africa was the killing of the right-wing Nazi 
propagator and farmer, Eugene Terreblanche in April 2010. This was done right in the 
midst of the 501h anniversary of the Sharpeville Massacre of March 21st, 1960, when 
police killed 69 unarmed African demonstrators. The crime of apartheid is dated from 
March 21st, 1960, although apartheid as a form of government dated back to 1948 when 
the National Party came to power. The killing of Terreblanche raised the spectre in the 
white population that a race-war had now commenced4. 
2 Leila Nadya Sadat, A Comprehensive History of the Proposed International Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity p. 16 Whitney R. Harris World Law Institute, 
Washington University Law, 2010, quoting Honourable J.J. Van Aartsen, Mayor. 
3 The case is Afri-Forum et al and Julius Malema et al Case No: 20968/2010, Equality Court, 
Johannesburg 
4 Headlines in South Africa and around the world stated "South Africa Risks Civil War After the Killing 
of White Supremacist Leader Eugene Terreblanche". See mainly the Mail and Guardian of South Africa 
weekly issues of April 2010. See also The Christian Science Monitor of 4th of April 2010. 
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Another moral panic was evident in March 2013 when two bodies allegedly linked to 
Winnie Mandela's activities in the 1980s were exhumed, and speculations were rampant 
that Winnie Mandela would be prosecuted for apartheid-era crimes5• This development 
opened old wounds as to how Winnie Mandela, who fought against the crime of 
apartheid, could be threatened with prosecution when the real apartheid criminals were 
walking around with impunity6. 
Another example of a moral panic that has recently been displayed is that of an 
apartheid security police officer named Steve Whitehead. This security officer was 
alleged to have engaged in the torture-murder of a popular trade unionist by the name of 
Neil Aggett in the 1980s. Neil Aggett is discussed in Chapter One. In November 2012, 
it was revealed that Whitehead was doing business with the ANC government. 
"Whitehead had never sought amnesty from the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission or apologized to the Aggett family"7• It is stated that Whitehead is 
theoretically still vulnerable to prosecution8. 
The basis for choosing the crime of apartheid in South Africa and using Canada as an 
example for the possible application of the concept of universal jurisdiction (to be 
defined and explored fully in Chapter Five) is that an international convention was set 
up to depict the practices of a self-named regime as a crime against humanity providing 
for universal jurisdiction to prosecute the perpetrators of these crimes. If the 
5 See "Bodies Linked to Winnie Mandela Exhumed" The Age World 13 March 2013. 
6 There is a huge debate on this issue, se Larry May, War Crimes and Just War (St. Louis; Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 
7 Drew Forrest, "Neil Aggett's Tormentor Does Work for the State" Mail and Guardian 9 November 
2012. 
8 Ibid. 
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perpetrators of the historically well defined crime of apartheid are left unaccountable 
and with impunity, what does this mean in terms of the status of international justice and 
the calls for holding criminals against humanity and war criminals accountable? 
Post-apartheid South Africa set up a unique post-conflict justice process in the form 
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as will be seen in Chapter Three. 
This process was heralded as a precedent for securing justice while maintaining peace 
under a democratic regime. The lack of prosecutions means that this experiment has 
accorded impunity by default and is not a useful precedent. On the other hand, Canada 
has projected itself to the world as a country built on solid principles of justice, the rule 
oflaw, humanitarianism and objectively neutral in its relations with all the nations of the 
world. Canada has also advocated its abhorrence of impunity for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity. There is thus potential in Canada for the application of universal 
jurisdiction. Canada was also at the forefront in expelling South Africa from the 
commonwealth in the early 1960s and in imposing economic sanctions in the 1980s. 
Other bases for choosing the crime of apartheid and the possible application of universal 
jurisdiction by Canada are given in Chapter One. 
Chapter Outlines 
Chapter One, the introductory chapter, discusses in summary form the practices of 
apartheid which constituted the elements of the crimes against humanity. This chapter 
also discusses why it is important, for justice for victims of the crime of apartheid and 
4 
the development of international criminal law, to study the question of accountability 
posed by the post-conflict and post-apartheid justice in South Africa. 
Chapter One is a foundational chapter. It begins the analysis by itemizing the reasons 
why apartheid criminals should have been and should be prosecuted. The chapter 
analogizes the practice of apartheid to that of Nazi Germany and how the labeling of 
apartheid as a crime against humanity stems from the Nazi precedent. The idea of 
prosecuting apartheid criminals enunciated by ANC and various scholars also originates 
from the example set by the prosecution of Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg. 
The chapter discusses how apartheid was implemented through various laws and 
practices and its effects on the black population in South Africa and in neighboring 
countries. 
This chapter sets the stage for what follows in Chapter Two. 
Chapter Two discusses the responses of the United Nations, the international 
community, the main opposition to apartheid - The African National Congress (ANC) 
and scholars of renown to the practices of apartheid in South Africa. 
The practices of apartheid resulted in strong condemnation by the United Nations 
(UN) which labeled apartheid as a crime against humanity. The ANC and several 
scholars called for the prosecution of apartheid criminals. This chapter dovetails into 
Chapter Three which deals with how those who committed the crime of apartheid were 
to be treated. 
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Chapter Three discusses the practices and responses of the post-apartheid South 
African government to apartheid-era crimes through the creation of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission {TRC) as a form of accountability. 
This chapter discusses the negotiations that led to the demise of the apartheid regime 
and the constitution of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission {TRC), a process and 
mechanism for addressing the conflict of the past. I conclude that this process was used 
by the post-apartheid government as an excuse for the lack of prosecutions and 
reparations for the crime of apartheid. The "unfinished business" of apartheid-era 
crimes resides in this process, albeit that the TRC had recommended that prosecutions 
be embarked on and that reparations be made to the victims of apartheid. 
Chapter Four discusses the possibility of the creation of the International Tribunal for 
the Prosecution of the Crime of Apartheid {ITPCA). 
In order to address the impunity enjoyed by apartheid criminals, given their lack of 
prosecution in South Africa, one avenue that is open is that of the creation of a 
specialized tribunal. A tribunal was contemplated in the Apartheid Convention . There 
are now several specialized tribunals upon which the apartheid tribunal could be 
modeled. It is concluded that given the decision not to prosecute internally, South 
Africa would not cooperate in the setting up of an international tribunal. 
Chapter Five discusses the concept and application of universal jurisdiction. 
Another avenue that is possible in ending impunity for the crime of apartheid is the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction. The concept of universal jurisdiction is defined and 
6 
case law, where it has been exercised, is discussed. Universal jurisdiction however, is 
exercised in national jurisdiction. 
Chapter Six discusses the politics and law of war crimes and crimes against humanity 
in Canada, a country which is used as a case study for the possibility of invoking the tool 
of universal jurisdiction to address the problem of accountability for the perpetrators of 
international crimes including the crime of apartheid. 
The jurisdiction that has been chosen for the exercise of universal jurisdiction is 
Canada. This chapter traces the processes evident in Canada from 1945 to 2005 to come 
to grips with the issue of prosecuting war criminals from other jurisdictions in Canada. 
This process is as much political as it is legal. 
Chapter Seven discusses civil measures Canada undertook in its opposition to 
apartheid South African before 1994 particularly how Canada handled the issue of 
sanctions against apartheid South Africa. 
The previous chapter set the scene for this chapter. Chapter Seven begins to address 
how universal civil jurisdiction had been applied to the crime of apartheid during the 
apartheid era. As Canada has no law equivalent to the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act, the 
discussion of universal civil jurisdiction is limited to that of sanctions and enforcement 
mechanisms. 
Chapter Eight discusses the possibility of the use by Canada of its then new criminal 
code provisions on war crimes to prosecute apartheid criminals before 1994. 
Chapter Six also sets the framework for Chapter Eight which analyzes how the 
application of universal criminal jurisdiction, enabled by the incorporation of the new 
7 
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criminal code provisions, could have been applied in Canada to the crime of apartheid. 
There was no constituency in Canada propagating for the prosecution of apartheid 
criminals and Canada was resolved to prosecute Nazi war criminals only. 
Chapter Nine discusses the law that would be applicable and the defenses that would 
be deployed if apartheid criminals were to be prosecuted in Canada under Canada's new 
war crimes legislation. 
Prosecution of war criminals in Canada using the 1987 amendments to the Criminal 
Code were not successful. After the coming into force of the ICC statute in 2000, 
Canada enacted the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act. This chapter 
addresses the applicability of the new Act to the possible exercise of universal criminal 
jurisdiction against apartheid criminals. It also discusses the new cases Canada has 
prosecuted using this new legislation. 
Chapter Ten discusses the role of the victims of apartheid m international 
prosecutions of apartheid criminals and in civil suits for reparations. 
Victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity are supposed to be at the centre 
of criminal prosecutions but are often marginalized as they cannot bring private 
prosecutions themselves. In Canada they still cannot file civil suits against foreign 
perpetrators. This chapter discusses the need to empower victims to be fully engaged in 
the process of criminal prosecutions and civil litigation. 
Chapter Eleven is the conclusion and presents in summary form the contents of the 
dissertation and concludes that apartheid criminals have continued to enjoy impunity and 
8 
their accountability can only be addressed through the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
by countries like Canada. 
This chapter in addition to discussing reparations for the crime of apartheid, also 
deals with why it is absolutely imperative to ensure that the crime of apartheid which is 
an unfinished business, does not end up like the U.S. model where festering feelings of 
racial injustices continue to be prevalent. The state of affairs in the U.S. goes back to 
the injustices of slavery, injustices whose legacies remain largely unaddressed. 
I further outline what further work still needs to be done on the question of the crime 
of apartheid. 
9 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE CRIME OF APARTHEID 
1.1 Introduction 
This introductory chapter catalogues the practices of apartheid which induced the 
United Nations to label apartheid as a crime against humanity and as a war crime 
because of the evidence of gross and systematic violations of human rights. The chapter 
also elaborates on the justification for this study. 
"If apartheid is a crime, why has no one been prosecuted"9, asked Garth Meintjens, 
an associate director at the Centre for Civil and human Rights at Notre Dame Law 
School in 2002. This question is germane in the context of the existence of: (1) the 
United Nations International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid10, (ICSPCA) a convention which was signed in 1973 and came into 
force iQ. 1976. It declared apartheid as a crime against humanity; (2) the incorporation 
into the 1998 statute of the United Nation's sponsored International Criminal Court11 
(ICC), which became operational in 2002, of the "crime of apartheid" as one of the 
examples of the "crimes against humanity"; (3) the domestication of the statute of the 
International Criminal Court into the domestic laws of many countries including 
Canada12 in 2000 and South Africa13 in 2002; (4) the proclamations and declarations by 
9 Garth Meintjens, "If Apartheid Is A Crime, Why Has No One Been Prosecuted" (October-December 
2002) Africa Legal Aid 19. 
10 1015 U.N.T.S. 243 (Apartheid Convention) 
11 U.N. Doc. A/Conf 183/0 available at http://www.un-org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm 
12 Crimes Against Humanity And War Crimes Act (2000). Canada left out the "crime of apartheid" and 
"forced disappearances". This will be discussed later. 
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the anti-apartheid movements and numerous scholars that apartheid criminals would 
eventually be prosecuted; (5) the numerous United Nations Resolutions and Declarations 
and the numerous Security Council Resolutions on the crime of apartheid; ( 6) the world-
wide revulsion of the crime of apartheid as evidenced by the imposition of various 
economic, military, cultural, sporting and other sanctions against South Africa; (7) the 
rulings of international tribunals such as the International Court of Justice against South 
Africa; (8) the findings of the constitutional court of South Africa in the Basson case that 
apartheid is a crime against humanity and that its perpetrators could be prosecuted, and 
(9) the finding by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa that 
apartheid is a crime against humanity and its recommendations that those individuals 
who committed this offence and were not given amnesty should be prosecuted. The 
crime of apartheid could be prosecuted, not just in South Africa but, as Meintjens states, 
"all of the most serious international crimes committed by the apartheid regime are 
subject to either permissive or compulsory universal jurisdiction"14• For all the above 
prompts, the crime of apartheid presented itself as tailor-made for prosecution in South 
Africa and the exercise of universal jurisdiction. 
The apartheid regime had long since the 1960's, been labelled as a crime against 
humanity by its victims and the United Nations. The Nazi practices and experience in 
Germany was the precedent and reference point. The very idea of prosecuting leaders of 
the apartheid regime in South Africa after the collapse of apartheid had been hinted at 
many times by the leaders of the South African liberation movements following the Nazi 
13 Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Art. 27 of 2002). 
14 Meintjens, supra at 20. 
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precedent. Samuel Daniels of the African National Congress for example hinted that 
after apartheid was overthrown, a tribunal would be set up to prosecute apartheid 
criminals and that appropriate sentences would be imposed. Sechaba, the official organ 
of the African National Congress also carried an editorial which stated15 : 
There is no crime in the book of crimes which Botha and his Generals 
have not committed. Be it murder of detainees, assassination of political 
and trade union leaders, raping women detainees, mutilation of genitals of 
thousands of men in torture sessions in detention, street executions with 
vigilantes and SADF death-squads, destabilisation and acts of aggression 
on neighbouring states, you name it, Pretoria has committed it, not once or 
twice but many times over. But each crime must be recorded separately, 
because the time to punish the guilty is fast approaching. No one can hold 
back the day of reckoning. 
Oliver Tambo, in a speech to the United Nations on March Iih, 1964 entitled "Make 
Accomplices of Apartheid Account for their Conduct", the leader of the African 
National Congress made what became a recurring theme of the African National 
Congress: the desirability of imposing economic and arms sanctions against South 
Africa and of holding the perpetrators and accomplices of apartheid, both individuals 
and corporate, legally accountable for their actions. He specified that, "in the past we 
have stated, and we repeat now, that the oppressed people in South Africa must and will 
settle accounts with their oppressors by any means open to them .. [and] those outside 
South Africa who are accomplices in the perpetration of an acknowledged vice must 
15 Sechaba (August 1987) at 1. 
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account for their conduct."16 The African National Congress sent a message that "we 
cannot overemphasize the urgency of identifying all those forces and influences which 
should be held answerable for any past, present or future loss oflife in South Africa." 17 
Throughout the years, the African National Congress emphasized the connection 
between Nazism and apartheid. Just as Nazism had been politically, economically, 
militarily and culturally supported by other countries, so too was apartheid in South 
Africa. On March 21st, 1978, Oliver Tambo addressed a special UN Committee on the 
connection between Nazism and apartheid in these terms: 
To put the matter briefly, the accession of the apartheid regime to power 
30 years ago coincided with the efforts of the fascist forces, defeated in 
Europe, to regroup themselves wherever this was possible, in preparation 
for their re-emergence on the world scene, once more organised, once more 
strong enough to seek to impose their will on the peoples of the world. In 
South Africa these forces found fertile ground, enriched by a long history 
of colonial and white minority domination, and made specially favourable 
by the fact that the present rulers of our country had for many years prior to 
their 1948 victory organised themselves into Nazi vanguard of South 
Africa, adopted and schooled themselves to the philosophy and practice of 
Nazism and openly declared their determination to tum South Africa into a 
Nazi stronghold. 
When, therefore, this Nazi vanguard came to power, and for so long as 
it retained its hold on this power, it was clear that the task which mankind 
had set itself - to rid the world of fascist tyranny - and for which it had 
already paid such high price, was as yet unaccomplished. Democratic 
humanity is thus faced with the task of dislodging and destroying the 
forces of Nazism, now embedded in the fabric of South African society. 
When the United Nations resolved its 1975 General Assembly session 
that it has "a special responsibility towards the people of South Africa," it 
was acknowledging and laying emphasis on the fact that we had inherited 
16 In E.S Reddy, ed. Oliver Tambo: Apartheid and the International Community: Addresses to the United 
Nations Committees (New Delhi: Sterling publishers, 1991) at 17 found at 
www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/or/intemational accessed 05/ 10/2009). 
17 Ibid. 
13 
the retreating but unrepentant forces of Nazi aggression and domination. 
What Nazism achieved though gas chambers and concentration camps 
nearly four decades ago has been repeated in our country over the past 30 
years by the subtle methods and techniques, with Sharpeville and Soweto 
serving as danger signals alerting mankind to the gruesome inhumanity of 
the South African apartheid system. No one could possibly deny that 
millions of black people who should be alive and healthy today have died 
during the past 30 years, killed and consumed by the apartheid system and 
those who work it. 
We want to suggest here that this "special responsibility," by the very 
nature of its origin, is shared alike by the peoples of the world. It extends 
to the millions upon millions of the peoples of Europe, Africa, the 
Americas and Asia who stood together to defeat fascism, who came 
together to form this Organisation, and who, by that act, collectively 
pledged to ensure that the scourge of the swastika would never again haunt 
the world. 
The world-wide programme of activities to observe the International 
Year against the inhuman apartheid system should therefore not overlook 
the Nazi component of that system, and should reflect the essential 
continuity of the struggle from Hitler to Vorster. These activities and 
actions should in part be targeted on all the well-known and notorious 
pillars of support for the apartheid regime, which are political, economic, 
military and cultural. 18 
On calling on the international community to "impose comprehensive and mandatory 
sanctions against South Africa" 19 Oliver Tambo emphasized that: 
The issue to which this Conference must address itself has a long history, 
for the question of white South Africa's treatment of the black people is 
older than the United Nations itself. Since 1946, no other question has 
appeared so often on the United Nations agenda, or remained there for so 
long. 
We have, today, to deal with a rouge regime that has repeatedly, 
consistently, and deliberately violated almost every single norm recognised 
by the international community. 
• the apartheid regime stands today in breach of United Nations General 
Assembly, Security Council, and International Court of Justice decisions 
over its illegal occupation of Namibia; 
18 Ibid at 49. 
19 Ibid at 54. 
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• the apartheid regime stands today in breach of almost every single clause 
of the Universal Declaration of Human rights; 
• the apartheid regime stands today judged as a criminal under the 
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid; 
• the apartheid regime stands today in breach of the United Nations 
Charter for its repeated acts of aggression against its neighbours. 
Let us, therefore, at the outset of this Conference be very clear about the 
nature of the problem with which we are dealing. We are not discussing a 
normally law-abiding member of the international community that has had 
a momentary lapse. We are dealing with an outcast, one who has continues 
to follow policies that have been declared a crime against humanity, a 
regime that has repeatedly acted in defiance of United Nations resolutions. 
A number of well-known scholars treated apartheid as a crime against humanity; 
especially starting in the 1970's. They argued that apartheid criminals should face 
criminal prosecutions although there was no speculation as to how criminal prosecutions 
would unfold. For example, Kader Asmal 's writings on Apartheid South Africa argued 
that "apartheid is a violation of international law [and commits Crimes against 
Humanity] and it has been recognized by the international community as a whole [as 
such]." And that its perpetrators deserved to be prosecuted.20 G. Brahme's article in the 
same publication is appropriately titled, "Some remarks on Responsibility for the Crime 
of Apartheid under International law"21 • Brahme echoes the same sentiments that 
apartheid is a crime against humanity and must be prosecuted. 
20 In Apartheid, South Africa and International Law, available at 
http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/campaigns/legaVhmtl. See also Asmal, "Judges and Justice in 
South Africa" (March 1989) Sechaba 9. 
21 In Apartheid, South Africa and International Law, supra. 
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Albie Sachs who went on to become a judge of the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa from having been a member of the ANC,22 also urged for the prosecution of 
apartheid criminals under international criminal law as did E. Sagay.23 
In his seminal book, International Law: A South African Perspective, 24 John Dugard, 
a South African law professor and perhaps the most prolific authority on the South 
African judiciary and human rights practices under apartheid, also recognized that 
apartheid was a crime against humanity and that for those who signed the Convention, 
the Convention provided for universal jurisdiction. The crime of apartheid was also 
made an extraditable crime. Unfortunately, the Apartheid Convention was not 
implemented in practice during the apartheid era. 25 
Professor Clark of Rutgers University wrote a widely read and influential article in 
the l 980's branding apartheid as a crime against humanity.26 
According to Professor Robert Currie of Dalhousie University Faculty of Law in his 
book International and Transnational Criminal Law27 "it has not been seriously 
contested by any significant number of states ... that apartheid is indeed a crime against 
humanity and thus a crime under customary international law. [That those] states voting 
against adopting or refusing to ratify expressed little discomfort with treating apartheid 
as a crime against humanity."28 
22 In Ibid. 
23 In Ibid. 
24 (Capetown: Juta, 2000). 
25 Ibidat161. 
26 
"The Crime of Apartheid" in M.Bassioumi (ed.) International Criminal Law 3rd ed. vol. 1 (New 
York:Transnational, 2008). 
27 Robert Currie, International and Transnational Criminal Law (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010) at 294. 
28 Ibid., at 294. 
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Although the opinions of scholars are not binding, and just because a scholar holds an 
opinion does not make that opinion true, it is beside the point. What is important is the 
holding of the opinion itself as opinions of scholars shape, in general, the current 
thinking and could be of persuasive value. These are the scholars who receive invitations 
to draft conventions and to act as expert witnesses in congressional hearings and at 
prosecutions of war criminals. Expert opinions influence the judiciary. Some experts 
get appointed to the judiciary or get elected to parliament where they influence policy 
making. In other words, long before apartheid was defeated, there were public calls and 
publications in the international community that labelled apartheid as a crime against 
humanity, with an arguable case that the perpetrators of the crime would be prosecuted 
just like the Nazis were, along with the colluding organizations, institutions and 
corporations. These perpetrators had been put on notice beginning in the 1960s that 
apartheid was regarded as a crime against humanity with the possible consequences of 
prosecutions. 
The arguments that apartheid is a cnme against humanity did not die out after 
apartheid was ended. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission said m 1998 that 
apartheid was a crime against humanity29. 
It has, however, been disputed as to whether or not apartheid is indeed a crime under 
customary international law. Justice Sprizzo of the Federal Southern District Court in 
New York held that apartheid was not a crime under customary international law for the 
purposes of the Alien Tort Statute because the Apartheid Convention has not been 
29 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Reports ( 1998) vol. I at 94 and vol. 5 at 222, 
Dugard, supra. 
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adopted by most world powers30• Other scholars have disputed outright that apartheid 
was a crime against humanity. 31 Booysen argues that the Apartheid Convention 
cannot be used as a basis of criminal prosecutions as it is, among other weaknesses, 
poorly drafted. He further states that the system of apartheid cannot be equated to 
classical international criminality. It was merely repressive but not criminally so. He 
argues that the Apartheid Convention itself is more akin to a political statement than a 
legal document upon which justiciability can lie. 
If no one has been prosecuted for the crime of apartheid, given the advocacy for same 
reviewed above and as Meintjens maintains, apartheid criminals have escaped with 
impunity from their having committed war crimes and crimes against humanity. The aim 
of this dissertation is to investigate if, how and why apartheid criminals have gotten 
away with impunity and what legal and political avenues if any may be available to 
bringing them to account. In order to address the questions raised including that of 
Meintjens, a historical and comparative approach will be adopted. The dissertation will 
discuss what measures the United Nations, the post-apartheid government, the 
international community, Canada, victims and various constituencies have taken to 
address the criminality of apartheid. 
This situation will be examined through the prism of the Canadian jurisdiction. I will 
address several questions. How was apartheid treated in international criminal law 
before its demise? Were there any prospects for the prosecution of apartheid criminals 
30 In Re South African Apartheid Litigation:Ntsebeza et al v Citigroup Inc. et al, 346 F.Supp 2"d 538, 
2004. 
31 See H. Booysen, "Convention on the Crime of Apartheid" (1976) 2 SAYIL 56 and G.N.Barrie, 'The 
Apartheid Convention after United Nations versus South Africa" ( 1986). 
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before the end of apartheid? Should Canada, as an example, have prosecuted apartheid 
criminals between 1948 and 1994? Can Canada prosecute apartheid criminals post-
1994? Can a case be made for the prosecution of apartheid criminals in Canada? Does 
the crime of apartheid lend itself to the exercise of universal jurisdiction? Can the 
exercise of universal civil litigation against corporate aiders and abettors of apartheid be 
replicated in the criminal forum? 
The study is oriented more to the legal theoretical exploration of the possibilities, 
imperatives and limitations of universal criminal jurisdiction than to the practical 
predilections of the exercise. 
The application of universal jurisdiction is proposed as a new model to address the 
impunity enjoyed by apartheid criminals. It is new in the sense of not having been 
applied to the pursuit and prosecution of apartheid criminals anywhere. 
The crime of apartheid is worthy of study for important reasons: to test the claims of 
nation states that they will invoke universal jurisdiction to stem the impunity of war 
criminals and criminals against humanity. I will assess the cogency and political will of 
states that have domestic legislation to prosecute or extradite or provide other 
accountability mechanisms for those who are suspected of having committed war crimes 
or crimes against humanity but have been left unprosecuted by their national state. 
I will argue that apartheid has elicited fewer attempts to prosecute its proponents 
within and without South Africa while other previously ill-defined or less defined 
criminal conduct has been prosecuted after the fact (Bosnia, Iraq, East Timor, Sierra 
Leone, Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Congo and Cambodia) utilising the concept of universal 
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jurisdiction. This is interesting in light of the fact that South Africa was also condemned 
by the United Nations more often than any other nation for gross human rights violations 
between 1946 and 1994.32 There was also a very developed world-wide anti-apartheid 
movement between 1948 and 1994 including in the areas of economic sanctions, 
visiting, armaments and sports. 
Why should Canada be the laboratory for the case study on the prosecution of 
apartheid criminals in the contemporary world? Why should Canada apply universal 
criminal jurisdiction against apartheid criminals? I will argue that there are many 
reasons: Canada had one of the largest and broadest Commission of Inquiry on Nazi 
War Criminals in history; Canada was the first western country to bring in major 
changes to its criminal laws to permit the domestic prosecution of war criminals in 
Canada and its legislation was copied elsewhere33 ; Canada has had an international 
reputation for legal and political neutrality, fairness and lack of politically motivated 
international stances; Canada has been one of the leading countries in the promotion and 
success of the introduction of the International Criminal Court (ICC); Canada's Louise 
Arbour was the second chief prosecutor at the new International Criminal Court 
following the resignation of the first prosecutor, Justice Goldstone of South Africa. 
Canada has attempted, a modicum of vigorous investigation and prosecution of war 
32 See Resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on the question of Apartheid, 1962-
1988 (UN Centre Against Apartheid, New York, 1988). See numerous briefs in the Apartheid Litigation 
case and in following chapters. 
33 This was triggered by the Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals (Ottawa, 1986 (The Jules 
Deschenes Report). 
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criminals, particularly Nazi war criminals;34 Canada has a separate war crimes section 
within the Federal Department of Justice; Canada has included in its Immigration Act 
and Citizenship Act, the investigation and exclusion of war criminals from coming to 
Canada; the former Liberal Minister of Justice Irwin Cotler, had been one of the world's 
and Canada's most vociferous proponents of the prosecution of war criminals before and 
after he became Minister of Justice; Canada is known to have accepted a lot of 
immigrants from South Africa before and after the collapse of apartheid; after the 
Supreme Court of Canada threw out the first case on war criminals, 35 Canada tightened 
up its legislation to correct the Supreme Court's interpretation of international law and 
ensure the possibility of prosecution and conviction of war criminals;36 Canada's 
Supreme Court has ruled that a Rwandan immigrant was a deportable and should be 
removed back to Rwanda to face prosecution for the commission of war crimes;37 
Canada, using the new war crimes legislation, recently convicted a Rwandan war 
criminal of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, and rape;38 Canada has a 
very well known, deserved, and oft-copied reputation for justice of its judiciary among 
nations particularly in reference to its Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Canada and 
34 Chile Eboe-Osuji, "Crimes Against Humanity: From Finta to Mugesera" Canadian Council on 
International Law (website, November 2002). 
35 R. v Finta [1994] 1 SCR 701. 
36 Canada, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act (2000). 
37 Canada v Mugesera et. Al. 2005 SCC 40. 
38 R v Munyaneza, 2009 QCSC 2201. An appeal to the Quebec Court of Appeal was filed. Shortly after 
the sentencing of Munyaneza in October 2009, Canada arrested another Rwandan, Jacques Mungwarere 
and charged him with the same international crimes as had been visited on Munyaneza. Canada is also 
vigorously pursuing Rwandan criminals under the Immigration avenue of revocation of refugee status and 
deportation, see, Adrian Humphreys, "Man Linked to Family's Killing in Sixth Appeal", National Post 3 
February, 2010 at A7. Mugesera is the most famous Rwandan immigration case in Canada. 
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Australia were the leading major western countries to denounce apartheid and impose 
economic sanctions in the 1980s. 39 
Recently, in 2007, the former Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney released a 
book40 in which he articulated Canada's abhorrence of war criminals and criminals 
against humanity including apartheid criminals whom he likened to the Nazis. Linda 
Freeman in her book The Ambigous Champion: Canada and South Africa in the 
Trudeau and Mulroney Years41 states that Canada was the most vocal western country in 
terms of imposing economic sanctions against South Africa because of the criminality of 
apartheid. Canada has therefore been dealing with the issue of the criminality of 
apartheid for a very long time and would not need to be convinced late in the day that 
apartheid was a crime against humanity for purposes of prosecution. 
Canada has various constituencies advocating for the prosecution of war criminals. 
The most successful have been the Canadian Jewish Congress and Rwandan Canadians. 
Other communities fought and won apologies or compensations. These include 
Japanese Canadians, Chinese Canadians and Ukrainian Canadians. These are among 
other factors, compelling reasons for making Canada a good case study for the 
investigation and prosecution of apartheid criminals and the utilization of the concept of 
universal jurisdiction. 
The topic of prosecuting apartheid criminals abroad has been broached in relation to 
the statutory exercise of jurisdiction in civil matters against corporations that benefited 
39 Prime Minister Brian Mulroney likened apartheid to Nazism, see Memoirs: 1939-1993 (Toronto: MS, 
2007). 
40 Ibid. 
41 (Toronto. U. OfT. Press, 1997). 
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from apartheid.42 Using the Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA) (1789) of the United States, 
numerous corporations were sued for reparations in the United States by the victims of 
apartheid. 43 That litigation has spawned a flood of scholarly literature as will be seen.44 
There is no equivalent study on the possibilities or implications of criminal prosecutions 
of South African Apartheid criminals based on the concept of universal jurisdiction. 
There is no literature or study presumably because there have been no such prosecutions 
of Apartheid criminals using the concept of universal jurisdiction. Even the prosecution 
of Apartheid criminals for ordinary crimes related to apartheid within South Africa itself 
has spawned scant literature, disproportionate to the monstrosity of the crime of 
apartheid.45 The few full-scale studies include: Marlene Burger and Chandre Gould, 
Secrets and Lies: Wouter Basson and South Africa's Chemical and Biological Warfare 
Programme published in Cape Town by Zebra in 2002, and Ole Bubenzer, Post-TRC 
Prosecutions in South Africa.Accountability for Political Crimes after the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission's Amnesty Process published in Leiden by Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers in 2009. Why have apartheid criminals gotten away with impunity? 
In many cases, those who have written about it have been very lukewarm to the very 
idea of the exercise of universal jurisdiction with respect to apartheid criminals. For 
example, Geoffrey Robertson, a prominent British Barrister who also served as a judge 
42 Kristen Hutchens, .. International Law in the American Courts - Khulumani v Barclay National Bank 
Ltd.: The Decision Heard "Round the Corporate World" (2005) 9:5 German Law Journal 639. 
43 In re: South Africa Apartheid Litigation, MDL No. 14993 (Jes) (SDNY) (Nov. 2004). 
44 Hutchens Supra. 
45 Marlene Burger and Chandre Gould, Secrets and Lies: Wouter Basson and South Africa's Chemical and 
Biological Warfare Programme (Cape Town: Zebra, 2002); Ole Bubenzer, Post-TRC Prosecutions in 
South Africa.Accountability for Political Crimes after the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's 
Amnesty Process (Leiden et al: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009). 
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at the Special Tribunal for Sierra Leone stated in his book, Crimes Against Humanity-
The Struggle for Global Justice 3rd ed., published in London by Allen Lane in 2006, 
stated that the prosecution of apartheid criminals would be a non-starter. His argument 
was that no major western country signed the International Convention on the 
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, the treaty that criminalised 
apartheid.46 Lyal Sunga who worked for the United Nations Human Rights Commission 
came to the same conclusion. In his book Individual Responsibility In International Law 
For Serious Human Rights Violations, he argued that it was doubtful whether the 
conduct prohibited by the Apartheid convention would even be considered part of 
. . 1 1 47 mternattona customary aw. 
The study is based on the analysis of case law, scholarly studies and secondary 
literature as well as reports from various sources. Attempted interviews of government 
officials, ministers, judges and others was aborted when it became clear that either the 
subjects did not want to convey any meaningful information because of confidentiality. 
The dissertation offers instead a sustained review of the literature on the interplay 
between law and politics in the litigation and resolution of complex legal and political 
issues presented by the exercise of universal jurisdiction for the prosecution of the crime 
of apartheid and other international crimes in general. I will offer a synthesis of what I 
call models of legal and political litigation for the prosecution of war crimes and crimes 
46 Geoffrey Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity-The Struggle for Global Justice 3rd ed. (London: Allen 
Lane, 2006). 
47 Lyal Sunga, Individual Responsibility in International Law for Serious Human Rights Violations 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991) at 79. 
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against humanity, for the removal of impunity from the perpetrators of these crimes and 
for the benefit of the victims as well as the international community. 
1.2 The Crime of Apartheid 
After the demise of apartheid the Truth and Reconciliation Commission composed 
the most comprehensive evidence to date of gross and systematic violations of human 
rights in South Africa. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission set up by The 
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34 of 1995 of South Africa 
(the Act) accepted that apartheid was a crime against humanity and defined gross human 
rights violations as: 
The violation of human rights through (a) the killing, abduction, torture or 
severe ill-treatment of any person; or (b) any attempt, conspiracy, 
incitement, instigation, command or procurement to commit an act referred 
to in paragraph (a), which emanated from conflicts of the past and which 
was committed during the period of March 1960 to the cut-off date [of may 
1994] within or outside the Republic, and the commission of which was 
advised, planned, directed, commanded or ordered, by any person acting 
with a political motive.48 
It is not necessary to go far into the history of South Africa in order to demonstrate 
the criminality and violence of apartheid, suffice to review the immediate period of the 
1980s, with sporadic references to the period between 1948 and the 1980s. 
48 Section l(l)(ix). This statement is derived from many international human rights conventions. 
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Apartheid was not an arbitrary system of governance. It was based on laws 
governing all aspects of life. Of interest are the "security laws" that justified the arrest, 
detention, torture and sometimes killings of Africans. The most comprehensive law was 
the Internal Security Act of 198249. This Act was a consolidation of all previously 
existing security laws, most of which it also repealed. The earlier security laws 
included50 : 
(a) The Suppression of Communism Act No. 44 of (1950); 
(b) The Bantu Administration Act No. 38 of (1927); 
(c) The Public Safety Act No. 3 of (1953); 
( d) The Criminal Procedure Act No. 56 of (1955); 
(e) The Riotous Assembly Act No. 17 of (1956); 
(f) The Unlawful Organizations Act No. 34 of (1960); 
(g) The General Amendment Act No. 37 of (1963); 
(h) The Terrorism Act No. 83 of (1967); 
(i) The Affected Organizations Act No. 31 of (1974). 
49 For a good study of repression in South Africa using the Internal Security Act, 1982, see I. E. Sagay, 
State Terrorism in South Africa (New York: UN Centre Against Apartheid, 1984). See also Nicholas 
Haysom, "Human Rights Index" in (May 1985) I SAJHR 80. 
50 Sagay ibid at 3. 
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The publication of the International Defence and Aid Fund entitled Apartheid: The 
Facts51 had captured neatly the utilization and compass of these security laws at the 
hands of the South African police and army: 
The widest powers derive from the so-called 'security' laws. These are 
aimed at people or organizations whose activities and aims the regime 
describes as 'furthering the aims of communism', 'terrorism', 'endangering 
the security of the State or the maintenance of order', 'endangering the 
public peace' or 'threatening essential services'. The definition of these 
terms is so loose and the power conferred by the laws so wide, that the 
regime is able to use the law to act against any form of effective opposition 
to the apartheid system. The limits to its capacity to use these powers are 
not contained in the laws, but are set only by political and practical 
considerations. 
Under the 'security' laws, there are powers to detain people without 
trial; to ban people, organizations and meetings; to break up meetings: and 
to imprison people. By the restrictions they place on meetings, the laws 
licence attacks against protesters and demonstrators, which on many 
occasions have included the police killing people. The laws have also 
created conditions under which the torture of detainees has become routine. 
Section 28 of the Internal Security Act for example empowered the Minister of Law 
and Order to order the preventive detention of any person he considered engaged in or 
likely to be engaged in, "activities which endanger or are calculated to endanger the 
security of the State or the maintenance of law and order". Section 29 permitted police 
to hold detainees for interrogation indefinitely, in isolation and without access to 
relatives or lawyers. Section 30 empowered a State Attorney-General to issue an order 
denying the court its usual authority to release a charged person on bail if he "considers 
it necessary in the interests of the security of the state or the maintenance of law and 
51 In cooperation with the UN Centre Against Apartheid (New York and London, 1983). 
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order". Section 31 empowered a state Attorney-General to authorize incommunicado 
detention without charge of potential state witnesses until the end of the trial at which 
they are expected to testify. If they refuse to testify, they may be sentenced to up to five 
years' imprisonment for contempt of court. If they refute in court a statement made 
while in security police detention on the grounds that it was made under duress, they 
may be charged with perjury. 
In 1984 for example the above Internal Security Act sections were used to detain the 
following numbers of people:52 
Section 28 (Preventive Detention) - 28 
Section 29 (Detention for interrogation) - 280 
Section 31 (Detention of potential witnesses) - 18 
Section 50 (Short term preventive detention) - 72 
Section 50 of the Criminal Procedure Act, or no 
legislation at all, for period of less than 48 hours. - 152 
According to Amnesty International, many detainees had been tortured or severely 
ill-treated while detained incommunicado53 . Many studies have in fact also confirmed 
that opportunities for torture exist when detainees are held incommunicado anywhere in 
the world54• It is not surprising that torture and ill-treatment are now outlawed by treat 
law. 
52 SAJHR supra at 81. 
53 Amnesty International, South Africa: Briefing (London, 1986) at 17. 
54 See ANC Torture is Part of the System, infra 
28 
Not only did incommunicado detentions offer opportunities for torture in South 
Africa, they also led to extra judicial killings by security police of those tortured. At 
greater risk of torture and death in prison were political detainees, though even mere 
criminals had been known to die in prison. 
Indications of torture are not only revealed in numerous deaths in prison (to which I 
will return shortly) but also in numerous cases of detainees requiring hospitalization 
during or after detention due to injuries or serious mental disturbance. Dr. Wendy Orr, a 
district surgeon responsible for medically examining detainees and prisoners in the Port 
Elizabeth area, for example submitted evidence on 25th September, 1985 to the Supreme 
Court of widespread and regular torture and ill-treatment of detainees. Her evidence was 
supported by sworn statements from over 40 people, including detainees55 • The figure 
for the whole of South Africa would be staggering. Tortured detainees had no recourse 
to law as existing laws and regulations granted immunity in advance to all law 
enforcement officials for any actions committed "in good faith" in the exercise of their 
powers. 
The inquests that were conducted after the deaths in prison of Steve Biko, the leader 
of the Black Consciousness Movement, and Neil Aggett, a white trade unionist, revealed 
the extent of torture in South African prisons. 56 The gravity and widespread use of 
torture in South African prisons had also been revealed more clearly by a nation-wide 
empirical study conducted by three professors at the Institute of Criminology of the 
55 Reported in Amnesty International supra at 8. 
56 See Torture is Part of the System: State Violence in South Africa and Namibia (London: African 
National Congress, 1984) and Catholic Institute of International Relations (C.1.1.R.) et al, Torture in 
South Africa (London, 1982). 
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University of Cape Town.57 One hundred and forty-four former "security legislation" 
detainees were interviewed. The period covered was between 197 4 and 1983. Most of 
those detained were involved in all kinds of political work: student organizations, trade 
unions, community and political organizations. 
Using the operational definition of torture of the United Nations Declaration on 
Torture (to which I will return later), the results came as follows and I quote the whole 
tabulation: 
Only 17% of cases claimed no form of physical torture. The most frequent 
form of torture (7 5%) was beating, which included punching, hitting, 
kicking, slapping as well as beating and whipping with a variety of 
implements and other forms of assault. The next three most frequently 
reported forms of physical abuse were forced standing ( 50% ), maintaining 
abnormal body positions, which includes crouching, standing on toes with 
arms up stretched, holding chairs or other objects above the head, and 
holding a position as if sitting in an imaginary chair (34%) and forced 
gymnasium-type exercises (28%). In addition, 25% reported having been 
subjected to electric shock, 18% to strangulation either by hand or by 
means of a cloth or towel, and 14% to suspension in various forms. 
Other forms of physical torture were reported by 27% of cases. Hand analysis of these other 
descriptions revealed the following most frequent forms of abuse: 
Manacles, including handcuffs, legs constantly chained and chains placed 
around neck (15%); pulling out or burning hair or beard (5%); genital 
abuse (3%), and falanga, which involves beating the soles of the feet with 
some implement (3%). A further rage of abuses were reported by one or 
more cases and included: being wrapped in canvas, kept barefoot, burning 
57 D. H. Foster, D. Sandler and D. M. Davis, "Detention, Torture and the Criminal Justice Process in South 
Africa" in (May, 1987) Int'l J Soc L 105. See also their book, Detention and Torture in South Africa 
(London: James Currey, 1987). 
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matchsticks placed under nails, sand in shoes while doing exercises, being 
thrown into the air and allowed to fall, given salted water to drink, hands 
cut with knife, placed in boot of car, nose twisted, fingernails crushed by 
brick, petrol poured over body and set alight, breasts squeezed, held out of 
moving car, tied to a tree, and scrubbed on face and body with a hard 
brush. Even this substantial list does not entirely exhaust the range of 
abuses reported58 . 
In addition to physical torture, psychological torture was also part of the system. The 
findings on this aspect of torture are reported as follows: 
No cases reported an entire lack of psychological abuse. Over half of the 
cases reported having been subjected to the following forms: false 
accusations (83%); solitary confinement (79%); verbal abuse (71 %); 
threats of violence to self (64%); contradictory styles of interrogation 
(57%); and being given misleading information (51 %)59• 
These figures show that almost no one was safe from torture in South African 
prisons. Torture was so pervasive that the system itself could be called "torturous" i.e. it 
was based on torture. 
Gordon Winter, an ex-intelligence officer in South Africa also described from 
experience some of the horrible torture methods and causes of numerous deaths in South 
African prisons in his book, Inside BOSS, South Africa's Secret Police60• 
Torture resulted in many deaths in South African prisons. As of the period from 
1963 to 1984, for example, sixty individuals had been recorded as having died in prison. 
The majority of the deaths occurred in 1969 (6); 1976 (13), and 1977 (14). The official 
58 Ibid at 111-113. 
59 Ibid at 113. 
60 Gordon Winter, Inside Boss: South Africa's Secret Police (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1981 ). 
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South African explanation of the cause of the deaths are tabulated with names of the 
victims and dates of their deaths by the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights under Law 
in their publication, Death in Detention and South Africa's Security Laws61 as: 
OFFICIAL CAUSE OF DEATH 
Suicide by hanging 
Strangulation 
No further details 
Death by hanging 
Suicide: 
jumping from window or down stairs 
Natural causes: 
vanous 
slipped in shower or on soap 
fell down stairs 
hit head on desk after fainting 
Accidental: 
fell from tenth floor window 
hit back of head against wall 
injury to neck in fall on chair 
Shot while escaping 
Police assault 
Undisclosed 
TOTAL 
NUMBER OF 
DEATHS 
20 
1 
2 
1 
5 
14 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
6 
6 
60 
As can be seen from the table, the majority of the deaths were allegedly caused by 
suicide by hanging. But friends of the victims alleged that "suicide under torture is 
murder"62 thus imputing directly the deaths to official acts of murder. 
61 (Washington, D.C., 1983). By the end of 1987 about 20 extra deaths since 1984 had been reported to 
have occurred in prisons in South Africa. 
62 Poster reproduced in Torture is Part of the System supra at 13. 
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The torture and deaths of political prisoners in South Africa was only part of the 
story. There were many deaths caused directly by apartheid in South Africa. There was 
firstly official "judicial murders". Judicial murders occurred when political prisoners 
were forced to confess under torture to crimes they did not commit. These "confessions" 
were then used to convict the victims which convictions in tum attracted the death 
penalty. Secondly the nature of apartheid induced the subject population to commit all 
sorts of crimes which directly led to imprisonment63 . Some of these ended up dying 
mysteriously in prison. Thirdly, there were many arrests due to infractions of the pass 
laws. Pass laws were the cornerstone of apartheid. According to Amnesty 
Intemational's publication, South Africa: Imprisonment under the Pass Laws, 64 238,000 
Africans were arrested in 1984 alone for pass law and other infractions. A sizeable 
percentage of those arrested either for committing certain crimes or for pass law 
infractions never saw the light of the day again65 . According to the report, Torture is 
Part of the System there were on average two hundred (200) deaths in South African 
prisons every year. 
South Africa had one of the highest execution rates under the death penalty in the 
world. For example there were 130 people hanged in South Africa in 1980; 96 in 1981; 
100 in 1982; 90 in 1983; and 115 in 198466. In addition there were over 200 people who 
died mysteriously in South African prisons per year, in addition to the political detainees 
who died as a result of torture. 
63 This should be a subject for another study. 
64 (London 1986). 
65 Winter, supra. 
66 Amnesty International South Africa: Imprisonment Under Pass Laws, supra at 16. 
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Compared to Nazi Germany or what happened in Rwanda in 1994, the apartheid 
system never reached the genocidal threshold. As Leo Kuper says in his book 
Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century67 , genocide covers a wide range of 
forms: religious, racial, ethnic etc. and can also encompass varied conditions of 
colonization and decolonization etc. In South Africa it never reached the level of "racial 
genocide". Though the definition of genocide in line with the Genocide Convention is 
restricted to "intentional acts", in South Africa there was no intention to kill en mass 
despite the fact that massive deaths occurred directly as a result of the apartheid system. 
Kuper, in his book, discusses South Africa in a chapter entitled, "The non-genocidal 
society" and alludes to the "strong genocidal potential" of apartheid in relation to 
Africans, in these terms: 
The government segregates, and socially isolates, Africans, denying them 
membership in the wider community, and withholding the protection of a 
common humanity; it systematically deprives Africans of a wide range of 
basic human rights; it uproots vast numbers living in settled communities, 
so as to eliminate 'black spots', and it resettles them, in many cases with 
little or no regard for their survival; it tolerates health conditions which 
take a heavy toll of infant mortality, and generally of preventable deaths; it 
permits a wage structure which, apart from the extreme discrimination 
against Africans, denies hundreds of thousands an adequate level for 
sustenance; it canalizes African labour in a dehumanization to the level of 
a commodity; it condones, perhaps even authorizes, the torturing to death 
of political prisoners; and it subjects Africans to a daily routine of 
humiliation and deprivation. Yet the genocidal massacre of whole 
sections, including men, women and children, is not part of government 
practice, and the murders are on a smaller scale than one would expect 
from so tyrannical and brutal a regime. Here, too, there must be powerful 
restraints against genocide68 . 
67 (London: Hammondswork, 1978). 
68 Ibid at 203. 
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Kuper continues further: 
Many people already equate apartheid with genocide. I have taken a 
different view - that the policies and practices of apartheid have 
considerable genocidal potential, but that the level of violence and murder 
by the South African government and its agents, high as it is, falls below 
what one would predict, and that this suggests the pressure of powerful 
restraints on the govemment69. 
The supposed restraints on the government according to Kuper included regime need for 
African labour, demographic superiority of Africans, availability of other options e.g. 
forced removals and Bantustans, and external pressure. 
1.3 Forced Mass Removals and the Bantustans 
Apartheid was premised on exclusive white economic and political control of South 
Africa. Mass removals were necessary to retain white exclusivism. The pass laws were 
invented to maintain that system. 
The major law that became the purveyor to mass removals and eventually to the 
Bantustans was passed in 1913 as the Land Act. It stipulated in the main that 87% of the 
land in South Africa was to be reserved for white occupation 13% was reserved for 
Africans. The Land Act of 1913 was resuscitated into vigorous existence by the Group 
Areas Acts of 1950 and 1966. 
Since 1960, according to the South African Council of Churches writing in 1984, 
3,372,900 people had been forced to move and a further 1,740,500 were threatened70• 
69 Ibid at 206. 
70 Relocations: The Churches Report on Forced Removals (Nottingham: Russell Press Ltd., 1984) at 14. 
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Eight Million Africans had been deprived of their South African citizenship which in 
itself was a violation of international law. These eight million people were regarded as 
citizens of the Bantustans 71 • There were ten of these areas: Ciskei, Transkei, K wazulu, 
Kangwane, Qwa-Qwa, Bophuthatswana, K wandebele, Lebow a, Gazankulu and Venda. 
No country in the world except South Africa recognized these areas as independent. 
pespite numerous U .N. protests about these illegal removals to these areas, South 
Africa continued to remove and deport Africans to these areas until the end of apartheid. 
Their homes were tom down by government bulldozers or burned while property was 
still inside. Residents were rounded up and hauled onto trucks which dumped them in 
uninhabited and sometimes inhabitable lands. Some of those who protested at the 
removals were arrested and detained. Some were simply shot on sight by the police72 . 
A reviewer of a well-documented book on these removals entitled The Surplus 
People: Forced Removals in South Africa 73 had commented: 
The lesson of Nuremberg is that the iniquity in our midst is the 
responsibility of us all. When evidence is called on apartheid, perhaps the 
most compelling testimony will be given by those among the three million 
victims of forced removals in South Africa. A vast human tragedy has 
been documented here .... With material like this available the common 
citizen could never plead with conviction 'I did not know'74. 
1.4 Repression in the Bantustans 
71 For a general report on the Bantustans See Barbara Rogers, Divide and Rule: South Africa's Bantustans 
(London: I.D.A.F., 1976). 
72 Laurine Platzky and Cherryl Walker, The Surplus People: Forced Removals in South Africa 
(Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1985). 
73 Supra. 
74 Charles Nupen in (July 1986) 2 SAJHR at 250-1. 
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The Bantustans were located on economically barren lands. The lands were unable to 
support the existing population levels. All of the Bantustans without exception had 
internal security acts modelled on the repressive South African Internal Security Act. In 
1981 for example, when Ciskei obtained its "independence", 320 trade unionists were 
detained during the first week under the new security law 75 • Further in 1984 for 
example, a total of 532 people were detained under the security legislations of the 
Transkei, Ciskei, Venda and Bophuthatswana76• Like in South Africa, many of those 
arrested and held incommunicado were tortured and quite a number of deaths in prison 
occurred. 
The Bantustans served the South African regime very well. Stated the African 
National Congress: 
The degree of repression in the Bantustans is increasing. Previously, these 
areas were seen primarily as reservoirs of labour for the country's mines, 
farms and factories. Now they combine that function with repression of 
activists in the war against apartheid 77 • 
To cement the connection between apartheid South Africa and the Bantustans, the 
police forces and armies of the latter were trained by their counterparts in the South 
African police and the South African Defence Force. 78 
The international community regarded the Bantustans as part of South Africa. The 
creation of Bantustans violated two principal norms of contemporary international law: 
75 The Surplus People, Supra at 37. 
76 Supra at 81. 
77 Quoted in The Surplus People, Supra at 35-6. 
78 Supra at 4. 
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the right of a people to self-determination and the prohibition on race discrimination 79. 
The Bantustans were not viable territorial units apart from violating the territorial 
integrity of South Africa itself. The denial of citizenship as a result of the Bantustans 
was also a violation of international law. 
1.5 Crime of Apartheid in Namibia 
Namibia, a former Germany colony, was occupied by South Africa during the course 
of the First World War. In 1920 the League of Nations mandated South Africa to 
govern the territory on its behalf. This mandate continued after 1945 under the United 
Nations. However, in 1966, the United Nations terminated South Africa's mandate to 
rule over Namibia by resolution 214580• In 1971 the International court of Justice (ICJ) 
declared South Africa's continued occupation of Namibia illegal and a crime against 
h . 81 umamty . 
The crimes for which apartheid in South Africa was condemned and which had led 
the international community to regard as crimes against humanity as stipulated in 
ICSPCA (Apartheid Convention) were also committed in Namibia on a similarly 
pervasive scale. These crimes like in South Africa were committed in the process of 
implementing security legislations in the maintenance of apartheid. 
79 Ibid at 50. 
8
° For a review of the Namibian debate, see Gay T. McDougall, "International Law, Human Rights and 
Namibian Independence" (August 1986) 8 HRQ 443 and Geisa Maria Rocha, Jn Search of Namibian 
Independence: The Limitations of the United Nations (Boulder: Westview, 1984). 
81 Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971 (ICJ) Paragraphs 117 to 127. See Rocha ibid. 
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The most pernicious of the security legislation in Namibia was perhaps the Terrorism 
Act (No. 83) of 1967. This legislation authorized the death penalty for what were called 
"terrorist activities". These were defined as any behaviour with "intent to endanger the 
maintenance of law and order". The police and army would use the Terrorism Act to 
arrest, detain and imprison people for practically any reason and for any length of time. 
In Namibia in 1977, the South African government began to enact legislative acts by 
simply assigned letters with a number. The government began with the proclamation 
AG982. This Act authorized indefinite incommunicado detention. In addition there 
existed proclamation AG2683 which authorized the cabinet unequalled powers to detain, 
indefinitely and without charge, any person who was believed to be a threat to law and 
order in Namibia. Like in South Africa, torture in Namibian prisons was very well 
documented84 . For example, a Father Heinz Hunke in his publication entitled, Torture -
A Cancer in our Society (1978) documents the pervasiveness of torture in Namibia. 
Detainees were subjected to electric shock torture; beatings with fists and rifle butts; 
burning with cigarettes; hanging by the arms, sometimes with a weight added; sleep 
deprivation; and solitary confinement. As in South Africa, a good number of detainees 
died in prison under unexplained circumstances. 
1.6 Repression and Liberation Movements in Southern Africa 
82 See McDougall supra for a discussion of security legislation in Namibia. 
83 Ibid. 
84 See Amnesty International, Human Rights Violations in Namibia (London 1982). 
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The crimes committed by apartheid South Africa against Black citizens in South 
Africa and Namibia, forced the victims of repression to flee as refugees and to form 
liberation movements in neighbouring countries and elsewhere. These liberation 
movements began to make incursions into South Africa. South Africa, in defence of 
apartheid, proceeded to pursue the liberation movements' freedom fighters in the 
neighbouring states and elsewhere. Had South Africa not been committing criminal acts 
against the Black population in South Africa and Namibia, there would have been no 
need for the struggle for liberation and freedom in these countries. There would have 
been no refugees and no struggle for self-determination. South Africa was therefore the 
aggressor and in its aggression against the freedom fighters and neighbouring countries, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed. This state of affairs stemmed 
from the policy of apartheid. 
Apartheid South Africa had repeatedly committed aggression against neighbouring 
countries in Southern Africa. Aggression is a crime against international peace i.e. it is 
an international crime which gives rise to international responsibility85. According to 
the United Nation's definition of aggression86 : 
Art. 1. Aggression is the use of armed force by a state against the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another state, 
or m any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United 
Nations .... 
Art. 3. Any of the following acts [without being exhaustive] ... is act[s] of 
aggression ... 
85 Article 5 of the United Nations Definition of Aggression. 
86 U.N. G.A. Res. 3314(XXIX) 14 December 1974, reprinted in (1974) 13 ILM 710. 
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(g) The sending by or on behalf of a state of armed bands, groups, 
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against 
another state of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above ... or its 
substantial involvement therein. 
Angola87 and Mozambique88 received the brunt of South African aggression than the 
other Southern African countries. Southern Angola was more or less permanently 
occupied by South African troops since the late l 970's. Over 700,000 people had been 
killed as a result of South African aggression in neighbouring countries and about 8 
million people had been displaced from their homes89. Among the numerous sources of 
information on South African aggression in Southern Africa, perhaps Joseph Hanlon's 
Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa90 and Richard Leonard, 
South Africa at War: White Power_and the Crisis in Southern Africa91 maybe the most 
well documented. They describe the depth and destructiveness of South African war of 
aggression and destabilization against its neighbours. A picture that comes out is a 
picture of South African commission of crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity in these countries, as defined by the Nuremberg Principles as will be 
discussed later. In May, 1978 to just give an example of the criminality of apartheid in 
Southern Africa, South Africa attacked Southern Angola, ostensibly to strike against 
South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) guerrillas, and killed 612 people 
87 Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerd, Angola in the Front Line (London: Zed Books, 1983). 
88 Robert Davies, South African Strategy Towards Mozambique in the Post-Nkomati Period: A Critical 
Analysis of_Effects and Implications (Uppsala: S.l.A.S., Research Report, no. 73, 1985). 
89 Hanlon infra . 
90 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986). 
91 (Wesport: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1983). 
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and wounded 689 people92 . One Trevor Edwards, a British mercenary in South Africa 
described the torture and murders committed by the South African army during its 
military operations against neighbouring countries: "Our main job is to take an area and 
clear it. We sweep through it and we kill everything in front of us, cattle, goats, people, 
everything. We are out to stop SWAPO and we stop them getting into villages for food 
and water .. . . Sometimes we take the locals for questioning. It's rough. We just beat 
them, cut them, bum them. As soon as we're finished with them, we kill them." These 
are war crimes and crimes against humanity par excellence. In one such operation, a 
twelve year old boy in Southern Angola was tortured in order to make his mother talk: 
" ... we played water polo with him, put him in this kind of dam and pushed him about, 
let him sink. Every so often we took him out. He wouldn't cry. He just wet himself. 
The mother didn't say anything. In the end we just left him in the water and he 
drowned"93 • Such incidents occurred over and over and in multiplied numbers every day 
in Southern Africa. This resembled perfectly Nazi war crimes in occupied territories 
during Second World War. 
South African aggression was not limited to human targets in terms of torture and 
war related deaths, it also affected the political and economic infrastructures of the target 
countries. In July, 1986, for example, the Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference (SADCC) presented a memorandum to the summit meeting of the heads of 
state of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa which detailed the 
92 Cited in ibid at 80. 
93 Quoted in ibid. 
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cost of South African aggression since 198094 • It had cost over $20 billion involving: 
direct war damage; refugees; transport and energy costs. These costs translated 
themselves into immediate human tragedies e.g. famine, deprivation of shelter, fear and 
other atrocities. 
1.7 The Application of Law of Prosecutions 
What has been discussed above constituted the crime of apartheid for which the 
perpetrators could be prosecuted. It is necessary, therefore, before talking about the 
application of law to possible prosecutions of the crime of apartheid to indicate those 
who must bear criminal responsibility for the crime of apartheid. 
1.7.1 Penal Responsibility for the Crime of Apartheid 
Modem international law now recognizes and pins criminal responsibility for 
committing international crimes on individuals as well as institutions and organizations. 
In the case of the crime of apartheid, it is necessary to pinpoint exactly which 
individuals and institutions ran the state that was responsible for those acts that have 
been labelled international crimes. 
According to Joseph Hanlon95 , the nerve centre of the apartheid state and by 
extension the crime of apartheid, was the State Security Council which had obviously 
evolved with different characteristics and configurations over the years. The State 
94 
."The Cost of South African Aggression" Addis Ababa, July 1986, Memorandum by S.A.D.C.C. to the 
O.A.U. 
95 Supra 
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Security Council made the key decisions in South Africa and thus had held the real 
power, according to Hanlon. Hanlon argued that the South African Cabinet and 
Parliament only rubber stamped what had already been decided by the State Security 
Council96• The State Security Council included: The Prime Minister (who was 
Chairman); Minister of Defence; Foreign Affairs; Justice; Law and Order; Finance; and 
Manpower. It also included bureaucrats such as: Head of National Intelligence Service 
(NIS formerly Bureau of State Security - BOSS); Military Intelligence; the Police; and 
Defence Force and the Directors - General of Foreign Affairs and Justice. 
Among others who also bore responsibility are the Head of the prison department, 
local directors of all prisons; the military commanders whose units had been responsible 
for murder and torture in the townships and in foreign countries i.e. Namibia and other 
Southern African countries. None of the personnel of apartheid listed above, has been 
prosecuted for the crime of apartheid as defined by ICSPCA. 
1.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the gross and systematic human rights violations committed 
by the apartheid regime in South Africa for which accountability was mandated. The 
next chapter discusses the responses of the United Nations to the gross human rights 
violations that were being committed under apartheid in particular, and the framework 
the United Nations has set in dealing with impunity and accountability for gross human 
rights violations in general. 
96 See John Dugard, "Collective Cabinet Responsibility and Human Rights" in (May 1985) I SAJHR 52. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE CRIMINALISATION OF APARTHEID IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the evolution of the treatment of apartheid as practised in 
South Africa between 1948 and 1994 in international criminal law. It will be shown that 
apartheid criminals were slated for prosecution during and after the apartheid era. The 
discussion in this chapter will lay the foundation for arguing in later chapters why 
apartheid criminals should not get away with impunity. It also lays the foundation for 
the assessment of how apartheid criminals got away with impunity. 
2.2 Apartheid in South Africa: The United Nations Involvement 
This section deals with United Nations involvement with the issue of apartheid. The 
United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council perhaps issued more 
resolutions and declarations against the apartheid regime and how it was a threat to the 
peace and security in the world than on any other topic in the post-war world between 
1948 and 1994.97 Although United Nations General Assembly Resolutions and 
Declarations are not of binding international law import, they are regarded as evidence 
of evolving international thoughts and practices and may develop from "soft" to "hard" 
law of treaties or conventions. Quite a number of important international conventions 
97 John Dugard, "Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid" United 
Nations (2008) www.un.org/law/arl at 1. 
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began as mere Declarations. The Apartheid and Torture Conventions are just two of the 
examples of such evolution from soft to hard law.98 United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions are binding international law. 
As John Dugard has stated, apartheid was annually condemned by the General 
Assembly as contrary to Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter of the UN from 1952 to 1990 
and was regularly condemned by the Security Council after 1960.99 The triggering event 
for the Security Council condemnation was the Sharpeville massacre of March 21 5\ 
1960 when the South African police killed 69 Africans who were involved in a peaceful 
demonstration. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa that was 
convoked in 1995 to exorcise the past and compile a "truthful" record of the crimes 
committed under and during apartheid, with a view to reconciling the various racial and 
political communities who were in mortal combat, dated the criminality of apartheid as a 
crime against humanity as of March 1960. Sharpeville was a watershed in South 
African history. Sharpeville became the "moral panic" of South African condemnation 
by the international community100• The concept of moral panic will be discussed later. 
The first mention by the UN of apartheid as a "Crime Against Humanity" came in the 
1965 UN resolution entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial Countries and People" in which it proclaimed that "the 
practise of apartheid as well as all forms of racial discrimination threatens international 
98 For a discussion of soft law and hard law, see Andrew T. Guzman and Timothy L. Meyer, "International 
Common Law: The Soft Law of International Tribunals," Internet accessed, march 151 , 2012 
99 Dugard, supra, see Apartheid Convention supra. 
10° For the "Moral Panic" triggered by Sharpeville see Tom Lodge, Sharpeville; An Apartheid Massacre 
and its Consequences (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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peace and security and constitute a cnme against humanity" 101 • In 1966, the UN 
General Assembly in Resolution 2202 again labelled apartheid as a crime against 
humanity102• It took the Security Council 20 years to endorse the label of apartheid as a 
crime against humanity in resolution 556 of 1984. 103 Between 1965 and 1984 two 
conventions and a protocol to a convention had condemned apartheid as a crime against 
humanity; in 1971 the International Court of Justice had called the occupation of 
Namibia illegal and a crime against humanity; the Soweto massacres of 1976 and the 
murder of Steve Biko in 1977 had taken place. 
The two conventions before the collapse of apartheid in 1994 that declared apartheid 
as a crime against humanity were, firstly, the 1968 UN Convention on the Non-
applicability of Statutory Limitations to War crimes and Crimes against Humanity and 
secondly the 1973 UN International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of 
the Crime of Apartheid. Protocol I ( 1977) of the Geneva Convetions of 1949 included 
apartheid as a crime against humanity. 
What are the attributes of an international crime to which apartheid fit? International 
crimes include war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, torture, piracy, slavery, 
aggression, forced disappearances, hijacking of aircrafts, extra-judicial executions, 
forced removals, arbitrary detentions and related offences 104• 
101 Dugard, supra. 
102 Dugard, supra. 
103 Dugard, supra. 
104 A good compilation is that of Cherif M. Bassiouni ( ed) International Criminal Law 3"d ed. 3 Volumes 
(New York: Transnational Publishers, 2008). 
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International crimes were perhaps defined and delineated for the first time in the 
Nuremberg Principles. A crime is called an international crime for the following 
reasons 
105
: 
(a) It is a wrongful act infringing international obligations that are essential for the 
protection of fundamental interests of the international community as a whole and which 
therefore concern the international community as a whole; (b) It is an especially heavy 
violation of international law; (c) It is, for these very reasons, recognized by the 
international community as being an international crime. The United Nations General 
Assembly embodies the international community and generally expresses the will of 
most humanity. This is the case even when there is no unanimity. 
The Nuremberg Principles were recognized on December 11, 1946 by the United 
Nations General Assembly as norms of international law. 
2.3 Apartheid as a Crime in Conventional International Law 
Article 1 of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid106 which entered into force on July 18, 1976 stipulates that: 
(1) The States Parties to the present Convention declare that apartheid is a 
crime against humanity and that inhuman acts resulting from the policies 
of apartheid and similar policies and practices of racial segregation and 
discrimination, as defined in article II of the Convention, are crimes 
violating the principles of international law, in particular the purposes and 
105 G. Brahme, "Some Remarks on Responsibility for the Crime of apartheid under International Law" in 
Apartheid, South Africa and International Law (New York: UN Centre Against Apartheid, 1985) at 198. 
106 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (United 
Nations, Treaty Series vol. 660, at 195). 
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principles of the Charter of United Nations, and constituting a serious 
threat to international peace and security. 
(2) The States Parties to the present Convention declare criminal those 
organizations, institutions and individuals committing the crime of 
apartheid. 
Thus apartheid was recognized as a crime against humanity by treaty law. As is 
common knowledge, treaties are one of the most important binding sources of 
international law, commanding adherence not only by states parties to a particular treaty, 
but by the international community generally. Apartheid was a crime violating not only 
international law but was also a serious threat to international peace and security. The 
crime of apartheid as a crime against humanity was not limited to its practices in South 
Africa and Namibia, it extended to similar practices elsewhere as article 11 of the 
Apartheid Convention makes clear: 
For the purpose of the present Convention, the term "the crime of 
apartheid", which shall include similar policies and practices of racial 
segregation and discrimination as practiced in Southern Africa, shall apply 
to the following inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing 
and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other 
racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them: (a) Denial 
to a member or members of a racial group or groups of the right to life and 
liberty of person: (i) By murder of members of a racial group or 
groups; (ii) By the infliction upon the members of a racial group or 
groups of serious bodily or mental harm by the infringement of their 
freedom or dignity, or by subjecting them to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment; (iii) By arbitrary arrest and illegal 
imprisonment of the members of a racial group or groups; (b) Deliberate 
imposition on a racial group or groups of living conditions calculated to 
cause its or their physical destruction in whole or in part; 
( c) Any legislative measures and other measures calculated to prevent a 
racial group or groups from participation in the political, social, economic 
and cultural life of the country and the deliberate creation of conditions 
preventing the full development of such a group or groups, in particular by 
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denying to members of a racial group or groups basic human rights and 
freedoms, including the right to work, the right to form organized trade 
unions, the right to education, the right to leave and to return to their 
country, the right to a nationality, the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression, and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association, 
( d) Any measures, including legislative measures designed to divide the 
population along racial lines by the creation of separate reserves and 
ghettos for the members of a racial group or groups, the prohibition of 
mixed marriages among members of various racial groups, the 
expropriation of landed property belonging to a racial group or groups or to 
members thereof; 
( e) Exploitation of the labour of the members of a racial group or groups, 
in particular by submitting them to forced labour; 
(f) Persecution of organizations and persons, by depriving them of 
fundamental rights and freedoms, because they oppose apartheid. 
The Apartheid Convention is broader in compass than the Nuremberg Principles. 
The principle of the illegality of racial discrimination, like that practiced in South Africa 
had increasingly been elevated in international law if not already recognised as part of 
jus cogens - a peremptory norm of international law which cannot be derogated from or 
set aside by treaty or acquiescence. Non-discrimination as a case of jus cogens, 
apartheid as practiced in South Africa constituted a specific and particular case of 
violation of just cogens107 • Racial Discrimination is also outlawed by treat law, as 
recognised in the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination that came into force in 1966. Racial discrimination is thus a violation of 
international law. Considering the numerous U.N. Resolutions and Declarations against 
apartheid practices in South Africa; numerous treaties similar to Apartheid Convention.; 
various national legislations; various pronouncements in international circles; press 
releases, policy statements etc., apartheid had already become a violation of customary 
107 See Bassiouni 
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international law, conventional international law as well as general principles of law 
recognized by the community of nations. 
Apart from being an international crime on the basis of being a cnme against 
humanity in regards to its treatment of the majority population in South Africa as 
defined above, apartheid according to Brahmeios was also a crime against peace. This is 
because of: (a) its continued colonial and illegal occupation of Namibia, which in itself 
was also a violation of the principle of the right to self-determination of peoples I09 and, 
(b) its aggression and destabilization of neighbouring states. It was inevitable that in the 
course of its occupation of Namibia and its aggression against neighbouring states, 
apartheid also committed war crimes and crimes against humanity in those other 
countries as defined in the Nuremberg Principles. If this is the case, then apartheid 
committed and it continued to commit all the major international crimes, namely, crimes 
against peace; war crimes and crimes against humanity for which the international 
community has universal jurisdiction to prosecute the perpetrators of those crimes. 
The Apartheid Convention is regarded as the first convention to explicitly provide for 
universal jurisdiction for the prosecution of the perpetrator of the crime of apartheid I I 0• 
Article V goes further to stipulate more concretely universal jurisdiction by virtue of 
the acquisition of jurisdiction over the alleged criminal: 
108 Brahme, supra and see also Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries 
(United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514(XV) of 14 December 1960). 
109 Ibid. 
110 See Lyal Sunga, Individual Responsibility in International Law for Serious Human Rights Violations 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991 ). 
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Persons charged with the acts enumerated in articlel 1 of the present 
Convention may be tried by a competent tribunal of any State Party to the 
Convention which may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused 
or by an international penal tribunal having jurisdiction with respect to 
those States Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction. 
The concept of universal jurisdiction will be discussed later. This Convention is 
stronger as well, than the Genocide Convention as it provides for universal jurisdiction. 
The Genocide Convention provided for prosecution only by the states in which genocide 
took place. For the Apartheid Convention there would be no need for extradition unless 
the state has not yet accepted jurisdiction and there would also be no need for waiting 
for the constitution of an international tribunal, as required by the Genocide Convention. 
The coming into force of the Apartheid Convention in 1976 was followed by 
attempts by the United Nations to give stronger teeth to the convention and the exercise 
of universal jurisdiction against apartheid criminals. In 1980, consideration was given by 
the UN to the establishment of a special international court to try persons for the crime 
of apartheid 111 • No international tribunal was ever created for the prosecution of 
apartheid criminals. But the crime of apartheid continued to be denounced m 
international criminal law. John Dugard reports that, 
In 1977, Additional Protocol 1 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
recognized apartheid as a "grave breach" of the Protocol (art.85, paragraph 
4( c) without any geographical limitation. Apartheid features as a crime in 
the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind 
adopted by the International Law Commission on first reading in 1991 
without any reference to South Africa and in 1996 the Draft Code adopted 
on second reading recognized institutionalized racial discrimination as 
111 E/CN.4/1426(1981) quoted in John Dugard, "Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid" United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law (United Nations, 2008) at 
2, www.un.org/law/aw/) (accessed Sept. 21 5\ 2009). 
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species of crime against humanity in article 18 (f) and explained in its 
commentary that this "is in fact the crime of apartheid under a more 
general denomination" (Report of the International Law Commission on 
the work of its forty-eighth session (A/51110), p.49). In 1998, the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court included the "crime of apartheid 
as a form of crime against humanity" (art.7)112. 
The crime of apartheid was not a new phenomenon in international criminal law. The 
world had already seen the worst forms of this crime in the form of the holocaust, 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against peace and crimes against humanity committed by 
Nazi Germany. The next section deals with Nazi war crimes that preceded the crime of 
apartheid. The world was thus alive and alert to the possibilities that what was 
happening in South Africa could be a repeat of what happened in Nazi Germany. 
2.4 Nazi War Crimes 
It is thus necessary to dwell at some length on how Nazi War Crimes were dealt with 
in order to draw a few lessons regarding how apartheid criminals might be dealt with or 
might have been dealt with from 1948 up to the present.. Before the end of the Second 
World War, major powers were already meeting to formulate ideas about prosecuting 
individuals responsible for committing war crimes. Four major powers (the U.S.A., 
Britain, U.S.S.R. and France) met on August 8, 1945 at London and reached what 
become known as the London Agreement. This Agreement was the blue print for the 
prosecution of war criminals and criminals against humanity. These delegates drew up a 
Charter for an International Military Tribunal (IMT). The tribunal tried the Nazi War 
112 John Dugard Ibid at 2. 
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Criminals at Nuremberg beginning on November 20, 1945. The International Military 
Tribunal evolved a set of principles that became known as the Nuremberg Principles. 
Principles VI and VII of the Nuremberg Principles state: 
Principle VI: The crimes hereinafter set out are punishable as crimes 
under international law: 
(a) Crimes against peace: (i) Planning, preparation, initiation or waging of 
a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties, 
agreements or assurances; (ii) Participation in a common plan or 
conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the acts mentioned under (i). 
(b) War crimes: Violations of the law or customs, of war which include, 
but are not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave-labour 
or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, 
murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of 
hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of 
cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity. 
( c) Crimes against humanity: Murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation and other inhuman acts done against any civilian population, or 
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds, when such acts are 
done or such persecutions are carried on in execution of or in connection 
with any crime against peace or any war crime. 
Principle VII: Complicity in the commission of a crime against peace, a 
war crime or a crime against humanity as set forth in Principle VI is a 
crime under international law. 
The International Military Tribunal named 24 individuals as defendants to the 
charges defined in Principle VI of the Nuremberg Principles. All the individuals named 
had occupied high ranking positions in the Nazi party, military, police and security 
apparatuses. In addition, the following were named as groups or organizations which 
should be declared criminal: the Reich cabinet; the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party; 
the Schutzstaffeln, known as the SS; the Sicherheitsdienst, known as the SD; the 
Geheime Staatspolizei, known as the Gestapo; the Sturmabteilungen, known as the SA; 
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the General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces 113 • The South 
African State Security Council resembled the individuals, groups and institutions that 
were prosecuted in Germany by the l.M.T. 
The Nuremberg Principles established the principle of individual, group and 
institutional penal responsibility for committing an international crime. The named 
individuals and organizations were indicted for committing international crimes already 
referred to. 
The indictment consisted of the following four parts: Count One: The common plan 
or conspiracy against peace - the planning, preparation, initiation and waging of a war of 
aggression; Count two: Crimes against peace - the seizure of Austria and 
Czechoslovakia, aggression against Poland, France, Great Britain, Luxembourg, 
Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Netherlands, Yugoslavia, Greece, U.S.S.R. and U.S.A.; the 
occupation of Poland, France, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg, Yugoslavia, Greece and 
part of U.S.S.R.; the violation in 64 cases of a total of 36 international treaties and 
conventions; Count three: War crimes, genocide and the barbarous treatment of civilian 
population in the occupied territories and of the prisoners of war; Count four: Crimes 
against humanity perpetrated in the German occupied territories from Sept. 1, 1939 until 
May 8, 1945: persecution for political, racial or religious reasons in the form of killing, 
1 . d . 114 ens avmg, eportahon, etc. 
113 Edmund Jan Osmanczyk "Nuremberg War Criminals Trial, 1945-1946" in his Encyclopedia of the 
United Nations and International Agreements (London and Philadelphia: Taylor and Francis, 1985) at 
575-6. 
114 Ibid. See also Telford Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials, A Personal Memoir (New York; 
Knopf 1992). 
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The tribunal handed down the following sentences on October 1, 1946: three 
individuals were acquitted, three organizations were found to be criminal, seven 
individuals were found guilty and were sentenced to prison terms ranging from ten years 
to life imprisonment, and twelve individuals were sentenced to death by hanging. 
The Nuremberg Principles also established universal jurisdiction under international 
law for trying those accused of committing international crimes. This is not explicitly 
stated but is implicit judged by the invocation of "responsibility under international law" 
in several of the principles. This will be discussed in the chapter on Universal 
Jurisdiction. The other innovation of Nuremberg is the fact that if internal law does not 
impose a penalty for an act which constituted a crime under international law, this did 
not relieve the person committing the act of responsibility under international law 
(Principles I and II). Further, that somebody had acted as head of government or acted 
pursuant to the order of his government or a superior were no excuses under 
international law. 
I have discussed at length the question of the Nuremberg Principles in order to 
suggest that crimes of apartheid should meet the same judgement this time under the 
internal laws of South Africa, laws in and of Canada or any other country. 
2.5 The Recharged International Criminal Law 
Contrary to the claims that the Apartheid Convention is in disuse, one finds that it has 
assumed new life in the ICC statute and domestic legislation of states parties to the 
statute of the ICC. 
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The last two decades have witnessed an unprecedented energizing of international 
criminal law. 115 These developments raise the possibility that the Apartheid Convention 
could also be implemented even now by the setting of an international tribunal a topic to 
be discussed later. The most important new or latest development in international 
criminal law was the creation of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 116 
in 1998 whose statute lists "apartheid" as one of the international crimes amenable for 
prosecution under the statute. The incorporation of apartheid as a crime against 
humanity in the Rome Statute that created the International Criminal Court (ICC) 117 in 
2002 is quite significant in the development of international criminal law and the 
application of universal jurisdiction. Firstly, it is significant because apartheid had 
already been demobilized but it signalled that the prosecutions against those exhibiting 
old or new forms of apartheid could continue as a result of the Rome Statute in the 
countries that had incorporated the Rome Statute into domestic law. Secondly, it is 
significant that the majority of nations have ratified the Rome Statute incorporating the 
principles of universal jurisdiction in the prosecution of war criminals including the 
crime of apartheid. 
115 Bassiouni, "Introduction," in International Criminal Law, supra at xiii; Paust, J. Jordan; Bassiouni, M. 
Cherif; Scarf, Michael; Gurule, Jimmy; Sadat, Leila; & Zagaris, Bruce, International Criminal Law: 
Cases and Materials 3rd (ed.) (Durham: Carolina Academic Press, 2007) 
116 See The International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice 
Policy, International Criminal Court: Manual for Ratification and Implementation of the Rome Statute, 
3rd. (ed.) (Vancouver: UBC, 2008) www.iccir.law.UBC.ca; Schabas, William, (ed.) Essays on the Rome 
Statute of an International Court (IL Sirente, 1999). 
117 UN Treaty Series vol.2187 at 3. 
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The last two decades have also seen the creation of adhoc and specialized tribunals 
like those examining former Yugoslavia, 118 Rwanda, 119 Sierra Leone, 120 East Timor, 121 
and Cambodia. 122 These specific tribunals have generated impressive jurisprudence. 123 
This dissertation discusses whether the gap existing with respect to the prosecution of 
apartheid criminals could be closed by the creation of a specific international apartheid 
tribunal. 
Equally as important has been the explosion in the exercise of universal jurisdiction 
in as diverse national jurisdictions as Belgium, Spain, the UK, Australia, Canada, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, the USA and other countries. 124 Could universal jurisdiction 
be exercised against apartheid criminals. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Apartheid began to emerge as a serious issue of international concern immediately 
after the Second World War. The United Nations began to be seized by this issue in 
1946. The national liberation movements started calling for the prosecution of apartheid 
criminals in the 1960s. This concern by the United Nations and the victims of apartheid 
culminated in the 1973 UN's designation of apartheid as a crime against humanity in the 
118 Bartram S. Brown, "The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia" in Bassiouni Vol. 
3, at 69-103 
119 Roman Boed, "The International Tribunal for Rwanda" ibid Vol. 3, at 103-117 
120 David Crane, "The Special Court for Sierra Leone" ibid Vol.3, at 195-219 
121 East Timor is not very much studied as Tribunal 
122David Scheffer, "The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia," in supra note 7, at 219-257 
123 See Paust et al, supra. 
124 Lattimer, Mark and Philippe, Sands (eds.) Justice for Crimes Against Humanity (Oxford et al: Hart 
Publishing, preprint, 2007); American College of Trial Lawyers, Report to the International Committee of 
the American College of Trial Lawyers on the Prosecution of War Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and 
Genocide (Irvine, 2004 ). 
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International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 
which provided for the universal jurisdiction for the prosecution of apartheid criminals. 
Apartheid was also a crime under customary international law and a national state 
need not have ratified the Apartheid Convention in order to prosecute apartheid 
criminals. The next chapter deals with the state of Canada's war crimes prosecutions 
policy in the aftermath of the Second World War in order to set the stage as to whether 
Canada had the legal apparatus to prosecute apartheid criminals from 1948 to 1994. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION AND THE 
PROSECUTION OF APARTHEID CRIMINALS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) as a form of accountability for the crime of apartheid. Iris Ameida has 
commented that "it is undeniable that the political compris·e reached in South Africa 
with respect to accountability for crimes under the former tyrannical regime allowed for 
the transition to a democratic regime, the fact remains that domestic law makes this 
regime, in many cases, unable to punish perpetrators of crimes that are clearly illegal 
under international law."125 In the case of South Africa, this is regrettable because 
domestic prosecution of international crimes offers the potential to prosecute a greater 
proportion of offenders because domestic trials are apt to cost less than their 
international counterparts. 126 International crimes, however, whether prosecuted 
domestically or internationally are complex and difficult to prove127 and will 
nevertheless also be costly no matter where they are prosecuted. To prosecute murder as 
a crime against humanity, for instance, the prosecution must prove not only that the 
125 Iris Almeida, "Accountability for Crimes: The Role oflnternational Criminal Tribunals in Effectively 
Addressing Impunity" (August 1998) 17-3 Refugee 14 Oct 17). 
126 Nancy Armoury Combs, Guilty Pleas in International Criminal Law: Constructing a Restorative 
Justice Approach (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007) at 41. 
127 Ibid. 
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defendant killed the victim but that the murder took place as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack against a civilian population. 128 
South Africa could not go to a full extent to prosecute apartheid criminals . The TRC 
route was a compromise solution. The initial and only trials for related human rights 
violations in South Africa were very expensive following which South Africa abandoned 
the prosecution strategy. It could be argued that the costs of trials could be balanced 
with transfer of resources from other projects, for example arms purchases of which 
South Africa is known to engage in. Arms are very expensive, much more so than 
criminal trials. It is a matter of priorities. 
The question is, should apartheid criminals be allowed to continue their impunity? 
There are currently no victims' groups engaged in litigation to compel the South African 
government to prosecute apartheid criminals, neither are apartheid criminals being 
prosecuted by the state. There is no regional African Union Court created for the 
purpose of prosecuting apartheid criminals, nor is the ICC engaged, since the crime of 
apartheid took place before the creation of the ICC, this body is not competent to 
prosecute apartheid criminals. Do any mechanisms exist at the international level to 
ensure that regardless of domestic legal and political particularities and inadequacies, 
perpetrators of heinous crimes are still made to answer for them? 129 
The actions or inactions of the post-apartheid government may dictate whether or not 
universal jurisdiction on apartheid criminals is warranted. This chapter discusses the 
128 Ibid at 41. 
129 Almeida, supra at 17. 
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measures, the new South African government that took over after the demise of 
apartheid in 1994, implemented in order to address the crime of apartheid 
The last forty years has seen a number of models being used to address human rights 
violations that have been committed by authoritarian regimes, military juntas, ethnic 
warlords and colonial dictators. The term that has come to dominate this phenomenon is 
called "transitional justice" also sometimes known as "post-conflict justice"130. 
The following include the various models that have been identified as addressing 
post-conflict justice. The distinguishing characteristics of these post-conflict justice 
models are (1) whether they are aimed at prosecutions or amnesties, and (2) the national 
or international composition of the judiciary: 
• The international judicial model (Yugoslavia and Rwanda) are aimed at strict 
prosecutions of the perpetrators of the international crimes for which they were 
charged; 
• the mixed judicial model (East Timor, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Cambodia) are 
composed of national and international judges in the prosecution of the culprits; 
• the national judicial model (Ethiopia, Chechnya and others) are aimed at strict 
prosecutions and are composed of the national judiciary; 
130 See for a sample of works N. J. Kritz (ed.) Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon 
with Former Regimes (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1995) 3 volumes. N. J. Kritz, 
The Dilemma of Transitional Justice (Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1995); M. Cherif 
Bassiouni (ed.) Post-Conflict Justice (New York: Transnational Publishers, 2001) and Chandra Lekha 
Sriram and Suren Pillay, (eds.) Peace Versus Justice: the Dilemma of Transitional Justice in Africa 
(Scottsville: University ofKwazulu-Natal Press, 2009). 
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• the quasi-judicial model (South Africa) involves both amnesty and prosecutions 
as recommended by the quasi-judicial Truth and Reconciliation Commission and 
is purely national; 
• the non-judicial model (Chile, Argentina and others) is a pure amnesty exercise 
imposed on society by military juntas to protect themselves from prosecution 
after handing over power to successor regimes, and 
• the universal model (the International Criminal Court) deals with prosecutions by 
the International Criminal Court of any international criminal from any country 
and the composition of the judiciary is international. 131 
This chapter is only concerned with the quasi-judicial model of South Africa. A brief 
descriptive history and function of the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission is presented followed by some critical analysis of its role and performance 
in post-conflict apartheid South Africa. 
3.2 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
After over four decades of the practice of apartheid in South Africa as described in 
chapter one, the apartheid govefl1:111ent due to internal and international pressure to 
reform, embarked on negotiations in 1990 to end the practice of apartheid. An interim 
constitution was agreed upon in 1993. It envisaged the setting up of a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission to address the human rights violations of the past. Richard 
131 See Bassiouni, (ed.) Post-Conflict Justice, supra chapter III case studies. 
63 
Goldstone who had been appointed to conduct various human rights violations practices 
during the early 1990s in South Africa reports in his book For Humanity: Reflections of 
a War Crimes lnvestigator132 on the state of the negotiations between the National Party 
government and the African National Congress (ANC), a liberation movement: 
While the leaders of the ANC and people like Alex Boraine were 
becoming more convinced that South Africa should have an official truth 
commission, de Kl erk and his government and the ruling National Party 
were becoming more convinced that the less investigation into the past, the 
better. If they had had their way, a blanket amnesty would have been 
granted for all crimes committed prior to 1994. Of course, if Mandela and 
the ANC leaders could have had their way, they would have opted for 
Nuremberg-style trials for the former apartheid leaders. The eventual 
agreement to establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), 
therefore, was a political compromise. It is generally accepted that the 
revelations of the Goldstone Commission, particularly those implicating 
the leaders of the South African Police and the military, made it more 
difficult for de Klerk to resist the ANC demand for some form of 
accounting. 133 
The context of this compromise between 1990 and 1994 was the unprecedented 
violence in South Africa. It could have derailed these negotiations for a peaceful South 
Africa. Thousands of people were killed during this period with the participation or 
complicity of the apartheid government. 134 
Some of those who had in the past advocated for the prosecution of apartheid 
criminals, changed their minds about prosecutions. For example, Albie Sachs is quoted 
as saying: "If the price of peace in South Africa is that those involved in these terrible 
132 (Johannesburg: Wits Press, 2000.) 
133 Ibid at 66. 
134 Goldstone, ibid. 
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murders go unpunished, it is worth it." 135 Nelson Mandela was of the opinion, as early 
as June 1990, that "indulging in self-righteous indignation and finger pointing serve no 
useful purpose ... Today we wish to concentrate on the future [adding later on] that our 
attitude is to let bygones be bygones". 136 
According to Matas, writing in 1994, "there [was] a fear within the ANC (African 
National Congress) that a prosecution, after a peaceful transition, launched against the 
main architects of apartheid, would be viewed as political vindictiveness rather than the 
pursuit of justice. Any intention to prosecute that the ANC manifests will make the 
transition more difficult to accept". 137 
This sentiment appeared to have perpetrated the transitional post-transition process. 
There were hardly any prosecutions of apartheid criminals despite the TRC comprise. 
The postamble to the interim constitution established the philosophy that informed 
the subsequent tone of the commission proceedings and as will be shown later, to the 
less than fullsome prosecutions policy which led to impunity by apartheid criminals: 
This constitution provides a historic bridge between the past of a deeply 
divided society characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and 
injustice, and a future founded on the recognition of human rights, 
democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for 
all South Africans, irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex. 
The pursuit of national unity, the well-being of all South African 
citizens and peace require reconciliation between the people of South 
Africa and the reconstruction of society. 
The adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foundation for the 
people of South Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of the past, 
which generated gross violations of human rights, the transgression of 
135 Quoted in David Matas, No More: The Battle Against Human Rights Violations (Toronto: Dundurn, 
1994 at 105). 
136 Quoted in Matas, Ibid at 113. 
137 Matas, Ibid at 113-114. 
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humanitarian principles in violent conflicts and a legacy of hatred, fear, 
guilt and revenge. 
These can now be addressed on the basis that there is a need for 
understanding but not for vengeance, a need for reparation but not for 
retaliation, a need for ubuntu [humanity] but not victimization. 
In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty 
shall be granted in respect of acts, omissions and offences associated with 
political objectives and committed in the course of conflicts of the past. 
To this end, Parliament under this Constitution shall adopt a law 
determining a firm cut-off date ... and providing for the mechanisms, 
criteria and procedures, including tribunals, if any, through which such 
amnesty shall be dealt with at any time after the law has been passed. 138 
The new parliament in 1995 enacted the Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 which set up the Truth and Reconciliation Commission: 
Three committees of the TRC were established under the statute: the 
Committee on Human Rights Abuses, charged with investigating gross 
violations of human rights during the relevant period; the Committee on 
Amnesty, charged with considering and ruling on amnesty application 
made to the TRC; and the Reparations Committee, charged with 
considering appropriate reparations for the victims of the human rights 
violations. 139 
It became clear that the nerve centre for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
was the amnesty process. The Amnesty Committee could facilitate "the granting of 
amnesty to persons who make full disclosure of all the relevant facts relating to acts 
associated with a political objective."140 
The amnesty provision was conditional. This provision was challenged in court but 
as the Constitutional Court had stated: 
138 Goldstone supra at 67 and 68 
139 Ibid at 68. 
140 Section 3(1)(6) of the Act. 
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The Amnesty Committee may grant amnesty in respect of the relevant 
offence only if the perpetrator of the misdeed makes a full disclosure of all 
relevant facts. If the offender does not, and in consequence thereof the 
victim or his or her family is not able to discover the truth, the application 
for amnesty will fail. Moreover, it will not suffice for the offender merely 
to say that his or her act was associated with a political objective. That 
issue must independently be determined by the Amnesty Committee 
pursuant to the criteria set out in section 20(3) ... 141 
The amnesty provision had been challenged by AZAPO and other victims in courts 
all the way to the Constitutional Court of South Africa - the highest Court in the land 142• 
The attack on the amnesty provision was dismissed by the constitutional court which 
deferred to the legislative branch. Had that challenge succeeded, the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and the subsequent exposition of the truth about the 
atrocities of the past, such as is, would have been still-born. 
In dismissing the amnesty challenge, the Constitutional Court ruled that it was the 
considered and reasonable decision of the legislature of South Africa to provide for 
amnesty for those who came forward to tell the truth about their participation in political 
crimes during the apartheid era and that this truth-telling was necessary for 
reconciliation in order to heal the wounds of the past. The failure of the amnesty 
challenge eliminated the opportunity and future of any prosecution strategy against 
apartheid criminals even for those who did not confess and apply for an amnesty. The 
failure of this legal challenge elicited an avalanche of criticisms on several fronts, two 
of which were pre-eminent; (a) that of the judiciary as having perhaps not been 
141 Azapo infra paragraph 20. 
142 Azanian Peoples Organization v The President of the Republic of South Africa (1996) 8 B.C.L.R. 1015 
(Constitutional Court); (1996) (4) SA 562. 
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transformed from its apartheid roots despite the new presence of a racially and gender 
diverse judiciary, 143 and as Howard Varney states "the composition of the judiciary will 
always be a big factor in sensitive prosecutions."144 and (b) more poignantly, that an 
amnesty programme would be a violation of international law. 145 As Matas pointed out 
in 1994 "if South Africa were not to prosecute torturers, murderers, and criminals 
against humanity [and war criminals] as the price of peace, it would be violating 
international human rights law ... " 146 The reason for this prescription is that "the duty to 
prosecute crimes against humanity is a peremptory norm of international law or }us 
cogens. According the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, peremptory norms of 
international law take ·precedence over treaty obligations. By refusing to prosecute, 
South Africa would not just be violating a rule of international law, it would be violating 
a rule of international law of the most basic and fundamental character."147 
As will be discussed later, South Africa was not prohibited by court order to not 
prosecute apartheid criminals. The TRC recommended prosecution. The Constitutional 
143 See David Dyzenhaus, Judging the Judges, Judging Ourselves: Truth, Reconciliation and the 
Apartheid Legal Order (Oxford: Hart publishing, 1998) Jackie Dugard, "Judging the Judges: Towards an 
Appropriate Rule for the Judiciary in South Africa's transformation'', (2007) 20 Leiden J Int'l L 965; 
Penelope Andrews, The Judiciary in South Africa: Independence or Illusion, in papers 
ssrn.com.sol3/papers.cfm? accessed 31/08/2009. 
144 Howard Varney, "The Politics and Problems oflnternational Criminal Justice in Africa: The South 
African Experience" Infra at 76. 
145 The vast scholarly literature on this includes, Phenyo Rakate, The Duty to Prosecute and the Status of 
Amnesties Granted for Gross and Systematic Human Rights Violations in International Law: Towards a 
Balanced Approach_Model, Doctor of Laws Dissertation in Public International Law, University of South 
Africa (November, 2004); John Dugard "Is the Truth and Reconciliation Process Compatible with 
International Law? An Unanswered Question: AZAPO v. President of the Republic of South Africa" 
(1997) 13 SAJHR 258; Gunnar Theissen, Amnesty For Apartheid Crimes? The South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission and International Law, LLM Thesis, University of Western Cape, 1998. 
146 Matas, supra at 105. 
147 Matas, ibid at 105-106. 
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Court encouraged prosecutions. By not prosecuting, South Africa is in violation of 
international law. 
Ole Bubenzer, in his book, Post-TRC Prosecutions in South Africa148 has summarised 
amnesty applications and their dispositions before the TRC as follows and concludes 
that it is clear from the picture that emerges that "there are potentially hundreds of cases 
for which amnesty was not applied for that could be relevant for future criminal 
prosecutions." 149 Further, considering the scale of human rights violations in the period 
of South Africa's history which was relevant for the TRC's inquiries, the number of 
amnesty applications must be considered rather low. 150 Here are the statistics quoted by 
Bubenzer respecting the amnesty applications and dispositions: 
7115 applications were registered by the TCR. Of this total, 5143 
applications were refused administratively without a public hearing, 
mostly since no political objective was found to exist in the events 
referenced. 1973 applications were dealt with in public hearings in terms 
of section 19(3)(a) and (b) of the TRC Act, meaning that the applications 
conveyed a prima facie politically related offence and a gross human rights 
violation in terms of the TRC mandate. This number of applications relates 
to 1701 individual applicants. 1100 amnesty decisions were published in 
respect thereof. 857 applicants of those were aligned to the ANC, 85 to the 
IFP, 116 to the PAC or the Azanian Peoples Liberation Army (hereinafter 
APLA) and 289 to the security forces. Very few applications were 
received from the South African Defence Force (hereinafter SADF). 1499 
of those applicants submitted applications which concerned offences 
falling in the ambit of the committee's jurisdiction in terms of section 
20( 1) of the TRC Act. Of the remainder, 105 applicants were highly 
ranking ANC members, whose applications generally related to political 
activities, but were refused since they did not specify a specific violation 
148 Ole Bubenzer, Post-TRC Prosecutions in South Africa (Leiden et al.: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), p.16. 
149 Ibid, at 17. 
150 Quoting J. Sarkin, " The amnesty hearings in South Africa revisited" in G. Werle (Ed.) Justice in 
Transition-Prosecution and Amnesty in Germany and South Africa (2006) at 17. 
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or circumstance to be considered. Of the applications that were dealt with 
in public hearings, 1164 were granted, 806 were denied. 151 
In 2001, the TRC recommended the following, which has not been zealously 
implemented by the South African government: 
Where amnesty has not been sought or has been denied, prosecution 
should be considered where evidence exists that an individual has 
committed a gross human rights violation. In this regard, the Commission 
will make available to the appropriate authorities information in its 
possession concerning serious allegations against individuals (including 
privileged information such as that contained in amnesty applications). 
Consideration must be given to imposing a time limit on such 
prosecutions. Attorneys-general must pay rigorous attention to the 
prosecution of members of the South African Police Service (SAPS) who 
are found to have assaulted, tortured and/or killed persons in their care. In 
order to avoid a culture of impunity and to entrench the rule of law, the 
granting of general amnesty in whatever guise should be resisted. 152 
As early as 2003, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch in their 
publication entitled, Truth and Justice: Unfinished Business in South Africa153 stated that 
the two organizations were alarmed that the recommendations of the TRC were not 
being seriously and fully implemented: "in particular, that reparations had not been paid 
to victims of past human rights violations; and that prosecutions have not been mounted 
against individuals about whom there was credible evidence of involvement in gross 
abuses; that there was discussion of legislation providing for a further amnesty ... " In 
1999, Amnesty International had issued a public statement entitled "South Africa: No 
Impunity for Perpetrators of Human Rights Abuses" in which it stated: 
151 Ibid, at 16- 17. 
152 TRC, vol.5 chapter 8, at para. 14, quoted as well in Ibid. at 15. 
153 Asiapacific.amnesty.org/library/p2m7/engafi'530012003 at 1. 
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Amnesty International supports the call for perpetrators of human rights 
violations and abuses to be brought justice, which was made by civil 
society organizations on reaction to recent comments by the South African 
Human Rights Commission's chairperson, Dr. Barney Pityana. 
Amnesty International continues to receive information about new human 
rights abuses in South Africa allegedly perpetrated by those linked to past 
human rights crimes. Some of these perpetrators are still in positions of 
authority. 
The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, which 
established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), generously 
provided for amnesties which, in certain respects, conflicted with the 
country's obligations under international human rights treaties to which 
South Africa is party. The amnesties were justified as necessary for the 
securing of political peace. The deadlines also were generously extended 
and the TRC's Amnesty Committee continues to adjudicate applications. 
Amnesty International accepts that the conditionally and specificity of the 
amnesty process allowed the TRC to make factual discoveries and that 
open proceedings have allowed survivors of human rights abuses or their 
relatives to attend and oppose the applications. However, the survivors 
and relatives often felt aggrieved at the latitude granted to self-confessed 
perpetrators. 
Amnesty International is concerned that a legislated general amnesty, or a 
blanket amnesty by default, whether from Kwazulu Natal or at a national 
level, continues to remain an open option. The TRC, in its October 1998 
report, rightly and emphatically took a stand against such an option "in 
order to avoid a culture of impunity and to entrench the rule oflaw. 154 
According to the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR), the 
government could actually prosecute a narrow class of apartheid criminals including the 
following: 
a) Persons who did not qualify for amnesty at the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC); 
b) Persons who publicly advised the TRC that they would not abide by 
the jurisdiction and for whom available evidence against them 
amounts to a prima facie proof of guilt; 
154 Asiapacific.amnesty.org/library/ENGAFR530101999. 
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c) Persons whose names arose in TRC proceedings as committing 
crimes, who did not apply for amnesty, and for whom the TRC 
evidence amounted to a prima facie proof of guilt; 
d) Persons who have been identified by third parties in 'plea and 
sentence' and/or 'indemnity agreements' and for whom the evidence 
against them amounts to a prima facie proof of guilt; and 
e) Persons who have been identified by the National Intelligence 
Agency, the NP A and/or SAPS and for whom the evidence against 
them amounts to a prima facie proof of guilt. 155 
As of 2008, according to CSVR, "the National Prosecution Authority Strategy 2020 
does not mention post-TRC prosecutions [even] as a departmental obligation or action in 
need of medium to long term planning". 156 There are no ongoing prosecutions of 
apartheid era crimes in the 201 Os. As Howard Varney says, there has been "no strategic 
plan to investigate and prosecute crimes of the past in South Africa notwithstanding the 
truth for amnesty formula which demanded that there be a coordinated criminal justice 
response". 157 
The government seemed content and satisfied with the lack of prosecution. In 
initially opposing the South African victims' litigation in the U.S., for example, the 
South African government filed a brief in which it stated that in establishing the TRC, 
"government deliberately avoided a 'victors' justice' approach to the crimes of apartheid 
and chose instead one based on confession and absolution, informed by the principles of 
reconciliation, reconstruction, reparation and goodwill". It further stated that the TRC 
155 CSVR Transitional Justice Programme, Post Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Alternative 
Prosecution Policy Framework For Political Violence of the Past (8th July, 2008). 
156 Ibid at 3 note 3. 
157 Howard Varney, "The Politics and Problems oflntemational Criminal Justice in Africa: The South 
African Experience" in Max Du Plessis and Antoinette Louw (eds) Report from a symposium on The 
Investigation and Prosecution of 'Core International Crimes' and the Role of the International Criminal 
Court in Africa (Cape Town: Zevenwacht, 2006) at 76. 
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strategy "was based on a conscious agreement by all political parties in South Africa to 
avoid Nuremberg-style apartheid trials and any ensuing litigation". 158 
3.3 Limitation on Ambit of Accountability 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission played a small part in the lack of holistic 
prosecutions. While finding apartheid to be a crime against humanity, the TRC decided 
not to give its mandate a broader scope but to interpret "human rights violations 
committed as specific [individual] acts, resulting in killing, abduction and severe 
physical or mental injury, in the course of the past conflict". 159 This meant that the 
crimes of apartheid that were committed as a result of forced mass removals, mass 
detentions, mass torture and generalised state violence and war crimes that were 
committed in South Africa and in neighbouring countries could not be investigated and 
no one could be held accountable. 160 In essence what was a crime of apartheid which 
was a crime against humanity in international criminal law was reduced to specific 
individual criminal acts under South African criminal law. It can be argued in fact that 
the crime of apartheid as a crime against humanity vanished under the aegis of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission. Failure to deal with apartheid state policies meant the 
"directing mind" could not be held accountable. 
158 Brief of Amicus Curiae Republic of South Africa In Support Of Affirmance, in Khulumani - and - AEG 
Daimler-Benz, 05-2141-CU and 05-2326-CU (U.S. Court of Appeals, 2"d Circuit. 
159 TRC Report Volume 6, Section 5 Chapter 1, at 594. 
160 See critique of Mahmood Mamdani, "'Amnesty or Impunity'. A Preliminary Critique of the Report of 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa" (TRC) (2002) 32 (3-4) Diacritics 33-59. See 
also Jeremy Sarking Carrots and Sticks: The TRC and South African Amnesty Process (Oxford: 
Intersentia, 2004). 
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In a 2001 book entitled Unfinished Business: South Africa, Apartheid and Truth 161 
Terry Bell and Duminsa Ntsebeza offer a biting indictment of the unfinished business of 
post apartheid South Africa. According to Bell and Ntsebeza the major weakness of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission was that it was frequently curtailed by time 
constraints, lack of capacity and an absence of political will to delve too deeply or to 
expose responsibility at too high a level in the chain of command in the criminality of 
apartheid. The result was that complete exposure of the horrifying extent of apartheid 
was lacking leading to the continuing impunity in the high ranks of the perpetrators of 
apartheid: the politicians and the generals. "The guilty are still there, many still in 
positions of power.", they argued 162 "There is still a huge amount of evidence to be 
uncovered." 163 
According to Bell and Ntsebeza, apartheid bequeathed a "poisoned chalice"164• They 
write that as long as this past was not dealt with, it would return to haunt the South 
African body politic. Bell and Ntsebeza were not advocating for relentless prosecutions, 
but for more thorough accountability for those who never came clean with their crimes 
under apartheid. They were concerned with those who had been shielded by a 
government which regarded the compromise as the price for reconciliation. 
Coming to the South African government, Bell and Ntsebeza state that the 
government even opposed foreign reparations in that it is ''unacceptable that matters that 
161 Terry Bell with Dumisa Buhle Ntsebeza, Unfinished Business: South Africa, Apartheid and Truth, 3rd 
ed. (London: Verso, 2003). 
162 Terry Bell with Dumisa Buhle Ntsebeza, Unfinished Business: South Africa, Apartheid and Truth, 3rd 
ed. (London: Verso, 2003), at 345. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Ibid. 
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are central to the future of our country should be adjudicated in foreign courts"165 and 
that "even if the victims of apartheid were successful in the foreign courts, the South 
African government would not enforce the judgments of those courts." 166 Bell and 
Ntsebeza lament that fact that "it is the leadership of a democratic government that seeks 
to protect the perpetrators in the crime of apartheid from their day of reckoning" 167• But 
in the process the government of South Africa was not making recommended 
reparations at home nor prosecuting the apartheid criminals zealously. 
Bell and Ntsebeza report a seething anger in the victim community in South Africa. 
Among the examples for the anger include: 
The fact that General Johan Coetzee, having made hardly any disclosures, 
was practising law in his hometown of Graaff-Reinet at the tum of the 
twenty first century was another source of anger. Even more flagrant was 
the conversion of another police general, Johan van der Merwe, involved in 
bombing and in ordering a murderous cross-border raid, into a leading 
figure in the Association for Equality before the Law, established to defend 
apartheid era human rights offenders. The list of such leading figures, 
directly involved in the commissioning and execution of everything from 
murders to blackmail, bombings and torture in the apartheid cause, is 
lengthy: the number runs into thousands. These are people who have-
often literally - got away with murder168• 
Other critics have raised similar issues as Bell and Ntsebeza. 
165 Terry Bell with Dumisa Buhle Ntsebeza, Unfinished Business: South Africa, Apartheid and Truth, 3rd 
ed. (London: Verso, 2003), at 350. 
166 Ibid. 
167 Ibid at 350. The South African government later supported apartheid litigation in U.S courts: letter of 
South African Minister of Justice to Judge Sheindlin, 1 September, 2009. 
168 Terry Bell with Dumisa Buhle Ntsebeza, Unfinished Business: South Africa, Apartheid and Truth, 3rd 
ed. (London: Verso, 2003). At 344. 
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The subsequent loss of two high profile and arguably "show trial" cases in which 
General Magnus Malan, 169 the chief of the army during the latter part of the apartheid 
era, and Dr. Wouter Basson, 170 the chemical scientist, who had been charged with 
numerous counts of crimes of apartheid engendered significant setbacks to those who 
were seeking truth and justice for the crime of apartheid. The Constitutional Court of 
South Africa later ruled that Basson could be tried for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity which he committed in foreign countries, but the state never charged him 
again, for unknown reasons. 171 It may have something to do with the cost of the trial. 
The state has wide discretion to charge or not charge a person for a criminal offence. 
That discretion is generally not judicially reviewable. 
Malan was not tried for anything resembling war crimes or crimes against humanity. 
He and other military leaders were charged with murder but not murder as part of the 
crimes against humanity. Malan and others were acquitted and subsequently refused to 
apply for amnesty. 172 The prosecution and acquittal of Malan and his fellow generals 
revealed the disinterest and incompetence of the state in the prosecution of the crimes 
associated with apartheid. Howard Varney and Jeremy Sarkin accuse the prosecution of 
deliberately failing "to utilize available evidence, the failure to present the documentary 
evidence coherently and systematically, the failure to raise the key aspect of the 
169 State v Peter Msane and 19 others, case number cc196 (Malan case); See also for analysis, J.H. Varney 
"Case Study: The Malan trial (South Africa)" paper presented at Domestic prosecutions and Transitional 
justice conference, Magaliesburg South Africa 16-19 May 2005. 
170 S v Basson (2001) (1) SACR 235 (trial). The Court of Appeal upheld the court's acquittal. Decisions 
are in the Afrikaans language. 
171 S v Basson (2007) (3) SA 582 (CC). 
172 
"The TRC Appeals to Malan to Seek Amnesty" Mail and Guardian 9th May 1997. 
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accused's foresight in the killings." 173 The failure of the Malan trial contributed to the 
refusal or reluctance by the military and police and other law enforcement agencies to 
seek amnesty. There was no incentive. There were no more sticks and carrots. 
The biggest trial and the one closest to the Nuremberg style war crimes prosecution 
was the Basson trial to which I now tum. 174 
3.4 The Basson Case 
In 1999, Dr. Basson was charged with 67 counts which included murder, conspiracy, 
fraud and drug offences. Six of these counts included murder committed outside South 
Africa. Basson was discharged of the foreign-related charges on a motion by the defence 
at the outset of the trial on the grounds that South African criminal law did not reach 
beyond the borders of South Africa. In any case all those who committed offences in 
Namibia had been indemnified before Namibia obtained its independence from South 
Africa in 1989. Basson was acquitted also of all the other remaining counts at the end of 
the 30-month trial in 2001. 175 
The Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the acquittal, and refused to reinstate the 
charges for which Basson had been discharged without answering to these foreign-based 
charges. 176 The Constitutional Court of South Africa set aside the quashing of the 
173 Howard Varney and Jeremy Sarkin, "Failing to Pierce the Hit Squad Veil: An Analysis of the Malan 
Trial" (1997) IO SACJ 141, referenced in Mia Swart, "The Wouter Basson Prosecution: The Closest 
South Africa Came to Nuremberg". (2008) 68 ZAORV 2009 at 224 Notes 101 and 102. 
174 Mia Swart, ibid. 
175 Marlene Burger and Chandre Gould, Secrets and Lies: Wouter Basson and South Africa's Chemical 
and Biological Waifare Programme (Cape Town: Zebra, 2002). See also Buhenzer, Post -TRC 
Prosecutions, supra. 
176 S. v Basson 2004 (1) SA 246 (SCA). 
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charges by the trial judge, which included the use of poison to kill hundreds of South-
West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) captives who were battling against the 
apartheid criminal state in South West Africa as Namibia was then called. In setting 
aside the quashing of charges, the Constitutional Court reasoned that "no country ought 
to allow its soil to be used as a basis for planning cross-border criminal activities ... [the 
courts below] failed to put into the scale the extreme gravity of the charges, or to give 
consideration to the need to take account of South Africa's international obligations in 
respect of upholding principles of international humanitarian law."177 The Court ruled 
that international law obliged South Africa to prosecute crimes against humanity and 
war crimes. The Constitutional Court specifically admonished the state as follows: 
The state's obligation to prosecute offences is not limited to offences 
which were committed after the constitution came into force but also 
applies to all offences committed before it came into force. It is relevant 
to this enquiry that international law obliges the state to punish crimes 
against humanity and war crimes. It is also clear that the practice of 
apartheid constituted crimes against humanity and some of the practices 
of the apartheid government constituted war crimes. 178 
The highest court in South Africa thus gave the state the imprimatur to prosecute 
some apartheid war crimes and criminals against humanity. The state demurred for 
unexplained reasons. Not only on the Basson case but on many others for which there 
was evidence, including some of those forwarded for prosecution by the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. "There has never been a prosecution of a crime against 
humanity or any other international crime in South Africa". 179 Basson has been criss-
177 The State and Basson CCT 30/03 at paragraphs 170 and 171. 
178 Howard Varney, supra at 79. 
179 Varney, ibid at 79. 
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crossing the globe since he was acquitted but has not been recharged for offences for 
which he was not tried, albeit initially charged. No nation has exercised or attempted to 
exercise universal jurisdiction over him. Other apartheid war criminals and criminals 
against humanity have similarly not been subject to the application of universal 
jurisdiction. 
The failure to secure convictions involving the high profile apartheid criminals has 
also meant that not only is South Africa not prosecuting clear-cut cases of war criminals, 
it is also saddled with abject failure in the cases in which it has tried to prosecute them. 
It is urged that universal jurisdiction must be pressed into service to fill this gap. 
3.5 The P.W. Botha Case180 
The failure to prosecute P.W. Botha, the second to last apartheid president speaks 
volumes about the South African government's unwillingness, inability or incapacity to 
abide by both the dictates of the TRC and its obligations under international law. P.W. 
Botha was a prominent, worthy and deserving candidate for prosecution. 
Botha became a Member of Parliament in the election that ushered in apartheid in 
1948. From 1958 to 1966, he occupied various ministerial portfolios, some of which 
oversaw the massive forced removals of blacks from their ancestral lands to ghettoes and 
so-called homelands. In 1966, Botha was appointed Minister of Defence. In 197 5 he was 
responsible for South Africa's incursion into Angola where South African troops 
180 This is a summary from Alex Boraine, "P.W. Botha Before South Africa's Truth And Reconciliation 
Process" in Justice for Crimes Against Humanity by Mark Lattimer and Philippe Sands, (eds) (Portland: 
Hart Publishing, 2003) at 336-347. 
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committed massive war crimes and crimes against humanity and torture against civilian 
populations there. 
Later, P .W. Botha replaced John Vorster as Prime Minister, a portfolio that was later 
transformed into the Presidency. While still a State Prime Minister he continued to hold 
the post of Minister of Defence until he appointed General Magnus Malan. He was 
simultaneously the head of the State Security Council (SSC) which was the body that 
decided and approved all security operations as how to respond to the growing 
opposition to the criminality of apartheid. Most massive human rights violations 
including torture, extra- judicial killings, disappearances, killings, foreign invasions etc. 
happened in the 1980s when P. W. Botha was at the helm of power181 • The 1980s were 
known as the period of "total strategy" in which the South African apartheid government 
swore to maintain and hold onto apartheid by any means necessary. 
Botha refused to obey the subpoena issued by the TRC to give evidence about what 
he knew about the crime of apartheid during his exercise of power in South Africa. 
There was testimony by numerous individuals including Johan van der Merwe, former 
Commissioner of Police and Adrian Vlok, former Minister of Law and Order, that the 
orders to commit certain offences, for example the bombing of Khotso House, which 
was the headquarters of many organizations including the South African Council of 
Churches, came directly from Botha. So it is not quite correct to state as Rakate writes 
in his doctoral dissertation that the major problem in prosecuting apartheid criminals 
181 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Reports document the human rights violations that occurred 
under Apartheid more than any other publication before or hence. 
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would have been the lack of evidence. 182 Ministers who were part of the conspiracy to 
commit the crimes of apartheid directly implicated P.W. Botha in their commissions. 
(The same went for W outer Basson, although he was acquitted, over 150 witnesses 
testified against him.) 
When Botha refused to obey the subpoena, he was prosecuted in the courts and was 
convicted for contempt of court. The South African Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) set 
aside the conviction on a technicality. 
Despite the clear and direct evidence of Botha having engaged in war crimes and 
crimes against humanity, and the availability of witnesses to testify against him and 
indeed some already having testified against him during the contempt of court 
proceedings, Botha was never prosecuted for the crime of apartheid. He died peacefully 
many years later in 2006. Before he died, the TRC found with respect to Botha, the 
following: 
Mr. Botha was responsible for ordering former Minister of Law and Order 
Adriaan Vlok and former Police Commissioner Johan van der Merwe 
unlawfully to destroy Khotso House in Johannesburg (a building occupied 
by organizations considered by Botha to be a threat to the security of the 
government), thereby endangering the lives of people in and around the 
building. This decision, greatly enhanced the prevailing culture of 
impunity and facilitated the further gross violation of human rights by 
senior members of the security force. 183 
182 The vast scholarly literature on this includes, Phenyo Rakate, The Duty to Prosecute and the Status of 
Amnesties Granted for Gross and Systematic Human Rights Violations in International Law: Towards a 
Balanced Approach_Model, Doctor of Laws Dissertation in Public International Law, University of South 
Africa (November, 2004); John Dugard "Is the Truth and Reconciliation Process Compatible with 
International Law? An Unanswered Question: AZAPO v President of the Republic of South Africa" 
(1997) 13 SAJHR 258. 
183 TRC, Final Report, Vol.5, at 223-225. 
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The Commission concluded: 
For the reasons set out above and by virtue of the position as head of the 
state and chairman of the SSC, Botha contributed to and facilitated a 
climate in which the above gross violations of human rights could and did 
occur, and as such is accountable for such violations. 184 
The dismal performance of the state in prosecuting or lack thereof of apartheid 
engendered continuing reverberating consequences in South Africa. 
The acquittal of Magnus Malan, for example, resulted in the majority of the military 
and police not asking for amnesty and therefore never being put in a position of telling 
the truth and acknowledging their commission of crimes of apartheid. 185 Those who 
came forward partly came as a result of having been implicated by Eugene de Kock, a 
paramilitary policeman who was responsible for one of the most murderous police units 
at Vlakplaas towards the end of the era of apartheid 186• Eugene de Kock was one of the 
only few visible successful prosecutions of significant personalities involved in the 
crimes of apartheid187 . Others like Adrian Vlok, the Minister of Law and Order under 
apartheid, pleaded guilty and were given a suspended sentences. 188 Public reaction to the 
suspended sentence involving Vlok was highly negative on the dispensation of justice 
for apartheid era criminals. 189 
184 Ibid. 
185 See Louise Mallinder, Indemnity, Amnesty, Pardon and Prosecution guidelines in South Africa 
Working Paper no. 2 From Beyond Legalism, Amnesties, Transition and Conflict Transformation, Queens 
University, Belfast February 2009 at 107. 
186 Ibid. 
187 There were a few other lesser officials. Ibid at 106. 
188 See discussion in Camita Eames (Ed) Reconciliatory Justice: Amnesties, Indemnities and Prosecutions 
in South's Transition (C.SVR, 2007) at 14. 
189 Ibid. 
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The government was also severely criticized and sued for its neglect of paying 
reparations, another centre piece of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission process. 190 
The government has also been legally challenged, with success, for trying to convoke 
another avenue for an amnesty process, outside of and long after the expiry of the 
mandate of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 191 The government has further 
been placed between a rock and a hard place in that it has been successfully challenged 
both for not providing pardons in a timely manner for apartheid-era criminals who had 
been imprisoned for admittedly committing crimes of apartheid and for considering 
pardoning the criminals without consulting with the victims. 192 
What is more, government inexplicably opposed victim support groups and 
individuals who sought the invocation of universal civil jurisdiction in US courts for 
redress and reparations by global corporations who had aided and abetted the crimes of 
apartheid in South Africa. 193 The South African government opposition to victims' civil 
litigation for reparations in the US was followed by the US opposition to the exercise of 
universal civil jurisdiction by US courts. 194 While there is a precedent for the exercise 
of universal civil jurisdiction with respect to aiding and abetting the crime of apartheid, 
i.e. the Apartheid Litigation in the US under the Alien Torts Claims Act of 1789, there is 
190 Barbara Slaughter, "South Africa: Apartheid victims sue ANC government for compensation" 
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2002/jul2002/saaf-j 19 .shtml accessed 08/ 10/2009. 
191 Nkadimeng v NDPP case number 32709/07 (Transvaal Provincial Division). 
192 See string of cases ignited by a challenge to pardons policy; for example, see Centre for the Study of 
Violence and Reconciliation et al v the President of the Republic of South Africa et al case no. 15320/09 
(NGHC). 
193 Letter of South African Minister of Justice to Judge Sprizzo, July 11th 2003, 
www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2003/apartheid. 
194 Brief ofU.S Department of Justice as Amicus in Re: Apartheid Litigation (2003). 
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no precedent for the exercise of universal criminal jurisdiction with respect to apartheid 
criminals in the USA or anywhere else. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The post-apartheid transitional government utilized the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission to try to uncover the extent of the human rights violations of the previous 
government. Those who would confess and tell the whole truth about their participation 
in human rights violations would be absolved of all criminal and civil' liability. It was 
recommended that those who did not qualify for amnesty or did not request for one 
would be prosecuted. 
The government did not engage in any meaningful or mass prosecutions of those who 
did not qualify for amnesty or those who did not request amnesty. 
The high profile cases that were pursued ended disastrously. South Africa therefore 
presents itself as a country in which general amnesty for apartheid criminals was 
obtained by default: by apartheid criminals deliberately failing to apply for amnesty and 
the government not prosecuting them. 
The government did also not engage m meaningful reparations policies as 
recommended by the Reparations Committee of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. There are therefore victims who have been short-changed in terms of 
justice. Post-conflict justice in South Africa is an unfinished business. How could 
justice be secured for victims of apartheid? The next several chapters try to answer this 
question. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
COULD THERE BE AN INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE CRIME OF 
APARTHEID? 
4 .1 Introduction 
This chapter will explore the option of setting up an International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of the Crime of Apartheid (ITPCA). This chapter will also discuss the pros 
and cons of international prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity that an 
international tribunal would engender. 
The failure to prosecute Botha led the vice-chair of the TRC, Alex Boraine to write 
that, "if an International Criminal Court were in existence it would have been a different 
story ... there were many others who served with [Botha], in particular the high-ranking 
officers in the security forces, who could well have been called to account. Clearly the 
South African experiment, with all its benefits, illustrates vividly the need for an 
International Criminal Court" 195• This echoes, to a degree, with the thesis of this study. 
The International Criminal Court however, has no jurisdiction for offences that took 
place before its existence. Richard Goldstone, a former Justice of the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa and the first Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
195 Boraine, supra at 347. 
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the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) queries whether the prosecutor of 
the ICC would have second-guessed the decision of a democratically elected parliament 
by deciding to prosecute apartheid criminals at the ICC. 196 This evokes one of the most 
vexing problems in international criminal law. What is to be done to criminals whose 
nation state is not prosecuting them? Is it now a question of the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction by other nations, like Canada? The creation of an international tribunal has 
been given as an alternative as well. 
4.2 The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid197 
Article IV of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the 
Crime of Apartheid contemplates that states parties will enact legislative and judicial and 
other measures to prosecute the crime of apartheid. Article V contemplates the exercise 
of UJ and the creation of an international tribunal 198 for the prosecution of apartheid 
criminals. Yet, as M. Cherif Bassiouni and Roger Clark have stated, neither apartheid-
convention-related mandates has been implemented. None anywhere has ever been 
prosecuted for the crime of apartheid, 199 a point also made eloquently by John 
196 Richard Goldstone, "Revenge or Forgiveness: Truth and Reconciliation in the Aftermath of Human 
Rights Violations" John Bray Oration (Elder Hall, Australia) 11 March 2009, at 6. 
197 See Chapter Two for a full discussion ofICSPCA. 
198 See M. Cherif Bassiouni and Daniel Derby, "Final Report on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court for the Implementation of the Apartheid Convention and Other Relevant International 
Instruments," ( 1980-1981) 9 Hofstra LR 523. 
199 Roger Clark, "Apartheid" in M. Cherif Bassiouni (ed.) International Criminal Law (3rd. ed.) Vol. 1 
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), at 620. 
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Dugard. 20° Further, no international tribunal has been created to prosecute apartheid 
criminals, despite the fact that M. Cherif Bassiouni had been commissioned to start a 
study and design the framework for the creation of such a tribunal.201 
The collapse of apartheid effective in 1994 has led to the predictions and debates that 
the apartheid convention has resulted in disuse.202 Even at its beginning in 1973, the 
Apartheid Convention appeared to be an orphan in international criminal law at least as 
perceived by Western countries. No Western, European or North American democracy 
ratified it.203 The South African apartheid government, as well as the post-apartheid 
regime, never ratified the convention and never used it to prosecute those who 
committed the crime of apartheid. 204 In 1973 the United States justified its non-
ratification of the Apartheid Convention in the following terms: "We cannot accept that 
apartheid can in this manner be made a crime against humanity. Crimes against 
humanity are so grave in nature that they must be meticulously elaborated and strictly 
construed under existing international law. "205 In 1977, Additional Protocol I to the 
Geneva Conventions designated apartheid as a grave breach of the Protocol and a war 
crime. There are about 170 state parties to the Protocol. In 1998, the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court designated "apartheid" as a crime against humanity and this 
Statute has been ratified by the majority of the world's countries most of whom have 
specifically incorporated the statute into their domestic laws. Almost all western 
200 John Dugard, International Law: A South African Perspective (Cape Town: Juta, 1994). 
201 Supra, "Final Report". 
202 Clark, supra at 620. 
203 Jbid at 620. 
204 Ibid. 
205 
"Crime of Apartheid" in Wikipedia accessed September 291\ 2012. 
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countries have ratified the ICC Statute, thus apartheid is recognized by incorporation as 
a crime against humanity by the majority of human kind.206 
Could the Apartheid Convention now be used as a basis for the creation of an 
international tribunal? This question is worth exploring as an alternative to the failure to 
prosecute apartheid criminals in South Africa. 
4.3 An International Tribunal for the Crime of Apartheid 
The failure, inability or unwillingness to continue to pursue apartheid-era crimes calls 
for the convocation of an international tribunal if certain prerequisites are met. These 
prerequisites are drawn from how the existing international tribunals came into 
existence. The most relevant one is the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR). This tribunal seems to respond to the analogous dynamics that were envisaged 
in the Apartheid Convention with respect to apartheid criminals. 
It is important to stress that the only other criminal tribunals that existed before the 
modem tribunals of Rwanda and former Yugoslavia, i.e. the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Tribunals were created to judge defeated enemies. The defeated enemies played no role 
in the establishment of those tribunals. It was victor's justice at play. In South Africa 
there were no victors. 
206 Article 7 .1 (j) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
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4.4 The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
The ICTR was created in 1994 by the United Nations Security Council at the initial 
request of the immediate post-genocide government ofRwanda.207 The tribunal was 
charged with the prosecution of genocide and other serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in Rwanda and in neighbouring countries during the year 
of 1994. 208 An important prerequisite for the creation of an international tribunal to deal 
with post-conflict justice is the invitation or agreement of the government in power in 
the subject country. The new Rwandese government was the victor government. 
Similar invitations to the Security council were made by the former Yugoslavia, Sierra 
Leone, Cambodia, East Timor and others. The invitation or agreement of the subject 
government is an acknowledgment that the subject government cannot manage the 
colossal dynamics of the post-conflict prosecutions. 
The United Nations Security Council on its own motion can recommend the 
investigation and prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity as it did in the 
case of the Darfour region of the Sudan. 
207 See among numerous writings on this tribunal, Roman Boed, "The International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda" in M. CherifBassiouni, (ed) International Criminal Law, 3rd edition (Kluwer: Martinus Nijhoff 
publishers, 2008) at 103-117; Robert J Currie, International and Transnational Criminal Law (Toronto: 
Irwin Law: 2010) at 171; Roman Boed, "The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda" in M. Cherif 
Bassiouni (ed) Post-Conflict Justice (New York: Transnational Publishers Inc. 202) at 487-498; William 
Schabas, "The Rwanda Case: Sometimes It's Impossible" in Bassiouni (ed) Post-Conflict Justice at 449-
522; Lars Waldorf," 'A Mere Pretence of Justice' : Complementarity, Sham Trials, and Victors' Justice 
at the Rwanda Tribunal" (2011 33-4 Fordham Int'l LJ 220. 
208 William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court, 4th Edition (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011) at 12. 
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Rwanda eventually voted against the creation of the Tribunal because it would only 
get the top suspects and it was prevented from imposing the death penalty.209 Rwanda 
wanted all suspects prosecuted and the death penalty imposed. Internally Rwanda 
created the Gacaca local courts system to prosecute war criminals. Gacaca local courts 
were ancient traditional Rwandese courts. 
The two major international tribunals of former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are located 
outside the boundaries of the post-conflict society. This need not be the case, however. 
Such tribunals can be located within the jurisdictions of these societies. However, issues 
of security of the judges, prosecutors, defence and prosecution witnesses, counsel, and 
the independence from interference by the governments of the post-conflict countries, 
necessitate the location of these particular tribunals outside these countries.210 
The Yugoslav and Rwandan Tribunals are identical in terms of statutory and 
institutional set-ups. They even initially shared the same prosecutor. They have also 
produced identical persuasive jurisprudence on genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.211 
These tribunals have specific temporal mandates: to investigate and prosecute 
international crimes that occurred in the specific country. In the case of Rwanda, the 
mandate was limited to the crimes committed during 1994 only. The other characteristic 
of these tribunals is that the judiciary constituting them is international and race and 
209 Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 
2000) at 307. 
210 See Goldstone, For Humanity, supra. 
211 Schabas, supra at 13. 
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gender-diverse.212 The Rwanda Tribunal is based in Arusha, Tanzania and the Yugoslav 
one is based in the Hague. 
4.5 Jurisprudence of International Tribunals 
Specialized tribunals have asserted the principle of universal jurisdiction most 
vigorously. For example, in the oft-quoted decision, the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia in the Furundzija case found that torture was subject to 
universal jurisdiction by any state, as one of the consequences arising out of the 
peremptory character of the prohibition of that crime under international law. The Trial 
Chamber stated that: 
Furthermore, at the tribunal level, that is, that of criminal liability, it would 
seem that one of the consequences of the }us co gens character bestowed by 
the international community upon the prohibition of torture is that every 
State is entitled to investigate, prosecute and punish or extradite 
individuals accused of torture, who are present in a territory under its 
jurisdiction. Indeed, it would be inconsistent on the other hand to prohibit 
torture to such an extent as to restrict the normally unfettered treaty 
making power of sovereign States, and on the other had bar States from 
prosecuting and punishing those torturers who have engaged in this odious 
practice abroad. This legal basis for States' universal jurisdiction over 
torture bears out and strengthens the legal foundation for such jurisdiction 
found by other courts in the inherently universal character condemned 
wherever they occur, every State has the right to prosecute and punish the 
h f h . 213 aut ors o sue cnmes. 
212 See Munyonzwe Hamalengwa, The Politics of Judicial Diversity and Transformation: Canada; 
U.S.A.; U.K.; Australia; South Africa; Israel; Colonial and Post-Colonial World and International 
Tribunals (Toronto: Africa in Canada Press, 2012). 
213 Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija, Judgment, Case No.: IT-95-17/1-T, ICTY Trial Chamber, 10 December 
1998, at para. 156. 
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In 2004, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
amended their rules to permit transfer of cases to any state with jurisdiction over 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.214 The Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (SCSL), in the Prosecutor against Augustine Gbao case stated the following: 
"The crimes mentioned in Articles 2-4 of the Statute of the Special Court (crimes against 
humanity, violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and Additional 
protocol II, and other serious violations of humanitarian law) are international crimes 
entailing universal jurisdiction."215 International tribunals, however, will continue to 
supplement national jurisdictions, they are not meant to be the main vehicles for the 
prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
The modem international tribunals of the ICC, ICTY and ICTR have been admired 
for their impressive jurisprudence. Although the jurisprudence of these tribunals is not 
binding on national courts, they are regarded as having significant persuasive value. 
Their influence in the interpretation of domestic statutes involving trials for genocide, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity have been staggering.216 
214 Rule 11 bis, Referral of the Indictment to Another Court. The Rule provides as follows: "(A) If an 
indictment has been confirmed, irrespective of whether or not the accused is in the custody of the 
Tribunal, the President may appoint a Trial chamber for the purpose of referring a case to the authorities 
of a State: (i) in whose territory the crime was committed; or (ii) in which the accused was arrested; or (iii) 
having jurisdiction and being willing and adequately prepared to accept such a case, so that those 
authorities should forthwith refer the case to the appropriate court for trial within that State." 
215 SCSL, Appeals Chamber, 25 May 2004, Prosecutor against Augustine Gbao (case No.SCSL-2004-15-
AR72(E), at para. 8. 
216 See Mugesera, supra. 
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The Supreme Court of Canada, for example, stated that tribunal case law was 
"highly relevant to the analysis" of the element of the offence of advocating genocide 
and relied heavily on the jurisprudence of the ICTR.217 
The Quebec Superior Court Judge, Justice Dennis also relied heavily on the Rwanda 
Tribunal's definitions of the elements of genocide, war crimes, rape and crimes against 
humanity in Munyaneza for these crimes. 218 Akayesu was the first decision in 
international criminal law where an individual was convicted for rape which was defined 
as a crime against humanity.219 The Yugoslav tribunal set a very important precedent in 
Tadic by establishing the principle of "joint criminal enterprise" whereby individuals 
could "be convicted of crimes where they participate with others in criminal activities 
having as a common purpose and that purpose is carried out, even if the individual in 
question does not participate in the actual commission of the crime or has no knowledge 
of its commission."220 Generally, leaders of repressive states including the apartheid 
state have pleaded that they did not know what their subordinates were doing; that they 
themselves never committed the actual war crimes, rape, torture or genocide even when 
they set the overall policies that led to these offences. The subordinates claimed that 
they were following superiors' orders. 
4.6 Problems with International Tribunals 
217 See Mugesera, supra. See also Currie, supra at 261. 
218 Currie, ibid at 261. Munyaneza will be discussed fully later. 
219 See Akayesu in Schabas supra at 130-131; Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T). 
22
° Currie, supra at 168. 
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Despite their laudable achievements in relieving post conflict societies of pressures to 
administer justice under severe constraints and limitations, as well as in developing 
forward looking jurisprudence in international criminal law, international tribunals have 
faced some criticism and they evince some shortcomings. Corruption, inefficiency and 
perpetrating victor's justice are some of the criticisms that have been levelled against, 
for example, the Rwanda Tribunal.221 No member of the post-genocide government, for 
example, was ever charged or tried for having committed war crimes in Rwanda, even 
though there was credible evidence that the government committed war crimes while in 
opposition.222 It is inconceivable that the Rwandan government would have handed 
their own to the Rwanda Tribunal for prosecution. 
It has also been pointed out that prosecution before an international tribunal is an 
inadequate mechanism for promoting reconciliation. The state government may refuse 
to cooperate. Witnesses, fearful of reprisal from state governments may refuse to 
cooperate and therefore derail these prosecutions. Further, a tribunal that is located 
outside the country where the atrocities took place may have legitimacy problems at 
home. "The holding of trials in Arusha, Tanzania, far away from the theatre of genocide 
distances the people of.Rwanda from a process designed to render justice to its people. 
221 Lars Waldorf, "'A Mere Pretense ofJustice': Complementarity, Sham Trials, and Victor's Justice at 
the Rwanda Tribunal" (2011) 33-4 Fordham Int'l LJ 1221. 
222 Lars Waldorf, ibid p. 1222 referencing Alison Des Forges, Leave None To Tell The St01y: Genocide 
In Rwanda. 
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For the people to feel that justice was being done, the criminal justice system ought 
ideally to operate within sight and hearing of the victims themselves". 223 
4.7 Application.to the Crime of Apartheid 
Could South Africa propose the establishment of an International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of the Crime of Apartheid (ITPCA) or cooperate in its creation by either the 
African Union or the United Nations? 
Richard Goldstone has posed the following questions and recommendations m 
addressing somewhat indirectly the question I have posed above: 
Would an apartheid criminal who has been granted an amnesty by the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission be liable to be prosecuted for crimes 
against humanity in a non-South African court? Would South Africa be 
obliged, on request from Britain, to extradite the bombers of the ANC 
headquarters in London if they have been granted an amnesty by the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission?224 
In answering these questions, Goldstone states: 
I have no doubt that such a prosecutor should not be inhibited by national 
amnesties. In international law they clearly have no standing and would 
not afford a defense to criminal or civil proceedings before an international 
court or a national court other than that of the country which grants the 
amnesty. That does not mean that in deciding on an investigation or 
prosecution, the prosecutor will not take into account amnesty processes. 
Where states take upon themselves the task of addressing their past, 
international observers must consider the motives impelling them to do so. 
223 Justice Hassan Jallow, the Chief Prosecutor for the ICTR quoted in Okechukwu Oko, "The Challenges 
of International Criminal Prosecution in Africa" (2007) 31-2 Fordham International Law Journal 343 at 
372. This article extensively surveys the problems of international criminal prosecutions. 
224 Goldstone, For Humanity (supra) at 121. 
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Societies in transition often choose to forgo systematic prosecutions for 
fear of destabilizing the new democracy. Nevertheless I would suggest 
that an international prosecutor ignore self-amnesties of the kind granted to 
General Pinochet. On the other hand, in South Africa amnesties have been 
granted by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in consequence of 
legislation approved by a democratically elected legislature - a legislature 
that is representative of the victims of apartheid. It would be appropriate 
for an international prosecutor to consider the wishes of such victims and 
to take into account the moral justification for amnesty proceedings and 
whether in the context it enables the society (as it did in South Africa) to 
end repression in a relatively peaceful manner.225 
This reasoning is closely related to those statements made by the South African 
government in rejecting victims' litigation in U.S. courts that were indicated 
elsewhere. South Africa has adopted the position that the TRC provided 
accountability satisfactory to national reconciliation and it appears no more 
needs to be done other than economic development for the benefit of the rest of 
the population. It follows that it is improbable that South Africa would suggest 
the creation of an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of the Crime of 
Apartheid on its own or cooperate in its creation or to extradite perpetrators, or 
hand-over witnesses and evidence if such a tribunal is set up by the African 
Union or the United Nations. If South Africa has not prosecuted on its own any 
apartheid criminals, how can it cooperate in the creation of an international 
tribunal to prosecute the very criminals it is reluctant to prosecute? 
Goldstone is misguided in that he is referring to individuals who have been 
granted amnesty but the TRC referred for prosecution, individuals who were 
225 Ibid at 122. 
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not granted amnesty and those who never sought it. The South African 
government never prosecuted these individuals and it is not probable that it 
would hand over these perpetrators of the crime of apartheid to an international 
tribunal. There is also no international pressure or pressure from victims to 
create an international tribunal. Apartheid criminals will continue to enjoy their 
impunity for the foreseeable future. There is, however, still a role that can be 
played by an international tribunal for the prosecution of apartheid criminals if 
one were created. 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the possibilities of the creation of an international 
tribunal to prosecute apartheid criminals. Although current international 
tribunals like the ICTY and ICTR have earned credibility through the creation 
of persuasive jurisprudence, the creation of an international tribunal on 
apartheid modelled on these other tribunals is highly unlikely because South 
Africa has taken the position that accountability for the crime of apartheid has 
already been achieved through the TRC process. 
The next chapter discusses the application of the concept of universal 
jurisdiction. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION AND PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMES 
5.1 Introduction 
This study is an assessment of the prospects for the implementation of the 
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of 
Apartheid226 through the application of the concept of universal jurisdiction. 227 The 
prospects or lack thereof for the creation of an international tribunal228 to prosecute 
apartheid criminals has been discussed in the previous chapter. 229 This chapter is a 
literature review of the concept of universal jurisdiction (UJ). It includes an assessment 
of whether UJ could provide a framework for the resolution of the impasse of the crime 
of apartheid. The previous chapter concluded that the creation of an International 
Tribunal for the Prosecution of the Crime of Apartheid is not feasible in the present. 
Roger Clark230 argues that the applicability of universal jurisdiction to the crime of 
apartheid itself has received scant attention.231 The same is the case with respect to the 
creation of the apartheid tribunal contemplated in the Apartheid Convention. The 
226 1015 (U.N.T.S. 243, Nov. 30, 1973, herein referred to also as Apartheid Convention. 
227 Article V of the Apartheid Convention. The concept will be defined below. 
228 As also envisaged in Article V. 
229 Those who committed the crime of apartheid are referred to as Apartheid Criminals. 
230Roger Clark, "Apartheid," in M. Sherif Bassiouni, ed., International Criminal Law, 3d. ed. (Leiden: 
Mertinus Nijhoff, 2008) Vol. 1, 799. 
231 See Mia Swart, "The Wouter Basson Prosecution: The Closest South Africa Came to Nuremberg." 
www.za.eru.de/(2008). 
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discussion on this aspect of the Apartheid Convention232 is especially non-existent in 
comparison to other conventions that have been studied minutely by scholars. Currie 
states that "it is not clear whether, as a matter of customary international law, states may 
exercise full universal jurisdiction over the crime [of apartheid]"233 but "given its status 
as a crime against humanity, and that it is uncontroversial that universal jurisdiction may 
be exercised over crimes against humanity, then universal jurisdiction would seem to 
pertain as a matter of logic, if not state practice."234, to the crime of apartheid. In 
practice this has not happened. 
5.2 Introduction to the Concept of Universal Jurisdiction 
The literature on universal jurisdiction is vast, complex and contradictory. The 
chapter will include evaluating the tenor the concept has currently taken in Africa.235 
Universal jurisdiction is a principle of both conventional and customary international 
law236 
232 Roger Clark, supra note 1: see Graefrath, "Convention against the Crime of Apartheid," (1972) 11 
German Foreign Pol'y 395 Graefrath, "The Crime of Apartheid: Responsibilities and Reparations", (1981) 
Rev Contempt L 31; Blishchenko, Study of the International Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, United Nations, Notes and Documents 3174 (March 1974) (with 
special references to questions of implementation and responsibility under international law); Booysen, 
"Convention on the Crime of Apartheid", (1976) 2 S. Afr YB Int'l L 56; Brehme, Crime of Apartheid 
under International Law (Paper circulated at the Seminar on the Legal Status of the Apartheid Regime in 
South Africa and other Legal Aspects of the Struggle Against Apartheid, Lagos, Nigeria, Aug. 13-16, 
1984); Asmal, International law and the Liquidation of Apartheid, (Paper circulated at the 1984 Lagos 
Seminar). See also R. Bissell, Apartheid and International Organizations 159-60 (1977); United Nations, 
The United Nations and Apartheid 1948-1994 (United Nations Bluebook Series, Vol. 1, 1994; Weissbrodt 
& Mahoney, "International Legal Action against Apartheid", 4 Law & Inequality 485 (1986) 
233 Currie, supra at 294. 
234 Ibid., at 295. 
235 AU-EU Export Report on the Principle of universal jurisdiction (Sharm El-Sheik, Egypt, 2008) ; 
www.africa-union.org (assessed January 2"d, 2010). 
236 See e.g. F. Jessberger, "universal jurisdiction'', in A. Cassese et.al (ed.), The Oxford Companion to 
International Criminal Justice (Oxford: OUP, 2008), at 555; C. Ryngaert, Jurisdiction in International 
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Any text book on international criminal law will contain a definition of various 
elements of universal jurisdiction discussed below.237 
The principle of universal jurisdiction stems from the postulate that some crimes are 
so serious that they harm the international community as a whole and that, as a 
consequence, States are entitled, if not required, to bring proceedings against the 
perpetrators, regardless of the location of the crime and the nationality of the perpetrator 
or of the victims. Among those serious crimes are genocide, crimes against humanity, 
torture, some war crimes, apartheid and slavery. 
The principle of universal jurisdiction derogates from the usual rules of jurisdiction 
as recognized by international law and according to which there are four main criteria to 
establish jurisdiction: 
• Territorial jurisdiction: the State has legal jurisdiction to judge crimes committed 
on its territory; 
• Active personality jurisdiction: the State has legal jurisdiction to judge cnmes 
committed by its nationals; 
• Passive personality jurisdiction: the State has legal jurisdiction to judge crimes 
committed against its nationals; 
• Competence reelle (protective principle): the State has legal jurisdiction to judge 
crimes deemed to constitute a threat to some fundamental national interests. 
Law (Oxford: OUP, 2008), at 101; G. Werle, Principles of International Criminal Law {The Hague: TMC 
Asser Press, 2005) at 171; Principle 1.1 of the Princeton Principles on universal jurisdiction, reprinted in 
S. Macedo (ed.) universal jurisdiction: National Courts and the Prosecution of serious Crimes 
(Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004; Trial: universal jurisdiction, http://www. trial-
ch.org/en/int-law/universal-jurisdiction.htm. 
237 Ibid. 
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In a world where borders tend to blur, universal jurisdiction circumvents the classic 
criteria used by states to have jurisdiction by giving ground to the prosecution of the 
author of a crime, wherever he might be, following a fortuitous arrest, a complaint or a 
denunciation. 
In practice however, several conditions have to be fulfilled for the principle of universal 
jurisdiction to apply: 
• a specific ground for universal jurisdiction; 
• a clear and precise definition of the crime and of its constitutive elements; 
• national means of enforcement allowing the judiciary to exercise their jurisdiction 
over these crimes. 
Thus, the principle of universal jurisdiction is not an abstract entity. In its 
implementation, States have developed two distinct views: 
• a narrow concept according to which a minimum link between the State and the 
author of the crime is required, i.e. the author of the crime must be on the territory 
of the State seeking to prosecute him; 
• a broader concept according to which a claim can be lodged without the accused or 
prisoner sought being actually present (in absentia). 
The world's foremost authority in international criminal law and the application or 
otherwise of universal jurisdiction is perhaps M. Cherif Bassiouni of De Paul University 
Faculty of Law in Chicago. He has also written on the crime of apartheid. 238 Unlike 
numerous Non-Governmental Organizations like Human Rights Watch, Amnesty 
238 See Bassiouni, M. Cherif, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law 2"d Rev. ed. (The 
Hague: Kluwer, 1999). 
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International, Redress and others, who take a purely legal and non-political perspective 
in their advocacy of the need for the application of universal jurisdiction,239 M. Cherif 
Bassiouni's writings on universal jurisdiction are more nuanced, complex, historical and 
take into account political realities obstructing the exercise of universal jurisdiction.240 
M. Cherif Bassiouni241 states that international criminal law through treaty and other 
obligations, impose on nation states the duty to prosecute or extradite those suspected of 
having committed international crimes and to co-operate with other member states in the 
investigation, apprehension, trial and punishment of suspects who have committed an 
international crime. According to Bassiouni, the duty arises because these international 
crimes, such as crimes against humanity, have arisen to the level of "jus cogens". Jus 
cogens means "compelling law" or law deemed to be "peremptory" and 
"nonderogable", crimes for which impunity cannot be granted. These crimes are not 
subject to a statute of limitation; do not qualify for immunities of superiors up to the 
head of state. "Jus cogens" crimes carry further the universality of jurisdiction over such 
crimes irrespective of where they were committed, by whom they were committed, 
239 Amnesty International, Ending Impunity: Developing and Implementing a Global Action Plan Using 
universal jurisdiction (London: Amnesty International Publications, 2009); Amnesty International 
"universal jurisdiction - The duty of states to enact and implement legislation," September 2001, available 
online at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/OR53/002/200l/en/dom-IOR530022001 en.pdf; Human 
Rights Watch, universal jurisdiction in Europe: The State of the Art (2006); Redress, Challenging 
Impunity for Torture: A manual for bringing criminal and civil proceedings in England and Wales for 
torture committed abroad, July 2000. Available at: http://www.redress.org/smartweb/reports/reports; 
Redress, universal jurisdiction in Europe, http://www.redress.org/documents/whatis.html. 
240 See, Bassiouni, "universal jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical Perspectives and 
Contemporary Practice" in Bassiouni, International Criminal Law, supra, Vol. 11, at 153-201; Bassiouni, 
"The Need for International Accountability," in Bassiouni, International Criminal Law, supra, Vol. III, at 
3-29. 
241 Bassiouni, M. Cherif, (ed) International Criminal Law 3rd ed. 3 Volumes (New York: Transnational 
Publishers, 2008). See introduction and particularly chapter 4.7 "Crimes Against Humanity" at 437-492 
for elaboration. 
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against what category of victims and irrespective of the context of their occurrence 
whether in war or peace. Bassiouni 's is a succinct definition of universal jurisdiction. 
Despite the broad principles underlying the "jus cogens" nature of these crimes, 
Bassiouni, recognises that proclaiming broad principles is one thing and implementing 
them is a totally different thing. Bassiouni goes on to say that despite the duty to 
prosecute or extradite and the duty to co-operate, imposed on nation states, there have 
been very few prosecutions since the end of the Second World War when considered 
against the backdrop of millions of victims of wars and internal repression. Central to 
Bassiouni 's voluminous publications is finding an answer to this recurring question: 
"why have there been so few instances of prosecutions and other accountability 
mechanisms?" In his quest to find answers to that question, Bassiouni has come up with 
three explanations for the paucity of prosecutions or other accountability mechanisms: 
(1) "justice is all too frequently bartered away for political settlements". He further 
states (2) "the practice of political impunity has become the political price paid to secure 
an end to the violence of ongoing conflicts, or as a means to ensure tyrannical regime 
changes", and (3) "the limited recognition and application of the theory of universal 
jurisdiction." Universal jurisdiction is an exception rather than the rule in the 
contemporary world. 
Universal jurisdiction embodied in international conventions like the Geneva 
Conventions and Protocols; the Convention on Non-applicability of the Statutory Limits, 
the Apartheid Convention and the Torture Convention and customary international law 
were ineffectively exercised prior to the mid-1990s when the International Tribunal for 
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Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were established. The International Criminal Court 
Statute was founded in 1998 and has provided for the application of universal 
jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction was only exercised when particularly notorious 
perpetrators came to light. "The occasional nature of these trials often called into 
question the objectivity of the proceedings or determination. In addition, the decision to 
investigate and prosecute is often largely driven by political considerations, rather than 
due to the recognition of moral or legal obligations."242 
In his book Amnesty For Crime in International Law and Practice, 243 Andreas 
O'Shea advances nine constraints that hamper the nation states in their duties to 
prosecute or provide accountability mechanisms. These constraints speak to the 
weaknesses of exercising universal jurisdiction. The constraints are as follows: ( 1) the 
law of the state may place hurdles in implementing international criminal law. There 
may or may not be domestic implementation; (2) there may be political constraints such 
as an amnesty or diplomatic relations between countries; (3) there may be political 
constraints to extraditing war criminals, the other state may be tyrannical or have a 
broken-down legal system; (4) there may be financial constraints in domestic 
prosecutions; ( 5) the partiality or perceived bias of the judiciary may be a problem; ( 6) 
local public opinion may be against prosecution of war criminals; (7) there may be 
resistance to one state prosecuting an international crime which is a concern of the 
international community which must prosecute that crime rather than the particular state 
242 John McManus, "A New Era of Accountability Through Domestic Enforcement oflntemational Law" 
in Dumont, Helene and Anne-Marie Boisvert eds. The Highway To The International Criminal Court: All 
Roads Lead To Rome (Montreal: Les Editions Themis, 2003) at 503 - 543 at 506. 
243 (The Hague: Kluwer, 2002) at 98-101. 
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attempting to fulfill an international role; (8) there is no uniformity of prosecutions and 
punishments, therefore reducing or rendering impotent the objectives of punishment 
which is deterrence, and (9) there may be difficulties in effective prosecution of an 
international crime in the state in which the crime did not take place, for example the 
gathering of evidence and the availability of witnesses. I call these constraints, practical 
modalities. 
0' Shea proposes that there are advantages to national prosecutions over international 
prosecutions. 244 He suggests that a domestic prosecution has the certainty of a particular 
state's criminal law and procedure. He also suggests that, unlike universal jurisdiction, 
there is no concern over sovereignty, which can be a stumbling block in international 
relations of states. He goes on to suggest further that it would be easier to prosecute in 
the state in which the crime occurred because of the availability of evidence and 
witnesses. There would be financial advantage because of the pre-existing system of 
courts, judiciary, lawyers and prison system. The international criminal law system 
would not be able to cope with an influx of international criminal trials. The scales tip 
in favour of domestic prosecutions where the crimes took place rather than 
international/universal prosecutions. 
Ultimately universal jurisdiction is a function of politics. Universal jurisdiction has 
often floundered at the altar of political considerations. Professor Gregory Gordon in his 
article, "Averting Abuse of Universal Jurisdiction,"245 gives several examples of the 
244 Ibid, at 102-103. 
245 Gregory Gordon, "Averting Abuse of universal jurisdiction," University of North Dakota Law School; 
available online at http://globallawforum.org/U serf iles/ A vertingAbuseofUniversal. ppt. 
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political uses to which universal jurisdiction has been advanced. The most famous 
example is the running political battle between France and Rwanda where France has 
exercised universal jurisdiction over alleged Rwandan war criminals and had accused 
Rwandan President Paul Kagame of committing war crimes, while Rwanda in tum has 
counter-charged that France was complicity in the commission of war crimes and 
genocide in Rwanda in 1994.246 
In Principle Number Eight of the Cairo-Arusha Principles, African countries have 
declared the following in recognition of one of the fundamental problems of universal 
jurisdiction: "In applying universal jurisdiction, prosecuting authorities shall avoid bias 
and selectivity based on race, gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity, colour, language, 
age, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, birth or other status of 
the suspect. In particular, the application of the principle of universal jurisdiction shall 
not be used as a pretext to pursue politically motivated prosecutions."247 Universal 
jurisdiction is as much a legal concept as it is a dynamic political concept. 
In his book, Global Justice: The Politics of War Crimes Trials248 Kingsley Chiedu 
Moghalu lays bare the politics involved in the application of universal jurisdiction in the 
prosecution of war crimes, be it at the international criminal tribunal or in national 
courts. Moghalu states that the application of universal jurisdiction is based on the 
politics of the situation at hand. 
246 Ibid., at 11-15. 
247 Cairo-Arusha Principles, supra . 
248 Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, Global Justice: The Politics of War Crimes Trials (London: Praeger, 2006) 
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Robert Bork, in his book249 opposes the application of universal jurisdiction on 
ideological and sovereignty grounds. Bork challenges the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction, and what he sees as judicial activism of the judiciary, respectively 
internationally and nationally. Bork has chosen three countries for study: The 
U .S, Canada and Israel. He has also looked at international tribunals. Bork states that 
these three countries and the International tribunals are exercising "judicial 
imperialism" --"the continuing usurpation by the courts of the authority lodged in 
democratic government, pushing along the movement of societies to the cultural left"250• 
According to Bork, judicial imperialism at home and abroad is fuelled by many forces: 
the cultural left relying on the existence of rights that were never provided for in the 
various constitutions; the internationalization of law by the existence of international 
organizations which purport to develop new rights; the existence of international 
tribunals with their insistence on national courts applying notions of international law, 
law which is more politics than law; increasing judicial preference to cite foreign laws 
and judgments and the corruption of international law influenced by the 
misinterpretation of the US Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA). Bork concludes his book by 
stating that "universalistic rhetoric which is what rights talk is teaches disrespect for the 
actual institutions of any nation, perhaps particularly democratic nations"251 • Bork 
identifies a formidable danger brought about by judicial imperialism, "rights become 
249 Coercing Virtue: The Worldwide Rule of Judges (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2002). 
250 Ibid at 20. 
251 Ibid at 194-195. 
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weapons in political, cultural, and legal struggles for superiority accompanied by the 
redistribution, in the claimants' favour of wealth and privilege"252. 
Another critic of universal jurisdiction, although from a different perspective than 
Bork, is Osgoode Hall Law School Professor Michael Mandel253 . Whereas Bork is 
opposed to the exercise of universal jurisdiction, Michael Mandel is sceptical about the 
claim by the supporters of the international prosecution movement, i.e. those who urge 
for prosecution of war criminals, that war crimes prosecutions engender justice or 
accountability or forestall impunity. Mandel's book is perhaps the most comprehensive 
and critical of the books against the international prosecution/ criminal law movement. 
Mandel seeks to expose the hypocritical character of the modem war crimes movement 
which he regards as perhaps an unconscious proxy for US imperialism and not judicial 
imperialism as per Bork. "In practice, international criminal law has been very good at 
legitimating war and very bad at promoting peace" or justice254 . The US has labelled its 
enemies as war criminals in order to justify wars against the enemies, for 
example Yugoslavia and Iraq. The international prosecution movement has followed 
suit. The people who have been prosecuted are all or mostly the enemies of the US and 
their allies while the real war criminals, the US in Iraq and other places, NA TO and their 
allies have escaped any investigations or prosecutions. The US has shielded itself from 
the jurisdiction of international criminal law and the application of universal jurisdiction. 
In his view the international criminal tribunals are creatures of the US with 
252 Ibid at 194. 
253 How America Gets Away with Murder: 11/egal Wars, Collateral Damage and Crimes Against 
Humanity (London: Pluto Press, 2004). 
254 Ibid at 249. 
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hidden US agendas. The majority of judges in these tribunals are US - approved and are 
mainly from NATO countries or other US allies. Victims do not secure justice in these 
tribunals or in the national tribunals. "The usual suspects will continue to be rounded up 
while America gets away with murder". 255 Universal jurisdiction is not about the 
exercise of just international law principles, it is the exercise of political hegemony, 
particularly of the U.S. 
Mandel's book is sobering. He points out that Africans are now tried in Europe, a 
Europe that had colonized Africa. "They put these events, and these trials of Africans by 
European Courts, right in their context of 100 years of colonial rule, 80 of them by these 
same Belgians who now presumed to try their colonial subjects for crimes that they did 
plenty to encourage and nothing to prevent"256. 
Mandel argues that the U.S. has also imposed the institution of specially constituted 
tribunals. He has taken the examples of the Nuremberg and Tokyo criminal tribunals 
after the Second World War and the international criminal tribunals for Rwanda and 
former Yugoslavia. These four tribunals that were created to try war criminals, were 
engineered he says, by the U.S. after imposing its will on the international community. 
Convictions of the accused were and are the order of the day in these tribunals, he 
concludes. 
The tribunals that were supported by the U.S. had a specific mandate and mission, 
with limited jurisdictions. These were not international criminal tribunals with universal 
jurisdictions. Mandel argues that they were limited to trying respectively Nazi, 
255 Ibid at 233. 
256 Ibid at 231. 
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Japanese, Rwandese and Yugoslavian war criminals and that the U.S. had resisted the 
creation of international criminal courts with universal jurisdiction to try all war 
criminals including terrorists. 
The judiciary has also been pointed out as one of the obstacles to the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction. For example, Michael Kirby in his article ''universal jurisdiction 
and Judicial Reluctance: A new "Fourteen Points"257 discusses the attitude of the 
judiciary in matters of universal jurisdiction. Michael Kirby, is a world renowned 
Australian jurist who sat on the highest court of appeal there, lists the reasons in general 
terms why judges everywhere are reluctant to exercise universal jurisdiction over war 
criminals. Only a few will be mentioned: judges do not want to usurp the political power 
of the legislatures; war crimes cases are more political than legal and they tread on 
sovereign and diplomatic prerogatives; Judges prefer to defer to political organs on 
issues involving crimes that happened elsewhere; Judges are suspicious that war crimes 
laws are retroactive applications of later laws, an anathema to the established principles 
of criminal law; judges detest adjudicating crimes that happened elsewhere when all 
crime is traditionally local; Judges regard war crimes as new crimes and of uncertain 
applications; Judges have trouble adjudicating on criminals that may have benefited 
from amnesties and accorded immunities from their home country; Judges are reluctant 
to impose judicial imperialism on other countries or judiciaries; war crimes cases are 
usually politically controversial; Judges prefer that these cases be referred to 
international tribunals; and there are hardly any precedents for such cases; there is 
257 In Stephen Macedo, Ed. universal jurisdiction: National Courts and the Prosecution of Serious Crimes 
Under International Law (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2004) at 240 to 260. 
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already enough workload to be bothered with cases involving other nations and foreign 
cnmes. 
If all judiciaries were to base their reluctance on these reasons, then there would be 
no universal jurisdiction. 
5.3 The Law and Politics of Universal Jurisdiction 
It has been alluded above that the exercise and concept of universal jurisdiction is 
mirred in politics. But it goes deeper than that. There is no definition or agreement and 
consensus in international law as to what constitutes universal jurisdiction. When is 
universal jurisdiction to be exercised? There is no international convention cataloguing 
what universal jurisdiction means other than some specific sections of various 
conventions that state and provide for the exercise of universal jurisdiction.258 To 
overcome the lack of definition and international convention denoting what universal 
jurisdiction is, and to correct the confusion, some scholars of international standing met 
at Princeton University in 2004 and developed what they called the Princeton Principles 
on universal jurisdiction which could be used as a basis for a unitary international 
convention. 259 As of 2013 there is no convention specifying what universal jurisdiction 
means. In the meantime most nation states have incorporated into their domestic laws 
258 See discussion in C. Cherif Bassiouni, "The History of universal jurisdiction and its Place in 
International Law" in universal jurisdiction: National Courts and the Prosecution of Serious Crimes 
Under International Law, (ed.) Stephen Macedo, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 
at 39 to 64. 
259 The "Princeton Principles" are reproduced in Ibid at 18 to 26. 
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sections of international conventions allowing these states to exercise universal 
jurisdiction. 
The following subsections discuss vanous international attempts at refining the 
concept of universal jurisdiction. 
5.4 The United Nations and Universal Jurisdiction 
Apart from conventions developed by the United Nations that provide for universal 
jurisdiction, there has also been UN Declarations and resolutions on universal 
jurisdiction. The UN Security Council has similarly done the same. As Amnesty 
International indicates, "for nearly four decades, the General Assembly has been 
adopting resolutions which permit states to exercise universal jurisdiction."260 The 
following section deals with some of the Declarations. The 1973 Principles of 
International Co-operation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of 
Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity provides that: 
War crimes and crimes against humanity, wherever they are committed, 
shall be subject to investigation and the persons against whom there is 
evidence that they have committed such crimes shall be subject to tracing, 
arrest, trial and, if found guilty, to punishment. Persons against whom 
there is evidence that they have committed war crimes and crimes against 
humanity shall be subject to trial, and, if found guilty, to punishment, as a 
general rule in the countries in which they are committed those crimes. In 
that connection, States shall co-operate on questions of extraditing such 
persons. 261 
260 Amnesty International, universal jurisdiction: UN General Assembly Should Support this Essential 
International Justice Tool (London: Alpublications, 2010), at 55. This and following sections rely on the 
Amnesty International publication. 
261 Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 3074 (XXVIII) of3 December 1973, at paras. 1 and 5. 
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In 1989 Principles on the Effective Prevention and Investigation of Extra-legal, 
Arbitrary and Summary Executions states: 
Governments shall ensure that persons identified by the investigation as 
having participated in extra-legal, arbitrary and summary executions in any 
territory under their jurisdiction are brought to justice. Governments shall 
either bring such persons to justice or co-operate to extradite any such 
persons to other countries wishing to exercise jurisdiction. This principle 
shall apply irrespective of who and where the perpetrators or the victims 
are, their nationalities or where the offence was committed.262 
The 1992 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons form Enforced Disappearance 
provides: "All States should take any lawful and appropriate action available to them to 
bring to justice all persons presumed responsible for an act of enforced disappearance, 
who are found to be within their jurisdiction or under their control."263 
The 2005 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation 
for Victims of Gross Violation of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law also provide: 
In cases of gross violations of international human rights law and serious 
violations of international humanitarian law constituting crimes under 
international law, States have the duty to investigate and, if there is 
sufficient evidence, the duty to submit to prosecuting the person allegedly 
responsible for the violations and, if found guilty, the duty to punish her or 
him. Moreover, in these cases, States should, in accordance with 
international law, co-operate with one another and assist international 
judicial organs competent in the investigation and prosecution of these 
262 Recommended by Economic and Social Council Resolution 1989/65 of24 May 1989, Principle 18. 
263 Adopted by General Assembly resolution 47/133of18 December 1992, art. 14. 
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violations. To that end, where so provided in an applicable treaty or under 
other international law obligations, States shall incorporate or otherwise 
implement within their domestic law appropriate provisions for universal 
jurisdiction. 264 
5.5 Studies by the UN Secretariat and Expert Bodies 
In May 20 I 0, the Office of Legal Affairs submitted a survey of state practice 
concernmg the extradition or prosecution obligation to the International law 
Commission.265 On October I, 2010 the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights 
published a report on crimes under international law committed in the !Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) between 1993 and 2003.266 With regard to the role that 
states outside the DRC could play in ending impunity in that state using extraterritorial 
and universal jurisdiction, it stated: 
I 027. While there are prosecution mechanisms that could be 
implemented in the DRC to bring action against the many crimes 
committed, each State still has an immediate role to play in the fight 
against impunity. Certain States can also play a crucial role in the success 
of judicial proceedings, whether they are conducted by jurisdictions in 
another country or by an international or mixed jurisdiction. 
I 029. The exercise of extraterritorial or universal jurisdiction is made 
obligatory by international law in certain international conventions on the 
grounds that the most serious crimes under international criminal law, 
264 Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 60/147of16 December 2005, at paras. 4 and 
5. 
265 Survey of multilateral conventions which may be of relevance for the Commission's work on the topic 
"The obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere autjudicare)": Study of the Secretariat, 26 May 2010 
(http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/a cn4 630.pdf). 
266 Report of the Mapping Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and 
International Humanitarian Law Committed Within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo Between March 1993 and June 2003 (June 2010) 
(http:///www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countires/ZR/DRC Mapping Report Final En.pdf). 
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namely war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and torture, must 
not go unpunished. This principle authorizes the prosecution of 
perpetrators of these crimes even if there is no link between the offence 
and the State which brings proceedings. This form of jurisdiction is based 
on the nature and gravity of the crimes committed. Thus, a large 
proportion of the crimes committed between 1993 and 2003 on DRC 
territory can be prosecuted in accordance with universal jurisdiction. 
1031. All States should therefore apply these texts and their own laws, 
on the basis of either extraterritorial or universal competence, to prosecute 
those who bear the greatest responsibility for the crimes documented in 
this report, complying fully with the provisions of international law in 
effect. They should also co-operate with the implementations of 
procedures operating outside of their own judicial systems, by responding, 
for example, to the needs of their national or int~rnational jurisdictions 
carrying out investigations and agreeing to extradite the perpetrators to 
States that request it.267 
5.6 Commissions of Inquiry 
The Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict 
(Goldstone Report) concluded: 
127. in the context of increasing unwillingness on the part of Israel to 
open criminal investigations that comply with international standards the 
Mission supports the reliance on universal jurisdiction as an avenue for 
States to investigate violations of the grave breach of provisions of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949, prevent impunity and promote international 
accountability (Chapter XXVIII) 
1654. It is the view of the Mission that universal jurisdiction is a 
potentially efficient tool for enforcing international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law, preventing impunity and promoting 
international accountability. In the context of increasing unwillingness on 
the part of Israel to open criminal investigations that comply with 
international standards and establish judicial accountability over its 
military actions in Occupied Palestinian Territory, and until such a time as 
clarity is achieved as to whether ICC will exercise jurisdiction over 
267 Ibid, at paras. 1027 and 1031 (footnotes omitted). 
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allegedly crimes committed in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
including in Gaza, the Mission supports the reliance on universal 
jurisdiction as an avenue for States to investigate violations of grave 
breach provisions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, prevent impunity 
and promote international accountability. 
1975. The Mission recommends that States' Parties to the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 start criminal investigations in national courts, using 
universal jurisdiction where there is sufficient evidence of the commission 
of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Where so warranted 
following investigation, alleged perpetrators shquld be arrested and 
prosecuted in accordance with internationally recognized standards of 
justice. 268 
Universal jurisdiction as a principle is thus widely accepted and disseminated by the 
United Nations and its organs and in international criminal law and tribunal 
jurisprudence. 
5.7 Africa and Universal Jurisdiction 
African countries and scholars have engaged in a debate while supportive of "the 
principle of universal jurisdiction within the context of fighting impunity as well as the 
need to punish perpetrators of genocides, crimes against humanity and war crimes,"269 as 
to whether Africa is a guinea pig of the ICC and the experimental field in the exercise of 
universal jurisdiction.270 As of September 2012, the ICC had so far only charged 
268 U.N Doc. A/HRC/12/48, 25 September 2009, at paras. 127, 1654 and 1975 
(http://www.ohcr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/ l 2session/ A-HRC-12-48 .pdf). The Goldstone Report 
was highly and heavily condemned in many quarters but it is not our aim to discuss this issue here. See 
Alan Dershowitz, "The Case Against The Goldstone Report" accessed on December 301h, 2010. 
269 I 21h Africa-EU Ministerial Troika meeting, Summary; 28 April 2009, Luxembourg, at paras. 38 and 39 
(http://www.europa-eu-un.net/articles 86.htm). 
270 Report of the Commission on the Use of the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction by Some Non-African 
States as Recommended by the Conference of Ministers of Justice/Attorneys-General, Executive Council, 
13•h Ord .. See 24-28 
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Africans with international crimes and most if not all of the investigations of 
international crimes pertained to Africa. The ICC has not only investigated low level 
alleged criminals, it has also issued warrants against a sitting Head of state. European 
countries have used or attempted to use their universal jurisdiction mandates against 
sitting African foreign ministers or diplomats. As a result of these developments, 
African states take the view that they have been singularly targeted in the 
indictment and arrest of their officials and that the exercise of universal 
jurisdiction by European states is politically selective against them. This 
raises a concern over double standards, and the concern is heightened by 
multiple charges being brought against officials of African states in the 
jurisdictions of different European states. The African perception is that 
the majority of indictees are sitting officials of African states, and the 
indictments against such officials have profound implications for relations 
between African and European states, including the legal responsibility of 
the relevant European states. 271 
June 2008, Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, EX.CL/41 l(XIII) 
(http://intemationaljusticeafrica.org/documents/EX. CL %20411 (XIIl)%20-
%20study%20on%20Universal%20Jurisdiction.doc); Charles Jalloh, "Universal Jurisdiction, Universal 
Prescription? A Preliminary Assessment of the African Union Perspective on Universal Jurisdiction"; 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2009-38, University of Pittsburgh, March 2010; Makau Mutua, 
"The International Criminal Court in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities" Legal Studies Research Paper 
Series No. 2011-003, University of Buffalo, Law school, September 2010; Alexis Arieff et. Al., 
International Criminal Court Cases in Africa: Status and Policy Issues, Congressional Research Service, 
Washington, D.C, April 2, 2010; Louise Arimatsu, Universaljurisdictionfor International Crimes: 
Africa's Hope for Justice? Chatham House Briefing Paper, April 2010. www.chathamhouse.org.uk; Julia 
Geneuss, "Universal Jurisdiction Reloaded? Fostering a Better Understanding of Universal Jurisdiction: 
A Comment on the AU-EU Expert Report on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction" (2009) 7 JICJ 945. 
271 Report of the Commission on the Use of the Principle of universal jurisdiction, supra at para. 34 
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The African Union has openly challenged "the political nature and abuse of the 
principle of universal jurisdiction by judges from some non-African states against 
African leaders."272 
The African Union perspective addressed some of the questions raised by Mandel. 
Who developed international criminal law principles? Who benefits from their usage? 
The African Union perspective is useful in analysing the application of universal 
jurisdiction to prosecute apartheid criminals. 273 Once a question is posed as did Garth 
Meintjes in his paper, "If Apartheid is a Crime, Why Has No-one Been Prosecuted,"274 
the inquirer is raising the African Union perspective question. This is the underlying 
basis of this study: How and why have apartheid criminals gotten away with impunity 
and how can this development be arrested? 
African countries have observed the dearth of concern accorded to the cnme of 
apartheid. In developing the Cairo-Arusha Principles of Universal Jurisdiction (referred 
to as the African Perspective), African countries had in mind, among others, that: "The 
principles are prompted, among other things, by a concern that certain offences which 
have particular resonance in Africa, such as the crime of apartheid, have so far not 
272 Louise Amaritsu, supra, at 14; for a sustained discussion of the ICC's case load in Africa, see Alina 
Joana Apreatesie, The International Criminal Court: Starting with Africa? PhD Dissertation, Peter 
Pazmany Catholic University Budapest (2008). 
273 For a discussion ofTWAIL, see Makau Mutua, "What is TWAIL?" ASIL Proceedings April 5-8, 2000, 
Washington, D.C; Obiora Chinedu Okafor, "Newness, Imperialism, and International Legal Reform in 
Our Time: A TWAIL Perspective," [2005] 43: 1&2 Osgoode Hall LJ, 171; Makau Mutua, "Critical Race 
Theory and International Law: The View of an Insider-Outsider" [2000] 45 Villanova LR 840. 
274 Garth Meintjes, "If Apartheid is a Crime, Why Has No-one Been Prosecuted," (October-December 
2002) AFLA Q 19. 
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attracted prosecution under the principle of universal jurisdiction."275 , or the setting up 
of an international tribunal to prosecute the crime of apartheid. The crime of apartheid 
is thus a significant concern in the international politics of African countries. 
Apartheid is a concern of this dissertation in the context of the application of 
universal jurisdiction. The African countries recognized that, "While it is generally 
preferable to try gross human rights offences in the State where they occurred, it is 
sometimes necessary, in order to avoid impunity, to make use of international tribunals 
or other national jurisdictions."276 In the preamble, the Cairo-Arusha Principles on 
Universal Jurisdiction state that: "Most African States have accepted the principle of 
universal jurisdiction by becoming parties to instruments which provide for universal 
jurisdiction over certain crimes under international law, including under the 1949 
Geneva Conventions, the 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid and the 1984 Convention Against Torture. Many 
of those States, however, have not ensured that their courts can exercise jurisdiction in 
respect of gross human rights offences on the basis of universal jurisdiction."277, and 
African countries have not made any efforts to establish an International Tribunal on 
Apartheid. 
Although South Africa never ratified the Apartheid Convention, it has accepted the 
principle of universal jurisdiction through the ratification of other treaties or their 
incorporation into South African domestic law. South Africa has ratified the Rome 
275 The Cairo-Arusha Principles on Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of Gross Human Rights Offences: 
An African Perspective (Africa Legal Aid, 2002). 
276 Ibid. 
277 Ibid. 
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Statute of the ICC which stipulated that apartheid is a cnme against humanity. 
Customary international law is also regarded as domestic law when it does not conflict 
with South African domestic law. Thus the crime of apartheid is part of domestic law 
in South Africa and is prosecutable. 
The next sections deal with a few cases where truly universal jurisdiction has been 
claimed to have been applied. 
5. 7 .1 The Demjanjuk Case 
The legal issues that have come up m literature opposing universal jurisdiction 
include the prospect for violating the "double jeopardy" principle of due process where 
one accused could be charged in various jurisdictions for the same offences. A clear- cut 
case for this is the Demjanjuk case. 278 In the early 1980s in the US, Demjanjuk was 
accused of having been Ivan the Terrible, the person who terrorized Jewish prisoners in 
German concentration camps. Since the US had no prosecution policy involving war 
criminals at that time, Demjanjuk was deported to Israel at Israel's request. Demanjuk 
had no conriection to Israel. Israel was exercising universal jurisdiction. He was 
convicted at trial and the appeal was upheld at the second level. Later, the Supreme 
Court of Israel acquitted him on the basis of "new evidence". Demjanjuk spent several 
years in Israeli prisons while the decision on appeal was being awaited before he was 
allowed to leave for the US where he had been a citizen since 1958. Demjanjuk was 
278 For a comprehensive look at John Demjanjuk, see Y oram Sheftel, Show Trial: The Conspiracy to 
Convict John Demjanjuk As Ivan The Terrible (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1995). 
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again extradited to Germany in 2009 to stand trial for his crimes during the Second 
World War. He was again convicted in Germany and sent to prison. 
The Demjanjuk case gives ammunition to those who are opposed to the exercise of 
u~iversal jurisdiction as it could tend to trample on the prohibition against "double 
jeopardy" rights as well as those who are opposed to the trials taking place decades after 
the alleged offences had taken place given the eventuality that witnesses and evidence 
would long be buried. To prevent this happening, universal jurisdiction should be 
exercised immediately after the atrocities have taken place and prosecutions should only 
be undertaken by one country. Extraditions, if any, should also be requested as early as 
possible. 
To the supporters of the exercise of universal jurisdiction, the Demjanjuk affair is a 
dire warning to war criminals and criminals against humanity: that they will not run and 
hide forever, that they would be pursued relentlessly no matter how long it takes and no 
matter how old they are. Thus Demjanjuk offers lessons for both supporters and 
opponents of universal jurisdiction. 
5. 7 .2 The Eichmann Case 
Adolf Eichmann was a leader in the Nazi regime. He fled to Argentina afterwards 
where he lived incognito for years. He was abducted by Israel in 1961 and flown to 
Israel for trial as a war criminal. 279 Questions that arose in this case include whether it 
279 For a comprehensive study of the Eichmann trial and case of universal jurisdiction, see Hanna Arendt, 
Eichmann in Jernsalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (London: Penguin, 1994). See also Gary Bass, 
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was morally justified for Israel to abduct Eichmann from Argentina and what signal was 
that sending in terms of international relations and the sovereignty of nation states? Did 
the ends justify the means? On what jurisdictional basis did Israel which had not existed 
when Eichmann committed the offences, try him? On jurisdiction, the Jerusalem 
District Court upheld Israel's jurisdiction to try Eichmann and perhaps set the trend for 
future assumption of jurisdiction world-wide: 
The abhorrent crimes defined in this Law are not crimes under Israeli law 
alone. These crimes, which struck at the whole of mankind and shocked 
the conscience of nations, are grave offences against the law of nations 
itself ... Therefore, so far from international law negating or limiting the 
jurisdiction of countries with respect to such crimes, international law 
is .. .in need of judicial and legislative organs of every country to give 
effect to its criminal interdictions and to bring the criminals to trial. The 
jurisdiction to try crimes under international law is universal. 280 
Was that post:facto justice? The case also raised the issue of whether Eichmann 
could get a fair trial in Israel given the accusations facing him, the composition of the 
society and judiciary within which he was tried and the laws under which he was 
prosecuted, i.e. specifically, laws criminalizing the treatment of Jews by the Nazis. Was 
this a show trial? According to Ed Morgan, a then University of Toronto Faculty of Law 
professor in his book, The Aesthetics of International Law281 there is nothing in the 
annals of war crimes jurisprudence that competes with the Eichmann case in terms of 
theatrical or legal message. It is the most compelling war crimes drama of all. This is 
despite the observation that the Demjanjuk case has the most closely associated public 
.. The Adolf Eichmann Case: Universal and National Jurisdiction" in Macedo, (Ed.) universal jurisdiction, 
supra. at 77 to 90. 
280 Quoted in Gregory Gordon, "Averting Abuse of universal jurisdiction," supra., at 6. 
281 (Toronto et al: U ofT Press, 2007) at 19. 
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theatrics with public prosecutions282 of war criminals. Eichmann is one of the clearest 
examples of the application of the principle of universal jurisdiction. 
This case, like the Demjanjuk case also has something for both supporters and 
opponents of the application of universal jurisdiction. 
5.7.3 The Pinochet Case 
Augusto Pinochet's arrest in London on a Spanish warrant in 1998 both dismayed the 
opponents of universal jurisdiction283 and pleased the supporters of universal 
jurisdiction.284 The Pinochet case has been used by both camps to support their 
arguments about the dangers or virtues of the principles of universal jurisdiction. 
Kissinger and all those opposed to the exercise of universal jurisdiction have stated that 
the Pinochet case has destroyed the peaceful intercourse of nation states by transforming 
international politics into legal questions and the emergence of judicial imperialism, and 
that the practice interferes with national solutions to historic problems, for example the 
engagement into reconciliatory gestures and the granting of amnesties. Those in support 
of universal jurisdiction state that the Pinochet case is a powerful signal that impunity 
for war criminals and criminals against humanity is over and that more nations need to 
flex their muscles more through the frequent exercise of universal jurisdiction. 
282 Ibid. 
283 See for example Henry Kissinger, "The Pitfalls of Universal jurisdiction" (July/ August 200 I) Foreign 
Affairs. 
284 Human Rights Watch, universal jurisdiction in Europe: The State of the Art (June 2006); Kenneth 
Roth, "The Case for universal jurisdiction" (September/October 200 l) Foreign Affairs. 
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Central to the Pinochet case was the issue of immunity from prosecution for heads of 
states. Immunity is a defence to the application of universal jurisdiction. Rosalyn 
Higgins, a former judge of the International Court of Justice, has conveniently 
summarised the Pinochet case. 285 In the first Pinochet case a 3 :2 majority found that to 
the extent that Senator Pinochet enjoyed immunity with regard to conduct within the 
'functions' of a Head of State, the commission of international crimes was not within 
those functions and he had no immunity for those acts. However, this ruling was set 
aside in the second Pinochet case due to the links between one of the Law Lords and 
Amnesty International, an intervener in the case. 286 In the third Pinochet case287 a 6: I 
majority decided that Senator Pinochet could not benefit from immunity for the specific 
torture claims. Torture is a crime against humanity. Lord Brown-Wilkinson thought that 
after the affirmation of the Nuremberg Principles adopted by the General Assembly in 
1946 there existed the concept of crimes in international law - originally linked to war, 
but then decoupled from that: 'I have no doubt that long before the Torture Convention 
of 1984 state torture was an international crime in the highest sense. ' 288 In his view, the 
Torture Convention did not create a crime but established a system to fight it, one which 
required states to exercise jurisdiction or extradite. Still addressing the common law 
situation, he thought the immunity ratione personae was lost by a Head of State who 
was no longer in office, but his immunity in respect of official acts was preserved when 
285 
"International Law" in Blom-Cooper, Louis, B. Dickson & G. Drewry, (eds.), The Judicial House of 
Lords, 1876-2009 (Oxford: OUP, 2009), at 466-468. The following pages rely on the Higgins article. 
286 R. v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary, exp Pinochet Ugarte [2000] I AC 61. 
287 Ibid, (No 3) (2000] I AC 147. 
288 Ibid, 198. 
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he left office. However, the situation changed with the entry into force of the Torture 
Convention, which prohibited torture whether ordered by a Head of State or committed 
by an underling. If the former were to retain immunity ratione personae after departure 
from office, the whole purpose of the Convention would be thwarted. 
Lord Hope of Craighead dispelled the notion that it is not a function of state to 
commit acts which customary international law regards as crimes. It was held to be 
unsound in principle: '[T]he purpose for which [the acts] were performed protects these 
acts from any further analysis. ' 289 He was of the view that there was no general 
agreement as to whether crimes contrary to )us cogens were removed from immunity 
under customary international law. There thus remained for Lord Hope the question of 
whether a former Head of State had immunity in the courts of the state which had 
jurisdiction to try the crime.290 He came to the conclusion that it could not be implied 
that the Torture Convention had removed immunity ratione personae from former 
Heads of State for international crimes, but he then held that the immunity of Senator 
Pinochet could not survive Chile's agreement to the Torture Convention 'if the 
torture ... was of such a kind or on such a scale as to amount to an international crime. ' 291 
Developments in international law were 'in place' by 1988 and the 'obligations which 
were recognized by international customary law in the case of such serious crimes by 
[the date of Chile's ratification of the Torture Convention] are so strong as to override 
289 Ibid, at 242. 
290 Ibid, at 243. 
291 Ibid, at 246. 
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any objection on the grounds of ratione personae over crimes committed after that 
day.'292 
Lord Saville of New di gate agreed with Lord Nicholls in believing that immunities for 
parties to the Convention could not exist consistently with the terms of the Convention. 
To him there was no question of seeing if there had been an express or implied waiver: 
Indeed it seems to me it is those who seek to remove such alleged official 
torturers from the machinery of the Convention who in truth have to assert 
that by some process of implication or otherwise, the clear words of the 
Convention should be treated as inapplicable to a former head of state, 
notwithstanding he is properly described as a 'person who was acting in an 
official capacity. ' 293 
Lord Millett stood alone on certain points in his reasoning. His view that no statutory 
authority was required for the courts to exercise jurisdiction over international crimes (of 
which torture was one even before the Torture Convention was agreed) stood in contrast 
to that of his colleagues, who believed that such authority was conferred for the first 
time by section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. He also agreed with Lords 
Nicholls, Hope and Saville that the definition of torture in the Convention was entirely 
inconsistent with the plea of ratione personae: 'the official or governmental nature of 
the act, which forms the basis of the immunity, is an essential ingredient of the offence. 
No rational system of criminal justice can allow an immunity which is co-extensive with 
the offence. ' 294 
292 Ibid, at 248. 
293 Ibid, at 267. 
294 Ibid, at 277. 
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For Lord Millett, once a state was party to the Convention, there was no immunity to 
be waived. The implication would seem to be that that is so even so far as a current Head 
of State is concerned. By contrast, Lord Phillips of Worth Mantravers thought the 
argument would only concern what immunity Senator Pinochet might have had under 
the Torture Convention as a former Head of State. He thought it was still an open 
question whether international law recognized universal jurisdiction in respect of 
international crimes, but he held that 'no established rule of international law requires 
state immunity ratione personae to be accorded in respect of prosecution for an 
international crime. ' 295 He added: 'international crimes and extraterritorial jurisdiction 
are both new arrivals in the field of public international law ... I do not believe that state 
immunity ratione personae can co-exist with them. ' 296 
Lord Goff was the sole dissenter, sharing the views of Lords Slynn and Lloyd in the 
first appeal that no universal jurisdiction in respect of international crimes existed under 
customary international law. He found that, under section 20(1) of the State Immunity 
Act 1978, a former Head of State retained immunity for official acts and that the 1984 
Convention had not altered that. Lord Goffs analysis is not the prevailing perspective. 
5. 7 .4 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic 
of the Congo v. Belgium, also known as the Yerodia Case)297 
295 Ibid, at 289. 
296 Ibid. 
297 Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium (2002) I.CJ Reports 3. 
127 
In the exercise of its universal jurisdiction mandate, Belgium charged and issued a 
warrant for the arrest of Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, a sitting Congolese Foreign 
Affairs Minister for torture and war crimes. The Democratic Republic of Congo brought 
a claim against Belgium for its unwarranted use of universal jurisdiction and for 
violating the immunity rights of a sitting Foreign Affairs Minister. The charge and 
warrant were issued in absentia. Belgium at the time was applying a "broad" concept of 
universal jurisdiction as opposed to a "narrow" application used by most countries that 
assert universal jurisdiction which requires the alleged criminal to be present in the 
jurisdiction of the forum country. 
The International Court of Justice ruling that "rung around the world" stated, m 
contradiction to the Pinochet case, that "in international law it is firmly established that, 
as also diplomatic and consular agents, certain holders of high-ranking office in a state, 
such as Head of State, Head of Government and Minister of Foreign Affairs, enjoy 
immunities from jurisdiction in other states, both civil and criminal." But "it is only 
immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability of an incumbent Minister of 
Foreign Affairs."298 
The l.C.J however went on to decide that after an immunised person has left the 
position for which they had immunity, that person could be prosecuted. The court also 
held that an incumbent or former Minister of Foreign Affairs may be subject to criminal 
proceedings before certain international criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction. 
298 Ibid., at 21. 
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The prohibition of criminal prosecution of a sitting Head of State or Minister only 
applies to foreign national courts, but not to international tribunals like the ICC. 
This decision confers universal jurisdiction on specifically created international 
tribunals that have been mandated for the application of such jurisdiction. The default 
position is national jurisdictions applying universal jurisdiction. 
5.8 Civil Actions Against Corporations and Universal Civil Jurisdiction 
Victims of apartheid have brought a gigantic suit in the U.S. against vanous 
corporations for "aiding and abetting" apartheid. The reason why apartheid victims 
sought civil reparations elsewhere is because of the inadequate response to the provision 
of reparations to the victims at home. The first attempt of the victims of apartheid to 
access universal civil jurisdiction in US courts was nearly derailed when the District 
Court Judge, Justice Sprizzo dismissed the suit on a motion for summary judgement by 
the corporations. 299 In re South African Apartheid Litigation the Court had agreed with 
the representations of the US and South African governments that acceding to the suit 
would be intruding into foreign relations and policies of these countries. It was also 
argued that the suit would harm foreign investment in South Africa. Further it was 
pointed out that the suit would harm the purpose of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. One of the central elements posited for the opposition to universal 
jurisdiction is on this point: political question doctrine or the imperatives of foreign 
299 346 F. Supp 2"d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). See also Andrew Farrelly, "Foreign Policy in the Court - The 
ATCA and In Re: South African Apartheid Litigation: What Sosa Makes Courts Do" [2006] 30:2 Seton 
Hall Legis J 437. 
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policy. The sovereignty of the South African government to dictate its own policies 
regarding reparations would be injured by the exercise of power of a foreign court. 
Indeed in the South African Apartheid Litigation case, the presiding judge, despite the 
fact that 108 nations had ratified the Apartheid Convention, more nations than all the 
western countries put together, claimed the following strange logic: "Despite near-
universal condemnation of apartheid, Western European and North American countries 
have neither signed nor ratified the Apartheid Convention. This illustrates substantial 
international conflict concerning acceptance of the precise norms articulated in the text 
of the Apartheid Convention"300 . There is no analysis as to why western states never 
supported the Apartheid Convention or why the western standard of international 
criminal law must override the rest of the world's stance. It would have been due to 
economic interests, the fear of communism, and further that these countries had troubled 
racial histories themselves. Instead of questioning the morality of western countries, the 
judge is questioning the morals of the majority countries that ratified the Apartheid 
Convention. 
Although some other scholars as reviewed in an earlier chapter condemned apartheid 
as a crime against humanity, the kind of reasoning displayed by Sprizzo clearly suggest 
that apartheid criminals stand a good chance of acquittal in western courts. They could 
conceivably convince a judge that since the Apartheid Convention was not signed or 
ratified by any western government, it would not be safe to found a conviction upon it, 
300 Sprizzo, Ibid. 
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despite its incorporation into the Rome Statute and dismissively into Canada's Crimes 
Against Humanity and War Crimes Act. 
The victims appealed the decision to the US Court of Appeals, Second Circuit where 
the case was reversed and remanded301 . An appeal to the US Supreme Court by the 
defendants was dismissed on a technicality because the court could not constitute a 
quorum302. The case went back to the District Court before a new judge303 where Justice 
Sheindlin upheld the suit that aiding and abetting the crime of apartheid could be 
founded in the ATCA, i.e. the Federal Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit304 . 
In defending the suit, the corporations have deployed an arsenal of defences 
including the following in their Briefs:305 
• the plaintiffs fail to 'state a claim cognisable under the (tort statute) 
grant of jurisdiction' violating the laws of nations or a treaty of the 
US; 
• 'aiding and abetting international law violations are not actionable 
under the statute'; 
• 'allegations of aiding and abetting the apartheid government do not 
state a claim because doing business with apartheid South Africa 
did not violate international law'; 
• 'no defendant is alleged to have been involved in the promulgation 
or enforcement of the laws by which apartheid was administered 
(or) alleged to have committed torture, genocide or extrajudicial 
killing'; 
• 'complaints are composed almost exclusively of allegations 
concerning the sale of automotive vehicles and computers, and the 
loans of funds to parties in South Africa - conduct that is not and 
has never been violation of international law'; 
301 Khulumani v Barclay 504, F. 3d 254 (2"d Cir.2007). 
302 
"Justices won't hear apartheid suit" New York Times 12 May 2008. 
303 Justice Sprizzo had died in the interim. 
304 Case 1:02-md-01499-SAS, Document 141, 04/08/2009, USDC, SDNY. 
305 See summary in Patrick Bond and Khadija Sharife "Apartheid Reparations and the Contestation of 
Corporate Power in Africa" (2009) ROAPE 109. 
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• International law 'never imposed obligation on defendants to 
divest'; 
• 'none of the defendants' home countries ever prohibited South 
African commerce altogether'; 
• the UN Resolutions were limited to 'intense debates over whether 
to prohibit commerce with South Africa'; 
• the UN General Assembly is not a 'law-making body' but exists 
instead for purposes of 'political discussion' which is at best 
'merely advisory'; 
• various resolutions, e.g. UN Security Council Res. 569 ( 1985), 
were not binding on member states or corporations; 
• the tort statute is interpreted (and constrained) by 'specificities 
comparable to l 81h century paradigms related to piracy etc.; 
• the tort statute's jurisdiction does not extend to the extraterritorial 
nature/conduct of multinationals in foreign nations, and that it was 
never intended to be used applied outside US borders; 
• international law does not recognise corporate liability with 
jurisdiction extending to natural persons only, further highlighting 
that no international court has ever found a corporation guilty of 
'violating a norm of international law'; 
• the tort statute does not contain a statute of limitations, hence the 
defendants borrow the ten year limitation of the Torture Victim's 
Protection Act, to dismiss the claims; 
• there is 'no basis for tolling the limitations period ... to overcome 
their failing to bring suit so many years after Mandela's election ... 
• Khulumani's claims do not relate back as initially, the suit was 
materially different (deliberate on the part of Khulumani 's 
counsel), who have only this year switched to 'class action'; 
• Khulumani lacks associational standing, for 'the presence of the 
individual members - the real parties in interest - is required 
importantly to avoid the risk of duplicative litigation'; 
• 'Khulumani (KSG) lacks standing to sue on its own behalf; 
• 'cases are non-justiciable under the political question doctrine ... 
the adjudication of these cases before the Court would conflict with 
clearly articulated foreign policy and interfere with international 
diplomacy'; 
• South Africa views adjudications as intrusion upon its sovereignty: 
'SA has at every tum urged the US courts not to adjudicate 
plaintiffs claims'; 'plaintiffs seek massive monetary penalties on 
behalf of the classes they purport to represent ... SA considers it to 
be a direct challenge to the reparations programme carefully 
designed by the post-apartheid government to confront the legacy 
of apartheid'; and hence 
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• The successful prosecution of the case would disrupt the growth of 
the South African economy, undermining economic stability and 
deterring foreign direct investment 
In February 2012, one of the corporations, General Motors Company, settled the suit 
with the victims for 1.5 million worth of shares in the company. 306 The other 
corporations are still litigating. The conclusion of the apartheid litigation cannot be 
foretold. 
The scholarly commentary on the apartheid litigation in the United States that 
opposes the litigation adopts the position of the companies summarized above, while 
those in support of the litigation like Jeffrey Davies form part of the other burgeoning 
literature307 and claim that foreign litigation ensures that corporations that aid and abet 
war criminals do also not get away with impunity. One remedy to the impunity of 
apartheid criminals may lie in replicating these suits on natural individual apartheid 
criminals, abroad. 
5.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined a few cases where the concept of universal jurisdiction 
had purportedly been used. These are cases where the prosecuting state had no 
connection to the territory in which the crime took place. This is the paradigm that could 
306 Bill Corcoran "Apartheid Victims Secure GM Compensation Deal" Irish Times 3 March 2012. 
307 See; among others, Jeffrey Davis, Justice Across Borders: The Struggle for Human Rights in US 
Courts (Cambridge et al: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Kirsten Hutchens "International Law in the 
American Courts - Khulumani v Barclay National Bank Ltd.: The Decision Heard "Round the Corporate 
World"(2005) 9:5 German LJ 639. 
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be used in the prosecution of apartheid criminals in Canada or in any other country for 
that matter. 
The next chapters discuss the possibility of the prosecution of apartheid criminals 
in Canada. A long historical chronology of this legal possibility is developed in the next 
several chapters. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES LEGISLATION AND 
PROSECUTION IN CANADA, 1945-2005 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the genesis of Canada's implementation and exercise of the 
instrument of universal jurisdiction that began with the pursuit of Nazi war criminals. 
Canada's possible role in addressing the crime of apartheid during and after the 
apartheid era has to be placed in context of Canada's war crimes policy in general and 
historically. This discussion has to precede the specific policies Canada could have 
adopted with respect to South Africa during the apartheid era. Canada fought against 
Nazi Germany during the Second World War and could be justified in prosecuting and 
pursuing Nazi war criminals in Canada. Nazi Germany killed Canadian soldiers. There 
is no such connection with respect to apartheid South Africa. However, as will be seen 
later, Canada had no connection with respect to the genocide in Rwanda but Canada has 
prosecuted those accused of genocide in Rwanda who happened to live in Canada. How 
Canada dealt with Nazi war criminals found in Canada from 1946 to the 1980s can be 
instructive as to how it could have dealt with apartheid criminals found in Canada 
between 1948 and 1994 and after. This chapter deals with Canada's war crimes 
legislations and prosecutions following the Second World War, particularly with respect 
to Nazi War criminals. This chapter demonstrates the lengthy and convoluted politics of 
war crimes prosecutions in Canada. 
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6.2 The Moral Panic 
It took an article in the Ottawa Citizen in 1985,308 by a New York Times reporter, 
who claimed that Joseph Mengele, a Nazi Doctor (popularly called the "Angel of 
Death"), was in Canada or had applied to enter Canada, to cause a "moral panic"309 in 
the Canadian Government of the day to convoke a Commission of Inquiry on War 
Criminals in Canada310• That the mention of Mengele triggered the panic is evident 
from the minute that set up the Commission of Inquiry in motion311 : 
WHEREAS concern has been expressed about the possibility that 
Joseph Mengele, an alleged Nazi war criminal, may have entered or 
attempted to enter Canada; 
WHEREAS there is also concern that other persons responsible for war 
crimes related to the activities of Nazi Germany during World War II 
(hereinafter referred to as war criminals) are currently resident in Canada: 
AND WHEREAS the Government of Canada wishes to adopt all 
appropriate measures necessary to ensure that any such war criminals 
currently resident in Canada, or hereafter found in Canada, are brought to 
justice. 
THEREFORE, the Committee of the Privy Council on the 
recommendation of the Prime Minister, advises that, pursuant to the 
Inquiries Act, a Commission do issue under the Great Seal of Canada, 
appointing the Honourable Mr. Justice Jules Deschenes, of the Superior 
Court of Quebec, to be Commissioner under Part I of the Inquiries Act to 
conduct such investigations regarding alleged war criminals in Canada, 
including whether any such persons are now resident in Canada and when 
and how they obtained entry to Canada as in the opinion of the 
Commissioner are necessary in order to enable him to report the Governor 
in Council his recommendations and advice relating to what further action 
might be taken in Canada to bring to justice such alleged war criminals 
308 Ralph Blumenthal, New York Times, 23 Jan. 1985, at A4. 
309 See Jnji-a discussion of "Moral Panic". 
31° Commission of lnquily on War Criminals (Ottawa, 1996) (The Jules Deschenes Report). 
311 Ibid, at 17. 
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who might be residing within Canada, including recommendations as to 
what legal means are now available to bring justice any such persons in 
Canada or whether and what legislation might be adopted by the 
Parliament of Canada to ensure that war criminals are brought to justice 
and made to answer for their crimes. 
The Commission understood clearly why it was convoked and Jules Deschenes was 
aware of the high stakes involved. He states on page 245 of the Report that "the 
sensational allegations concerning Dr. Mengele's connection with Canada were the 
straw that broke the camel's back: the matter had to be clarified once and for all." 
The government had not responded to the call for a study into war crimes made by 
the much respected Law Reform Commission of Canada just the previous year. In its 
1984 study entitled "Extraterritorial Jurisdiction"312 the Commission recommended: 
That the Government of Canada authorized a study of the complex subject 
of war crimes including relevant aspects of international law, comparative 
law, constitutional law, criminal law and military law with a view to 
determining what war crimes legislation should be enacted by Canada to 
replace our present outdated legislation. Until that study is done, any other 
recommendations would be premature. Regardless of who undertakes the 
study, the Ministry of the Solicitor General of Canada and the Departments 
of Justice, National Defence and External Affairs should be included as 
participants in it. 
In fact the government already had several pieces of legislation on the books, 
pertaining to war crimes, which legislation was never used, but at the same time, it was 
never repealed313 • These pieces of legislation comprised of, the War Crimes Act314 of 
312 Working paper 37, (Ottawa, 1984). 
313 Ibid, at 83. 
314 S.C. 1946, C. 73. 
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1946 and the Geneva Conventions Act of 1965.315 The War Crimes Act of 1946 enabled 
Canada to continue to prosecute German soldiers accused of killing Canadian soldiers 
during the Second World War and the Geneva Convention Act of 1965 was Canada's 
implementation of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 that dealt with the treatment of 
the captured or wounded soldiers in international armed conflicts. 
More significant however, is that previous references to Joseph Mengele did not 
cause a "moral panic" in the government to cause it to request for a Commission to 
recommend requisite legislation. The presence or attempted entry into Canada of Joseph 
Mengele was extensively investigated between 1961 and 1962316. This never led to calls 
for war crimes legislation. Nor did the massive albeit intermittent pressure on the 
governments of Canada since the end of the Second World War to do something about 
war crimes result in any concerted response by the government to enact war crimes 
legislation. This time around, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney called the presence of 
Nazi war criminals in Canada, "a moral outrage."317 Suddenly reports in the press 
appeared suggesting that there were as many as 6,000 Nazi war criminals in Canada.318 
Moral panic was triggered. 
This chapter is an attempt to understand why in 1985, the government of Canada 
succumbed to the pressure to deal with Nazi war criminals in Canada by new and 
specific legislation. It is argued utilizing the concept of "moral panic" that the 
315 R.S.C. 1970, C. G-3. 
316 Supra, at 67-82. 
317 Quoted in Irwin Cotler, "Response to the Deschenes Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals" in 
Cotler (ed.) Nuremberg: Forty Years Later (Kingston: McGill-Queen's Printer, 1987) at 74. 
318 Ramon Hnatyshyn, "Domesticating the Nuremberg Principles: The Canadian "War Crimes" 
Legislation" in Cotler, ibid, at 35. 
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invocation of the image of Joseph Mengele in 1985, after the image had been absent for 
more than 20 years, became a convenient governmental precipitant to respond, 
especially after an accumulation of unprecedented pressure by very well organized and 
articulate "moral entrepreneurs" and pressure groups. A lengthy historical background 
going back to 1945 is necessary in order to understand the developments of 1985. 
The war crimes legislation is a good example and case study of how modem pieces 
of criminal legislation are brought on the scene by pressure groups utilizing "moral 
panic" of the moment or period. Depending on the timing, opportunity, pressure and 
duration of the "moral panic" incident, legislatures typically respond accordingly. It is 
argued that the finished product of criminal legislation is the product of a political 
process driven by pressure groups or victim groups. 
To understand the politics of war crimes legislation319, it is necessary to examine the 
history of the treatment of the issue of war crimes in Canada from 1945 to the present. 
6.3 The Definition of Moral Panic 
The concept of moral panic320 was coined by Stanley Cohen to explain societal 
reactions to and labelling of certain incidents that must be controlled because they pose 
real or perceived threat to society. According to Cohen: 
Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral 
panic. A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to 
319 Incorporated in Section 7 of the Criminal Code of Canada. 
320 Stanley Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of the Mods and Rockers, (London: Basil 
Blackwell, 1972, 1990 Edition). 
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become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is 
presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the 
moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other 
right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their 
diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) 
resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and 
becomes more visible. Sometimes the object of the panic is quite novel 
and at other times it is something which has been in existence long 
enough, but suddenly appears in the limelight. Sometimes the panic 
passes over and is forgotten, except in folklore and collective memory; at 
other times it has more serious and long-lasting repercussions and might 
produce such changes as those in legal and social policy or even in the way 
h . . . If 321 t e society conceives itse . 
Stuart Hall and others322 have amplified the definition of moral panic: 
When the official reaction to a person, groups of persons or series of 
events is out of all proportion to the actual threat offered when "experts," 
in the form of police chiefs, the judiciary, politicians and editors perceive 
the threat in all but identical terms, and appear to talk "with one voice" of 
rates, diagnoses, prognoses and solutions, when the media representations 
universally stress "sudden and dramatic" increases (in number involved or 
events) and "novelty" about and beyond that which a sober, realistic 
appraisal could sustain, then we believe it is appropriate to speak of the 
b . . f l . 323 eginnmgs o a mora panzc. 
The moral panic caused by the invoked spectre of the possibility of Joseph Mengele 
being in Canada in 1985 can only be comprehended by the confluence of events, 
individuals and politics of the immediate period as well as the history of the concern for 
war criminals in Canada. The panic itself was unleashed by one Sol Littman, who had 
devoted his life to ventilating the issue of war criminals in the world and in Canada in 
321 Ibid, at 9. 
322 Stuart Hall et al. Policing The Crisis: Mugging, The State, and Law and Order, (London: Methuen, 
1978, 1979 Edition). 
323 Ibid, at 16. 
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particular. Sol Littman was a representative of Simon Wiesenthal. During the 
Commission of Inquiry hearings, Sol Littman indicated that he supplied the information 
to Ralph Blumenthal of the New York Times in his article on Joseph Mengele. Sol 
Littman said that his assertions were based on "speculation", "impression", "possibility'' 
and "hypotheses"324. The general media picked this information up and splashed it in 
bold headlines. Suddenly Canada came to be portrayed as a "haven for war criminals," a 
distinction Canada did not want to have. Moral panic had set in. Did Canada become a 
leader in war crimes legislation and attempted prosecutions in order to shed the label it 
had acquired of being a haven for war criminals? Canada later became one of the 
moving forces in advocating for the Rome Statute that led to the creation of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). 
According to the Commission, Littman's indication of the hoax of his creation came 
too little too late: "the commission could not, of course, foresee that tum of events, and 
it devoted some substantial time inquiring into the Mengele affairs"325 • The 
Commission concluded that on the basis of the available evidence, it is established 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Dr. Joseph Mengele has never entered Canada".326 
The Mengele panic assumed a life of its own which still reverberates in Canada 
through the war crimes legislation in the Criminal Code as amended, and associated 
offshoots in the Immigration Act as amended, and the Citizenship Act as amended. 
Joseph Mengele is a name associated with some of the worst atrocities of Nazi Germany. 
324 Deschenes Report, at 68. 
325 Ibid. 
326 Ibid, at 76. 
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Dr. Mengele was assigned to the concentration camp of Auschwitz (a death camp) 
where he conducted the cruel experiments which history, according to the commission, 
has recorded.327 According to Irwin Cotler, a McGill Law professor at the time, the 
allegation about Mengele may have been a catalyst in prompting the government to do 
something that ought to have been done some forty years ago. But Mengele was not just 
another Nazi war criminal. "He was a metaphor for evil, for those monstrous crimes of 
which the Prime Minister spoke" 328• The combination of the images of "Mengele" and 
"Auschwitz" was explosive. It was the worst possible combination of evil, combustible 
enough to trigger a moral panic, the panic that caused the Mulroney government to 
convoke a Commission of Inquiry. 
Legislation was needed to ensure that justice must be done to war criminals, even if 
the crimes they committed were committed a long time ago and in a foreign land and 
even if these old war criminals had never posed any danger to the public in Canada. This 
was the uniqueness of the war crimes legislation as it was initially designed, it was 
moral panic invoked by unrequited distant occurrences. Almost all moral panics are 
caused by contemporary events. 329 
In South America the moral panic associated with Nazi war criminals could be 
justified on the basis that the escaped war criminals joined, supported or led repressive 
and genocidal regimes in South America. A study by Y ossi Schwartz, 330 indicates that 
327 Ibid, at 68. 
328 Cotler, Supra, at 74. 
329 Supra. 
330 
"Nazi War Criminals and The Death Penalty" in Munyonzwe Hamalengwa, (ed.) Political Halley's 
Comet, The Death Penalty in Global Comparative Perspective (manuscript with author), at 222-234. 
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former Nazis found useful employment in South American regimes. In Chile, for 
example, Walter Ruaff who was responsible for the death of 250,000 prisoners in the 
Ukraine during the war, was appointed by Augusto Pinochet as Chief Advisor for the 
Board investigating communist activities. Pinochet was later found to be a war criminal 
by the House of Lords in England and therefore extraditable331 • Klaus Barbie, a 
notorious Nazi escaped to Bolivia via and with the assistance of the U.S. government. 
There, under his leadership the storm troopers were trained in secret camps at Sanda 
Cruez de la Sierra, later to take part in the military coup conducted by General Garcia 
Meza in July 1980. In Paraguay, Alfredo Stroessner, the military dictator of several 
decades, hosted Joseph Mengele, former Gestapo Chief Heinrich Muller Pavelic, the 
leader of Nazi Croatia, among others. In Brazil, Alfred Boettcher who as an SS Officer 
served in Holland, and whom The Hague war crimes tribunal sentenced in absentia, 
became a Director of the Atomic Board and a Coordinator of the Nuclear Treaty with 
South Africa. Thus war crimes legislation would have been necessary to curtail the 
continuing danger posed by former Nazi war criminals. 332 
Irwin Cotler justified the enactment of war crimes legislation on the basis of five 
principles: (1) fidelity to the rule of law; (2) respect for Canadian Citizenship; (3) 
fidelity to our international obligations; (4) fidelity to Holocaust remembrance, and (5) 
fidelity to our children333 . I need not elaborate on these principles. 
331 Exparte Pinochet (No.3) (House of Lords), March 1999. 
332 Schwartz, supra. 
333 
supra, at 86. 
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On the other hand, calls for war crimes legislation have historically been on a number 
of grounds dismissed as "foreign baggage" by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau;334 that it 
would not "be advisable to start having trials in Canada on actions that occurred in other 
nations" according to Justice Minister Jean Chretien;335 that legislation was not 
necessary because it would "upset people";336 the United Kingdom developed a program 
in 1948 which Canada implemented, stipulating that "it was now necessary to dispose 
of the past";337 that it was pandering to "Jewish revenge" to deal with Nazi war 
criminals;338 that the issue of Nazi war criminals was an "ethnic quarrel between Jews 
and Ukrainians"339 and that Canada should do what is in the interests of Canada. It was 
also argued that war crimes legislation was "an exercise in selective discrimination" 
because it appeared to deal only with Nazi war criminals and not others. 340 
David Matas, a prolific writer on Nazi war criminals and a prominent lawyer and 
international human rights activist wrote in his paper, "The struggle for Justice: Nazi 
War Criminals in Canada" (2000)341 what I consider to be a summary of the history of 
Canada's policies and treatment of war criminals to the present: 
First Canada gave a haven to the murderers of Jews. But the state did 
nothing because Canada is not a Jewish state. Then Canada allowed the 
entry of Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese war criminals. But officials did 
nothing because Canada is not an Asian state. Then Canada found itself 
334 Svend Robinson, "Nuremberg Forty Years Later: Bringing War's Criminals to Justice In Our Time", 
in Cotler, supra, at 48. 
335 Ibid. 
336 Ibid. 
337 Deschenes Report, at 27. 
338 Cotler, supra, at 75. 
339 Ibid. 
340 Ibid, at 77. 
341 In From Immigration to Integration: The Canadian Jewish Experience: A Millenium Edition (B'nai 
Brith Canada: 2000). 
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with Ugandan, Rwandan and Somali war criminals. But again nothing was 
done because Canada is not a Ugandan, Rwandan or Somali state. Then 
Canada granted admission to Chilean, Central American and Argentinean 
perpetrators of crimes against humanity. Again nothing was done, because 
Canada is not a Chilean, Central American or Argentine state. Then 
Canada allowed entry of Soviet and Balkan criminals against humanity. 
Still nothing was done because Canada is not a European state. By the 
time the immunity Canada gave to Nazis was drawn to its logical and 
inevitable conclusion, Canada had become the dumping ground for the 
world's worst criminals, a rogue's gallery of those who have committed 
the world's most heinous crimes. The roadblocks that prevented Nazi mass 
murderers from being brought to justice ended up benefiting perpetrators 
of atrocities. 
6.4 Historic Opportunities and International Climate 
Shane Kelleher provides a quote from an Irish Minister of Justice, Nora Owen which 
is also apt to our study here. She stated that "there are moods and there are times when 
certain proposals will gain credence with the public. It is not a case of politicians not 
doing it".342 
There have been historic opportunities and the international climate has been 
repeatedly ripe since at least 1942 for the enactment of war crimes legislation in Canada. 
In the 1940s alone the international community developed and engaged in war crimes 
legislation and prosecution of Nazi war criminals and also designed international human 
rights instruments and treaties in response to the atrocities of the Nazi-inspired war. The 
following were the most significant developments which could have influenced 
Canadian legislation on war criminals:343 
342 Shane Kelleher, "Moral Panic: Crisis in Civil Liberty" paper prepared for a course for LLM, Osgoode 
Hall Law School, contained in Criminal Law course materials by Professor Hay and Beare 1999, at 579. 
343 See Deschenes Report, at I 01. 
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The Declaration on the Punishment for Crimes Committed during the 
War: St. James, 13 January 1942; 
The Declaration on German Atrocities: Moscow, 30 October 1943; 
The Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War 
Criminals of the European Axis: London, 8 August 1945; 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3 (I): 13 February 1946; 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 170 (III): 31 October 1947. 
Canada took the following position: 
Canada is not a party to the "Declaration of Hitlerites" [Sic} or the 
"Regulations of the International Military Tribunal" and is not bound by 
them. Canada views U .N. Resolutions as recommendations only and not 
binding legal obligations. 344 
The 1942 St. James' Declaration was issued by nine governments whose countries 
were occupied by Nazi Germany. Canada was an observer. The Declaration took note 
of Nazi violence against civilian populations, declared as one of the principal war aims 
the punishment of those guilty for such crimes and expressed the international 
determination that judgements be passed and sentences be carried out. 
The 1943 Moscow Declaration was a declaration of policy on the part of the United 
Kingdom, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. It provided for the return and trial of war 
criminals. The 1945 London Agreement was the basis for the Nuremberg trials and was 
signed by the U.K., the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and France. Nineteen countries became 
members. It is important to mention here that Canada never signed the London 
Agreement which formed the basis of the IMT and the Nuremberg Principles. It could 
344 Ibid. 
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be said, however, that its subsequent legislation is recognition of the Nuremberg 
Principles as well as general norms of international law on the issue under discussion. 
The United Nations resolutions called for the punishment of war criminals. Canada 
did seize the opportunity and enacted the War Crimes Act in 1946. This Act was 
limited to trying war criminals who had engaged in atrocities against Canadian 
personnel. These trials were conducted in Europe between 1945 and 1948. Thereafter, 
Canada abided by the advice of the United Kingdom in 1948 that "it is now necessary to 
dispose of the past as soon as possible". Minister of Justice Ramon Hnatyshyn explained 
Canada's subsequent inactivity in the field of war criminals, "during the fifties and 
subsequently as individuals and nations moved to put the trauma and horror of the 
Second World War behind them, the pursuit of war criminals became less of a priority in 
many countries".345 
Did however individuals and nations move to put the trauma and horror behind? Or 
was it Canada and a few nations that did this for other reasons? 
The efforts to pursue war criminals waned in all the major western countries 
immediately after the war to compel the Commission of Inquiry to note that "Canadian 
policy on war crimes during that long period was not worse than that of several Western 
countries which displayed an equal lack of interest". 346 The most prevalent activity took 
place from 1945 to 1949 and lessened or ceased in all major countries by 1952. Only 
socialist countries and the Federal Republic of Germany continued the effort against war 
345 Supra, at 46. 
346 Deschenes Report, at 33. 
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criminals. The Socialist Countries included Poland, the German Democratic Republic 
and the Soviet Union. 
Paradoxically at the level of the international community, especially at the United 
Nations, the rhetoric against war criminals never stopped. This was reflected by a 
phalanx of conventions and resolutions. In 1948, the United Nations passed the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and in 1949 the 
Geneva Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War were adopted. They all provided for the 
prevention and punishment of war crimes. 
In 1966, after a lengthy gestation period, the UN adopted the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights. This covenant set the stage for passing retroactive laws to 
punish previous wrongs like war crimes. The European Convention on Human Rights 
was adopted in 1958 with similar retroactive legislative features. In 1968, the UN 
adopted the Convention on the Non-applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes 
and Crimes Against Humanity which required state parties not to limit the period within 
which war criminals could be tried. And over the period, particularly from 1969 to 
1973, the UN passed numerous resolutions in which the need was reiterated to punish 
those persons responsible for both war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
Canada never signed the convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory 
Limitations. Its objections during the preparations for the Civil and Political Rights 
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Covenant led the Deschenes Commission to remark that "Canada's position was not 
glorious at all". 347 
Canada did also not sign the International Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973). It provided for universal jurisdiction in 
the investigation and prosecution of war criminals. Canada did not have to wait for the 
incorporation of war crimes elements into its domestic law before investigating or 
prosecuting war criminals. Customary international law was pregnant with permissive 
principles of universal jurisdiction. The courts may have held otherwise but Canada did 
not even try. 
However, it cannot be stated that there was no international atmosphere for the 
apprehension and punishment of war criminals. The international atmosphere was 
conducive but another "panic" had broken out the spectre of communism. 
6.5 The Cold War Panic 
In February 1946, it was made known to the unsuspecting public that a Russian spy 
ring had been operating in Ottawa. It was only exposed as a result of the defection of a 
Russian cipher clerk, Igor Gouzenko. The RCMP raided several homes in Ottawa on the 
morning of February 15th, 1946. The media headlines during and the following days, 
weeks, months and years were unrelenting. The panic of a Russian spy ring with the 
potential of stealing atomic secrets and spreading soviet communism resulted in the 
34 7 Deschenes Report, at 14 3. 
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convocation of a Commission of Inquiry. Posters graced Parliament Hill, "we want no 
Iron Curtain here". 348 
Had it not been for the enormity of the just concluded war in Europe, the cold war 
panic may have eclipsed the pursuit of war criminals. In many respects, in the long run, 
the cold war relegated the pursuit of war criminals to the back burner. The Commission 
of Inquiry into war criminals accepted the conclusion from a study: 349 
The central factor to consider in understanding why most countries have 
not sought out, prosecuted and punished Nazi war criminals to their full 
ability throughout the past forty years is the other issues have taken 
precedence (e.g., national rebuilding or the "Cold War") over bringing war 
criminals to justice which has been shifted, deliberately (as in France) or 
inadvertently to a lesser priority in their national agendas. The immediate 
post-war search for justice found and punished a considerable number of 
obvious big-name war criminals. This crusading spirit has been difficult to 
sustain for a long period of time especially as most of the remaining war 
criminals were low in rank and importance. 
The panic over communism in the post war era was immediately reflected in the 
flurry of legislation, particularly in the field of immigration law. After decades of 
dormancy, the Immigration Act was overhauled in 1952. Most of the changes dealt with 
preventing communists or perceived communists from entering Canada. The concern 
over the entry of suspected war criminals waned. The security net against war criminals 
was lowered, while that against communists was heightened. 
348 See Reg Whitaker, Cold War Canada. The Making of a National Insecurity State, 1945 - 1957 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) cover and at 27-81. 
349 Deschenes Report, at 32-33. 
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Between 1945 and 1953, the Immigration Act as amended prohibited the following 
classes from entering Canada: 
d) persons guilty of crimes involving moral turpitude; 
n) persons advocating the overthrow by force of the Government of 
Canada or the assassination of public officials; 
o) persons affiliated with organizations which preach such doctrines; 
p) enemy aliens or persons who have been alien enemies and who 
were or may be interned on or after the 11th day of November 1918; 
q) persons guilty of espionage; 
r) persons guilty of high treason or who assisted His Majesty's 
enemies in time of war. 
In June 1953, spies and saboteurs were added. "Enemy aliens" became synonymous 
with "communists". Remarkably in September 1950 prohibition against nationals of 
Germany was lifted but maintained against the nationals of Japan and others. 
The shift in concern for communists as against war criminals becomes meaningful if 
one considers that on October 14, 1946, the Allied Control Council in Directive Number 
38 sought to track down the following individuals: 1) major offenders, 2) offenders 
(activists, militarists, and profiteers, 3) lesser offenders, 4) followers, 5) persons 
exonerated. Major offenders included "war criminals".350 
The following categories of individuals continued to be rejected by Canada in 1949: 
350 Deschenes Report, at 181 . 
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1) member of SS or German W ehrmacht or a person found to bear 
mark of SS blood group (non-Germans); 
2) member of Nazi party; 
3) evasive and untruthful under interrogation; 
4) Failure to produce recognizable and acceptable documents as to 
time of entry and residence in Germany; 
5) false presentation or use of false or fictitious name. 
Canada issued a senes of Cabinet Directives in 1949, 1950, 1951 and 1952 
classifying and reclassifying individuals who could be rejected for entry. The Cabinet 
Directive of October 28th, 1949 stated that a visa is to be refused to "communists, 
members of the Nazi or Fascist parties or of any revolutionary organization, 
'collaborators' and users of false or fictitious names or documents".351 . A circular by 
the Department of Citizenship and Immigration issued as No. 72A pursuant to Order-in-
Council 4364 of September 14th, 1950 stated that "German nationals could now be dealt 
with on the same basis as any other European nationality".352 "Membership of the Nazi 
Party will not in itself be a cause for exclusion."353 Members of the Nazi Party or 
Waffen SS who were assessed to pose security risks continued to be denied entry in 
Canada. But Canadian resolve against Nazism was waning. The moral panic of 
communism caused the Canadian government to act in a way that might seem 
contradictory to its previous established principle of denying Nazis entry into Canada. 
351 /bid,atl82. 
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The Cold War made acceptable people who might otherwise have been considered 
unacceptable because of their role in Nazism. 
There was a clear shift from concern for war criminals to concern for individuals who 
would cause a security threat to Canada. All individuals who came to Canada passed 
through a security check system, including members of the infamous Galicia Division, 
who were alleged to be war criminals. 
The Galicia Division joined the Nazis in order to fight against the Communists in 
Russia. After the war, members of this division feared communist persecution. 354 This 
group of individuals, was thoroughly examined for security and criminality reasons and 
was found not to pose any security risks to Canada and was cleared of any commission 
of war crimes during their service in the German army. The Commission of Inquiry 
concluded that "charges of war crimes against members of the Galicia Division have 
never been substantiated, either in 1950 when they were first preferred, or in 1984 when 
they were renewed, or before this commissio,n."355 
6.6 The Second Wave: Continuing Political Pressure 
The Haralds Puntulis case exemplified the inactivity of the Canadian government in 
assisting with the apprehension of known war criminals in Canada. Puntulis was 
convicted in absentia in Latvia in 1965 for treason. But he was already in Canada, 
having entered Canada in 1948. The Soviet Union tracked him down to Canada and 
354 John Sopinka, Submission to the Deschenes Commission on behalf of the Ukrainian Canadian 
Committee. 5 May 1986. 
355 Ibid, at 261. 
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asked for his extradition in 1965. Canada refused on the grounds that the countries did 
not share an extradition treaty. Canada made no effort to initiate an extradition treaty 
with the Soviet Union in order to ensure that Puntulis would be extradited. Nor did 
Canada initiate domestic legislation so that Puntulis could be tried from within Canada. 
Puntulis died of natural causes in Toronto in 1982, "undisturbed by a Canadian 
government that preferred to tum the other cheek to the allegations against him". 356 
However, when Germany made a request for the extradition of war criminal Hemult 
Rauca in 1973, Canada could not refuse the request on account of lack of an extradition 
treaty with Germany. There was one. The only problem was that there was no 
documentation with which Rauca could be apprehended. There were no documents 
attacking the person to his documentary identity. He was eventually arrested for 
extradition in June 1982, almost ten years after Germany had requested for his 
extradition. The Rauca case aroused a lot of interest and possibilities as to how to deal 
finally with war criminals in Canada.357 
By the time Rauca was arrested and tried for extradition, the political and legal 
climate had begun to somewhat shift and intensify. After 1982, the political and legal 
pressure to do something about war criminals shifted completely. The following table 
shows the reports on numbers from various individuals of war criminals in Canada. The 
issue could no longer be ducked by Canada, starting in the early 1970s. 
356 On the Puntulis case and Canada's general disinterest, see David Matas and Susan Charendoff, Justice 
Delayed: Nazi War Criminals in Canada (Toronto: Summerhill Press, 1987), at 143. 
357 Federal Republic of Germany v Rauca (1982), 41 O.R. (2nd) 225. 
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6. 7 Statements in Chronological Order358 
This table is reproduced to show that for a government to act in cases where it is 
unwilling to do so, that government may require consistent and sustained pressure by the 
affected constituencies. The Canadian Jewish Congress and its supporters continued to 
press the Canadian government over a long period of time to prosecute Nazi War 
Criminals. Pressure was mounted along with the researched evidence on why 
prosecutions were called for. Governments do not always act just because it is the right 
or legal or moral thing to do. 
Alleged number of war criminals living in Canada 
1971, 19 May Simon Wiesenthal Toronto Star Several hundred 
1975, 26 Dec. Unidentified groups Montreal Gazette Over 50 
1976, 1 Dec. Michael Hanusiak Toronto Star At least 50 
1977, 11 Nov. Ian Adams Weekend Magazine 800 
1979, 6 March Robert Kaplan House of Commons Over one dozen 
1979, 6 March Maurice Dupras House of Commons Some 15 
1979, 25 March Olivia Ward Toronto Star Over 1,000 
1980, 28 April Meir Halevi Globe and Mail 200 
1981, January Interdepartmental Report to Government 500-100 
Committee 
1981, 24 Feb. Sabina Citron Globe and Mail 1,000 
1981, 29 May Abraham Cooper Regina Leader-Post 1,000 
1981, 13 July Irwin Cotler Ottawa Citizen At least 100 
1981, 15 Sept Adalbert Rueckerl Vancouver Sun 500-1,000 
1982, 18 June. David Matas Toronto Star 50-60 
1982, 12 Oct. Charles Kremer Windsor Star Over 2,000 
1982, 6 Nov. Dept. Of Justice Toronto Star Handful 
1982, 6 Nov. RCMP Toronto Star 80-100 
1982, 6 Nov. Irwin Cotler Toronto Star 75-100 
1983, 13 March Robert Kaplan Toronto Sun Over 100 
1983, 13 April Irwin Cotler La Presse Maybe 1,000 
1983, 5 July Jewish Defence Globe and Mail Maybe 1,000 
League 
358 Reprinted from Deschenes Report at 246-7. 
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Several events and issues towards the end of the 1970s and early 1980s conspired to 
drive the issue of Nazi war criminals in Canada to the forefront of the political agenda. 
The events and issues are not presented in any order of importance or chronology. The 
German statute of limitations became effective. This meant an end to further war 
crimes prosecutions in Germany. A world-wide protest convinced West Germany to 
extend its deadline indefinitely. Canada's ambassador to West Germany spoke 
vociferously on the issue.359 
The second event was the Elizabeth Holtzman Amendment in the House of 
Representatives in the U.S.A. It promised to strip war criminals of their U.S. citizenship 
and to be extradited or deported to various countries. A number of people were 
denaturalized and extradited or deported, including to Israel. John Demjanjuk was the 
most prominent first example of the U.S legislation. The U.S. developments energized 
the political debate in Canada. The U.S. established a special unit within the Department 
of Justice with a single mission: to track down and investigate alleged Nazi war 
criminals in the United States and where evidence warranted it, to bring actions to expel 
them. 
The third event was that Robert Kaplan became the Solicitor-General of Canada 
during the second Trudeau government which was re-elected in 1980. Robert Kaplan 
had been intensely lobbied by Jewish individuals and organizations, and had brought a 
private member's bill in 1978 to do something about Nazi war criminals. That bill did 
359 See Matas and Charendoff, supra, at 79. 
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not pass. Now in 1980, he was Solicitor General, in charge of the R.C.M.P. which are 
responsible for investigation of cross-border and international crimes. According to Sol 
Littman, "as a representative of a Toronto riding whose constituency is one-third Jewish 
and includes many holocaust survivors, Kaplan found some spiritual ease and 
considerable political advantage in criticizing the government for allowing Canada to be 
a haven for war criminals." Kaplan became the epi-centre of activity for Canada to do 
something about war criminals.360 However, despite Kaplan's strong personal 
commitment to taking measures against Nazi war criminals, and a surge of optimism on 
the part of the public, the Trudeau cabinet remained indifferent. 361 It was left to the 
Brian Mulroney government which assumed office in 1984 to do something about Nazi 
war criminals. 
In his Memoirs, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney explained why he caused the 
Government of Canada to change policy on Nazi war criminals: 
to me the idea of people who had participated in the extermination of Jews 
living in my country was odious and unacceptable. They had to be 
exposed, and then they had to be expelled from Canada. 
Prime Minister Mulroney then went on to blame Prime Minister Trudeau for inaction: 
The decision by Pierre Trudeau to leave, untroubled, Nazi war criminals 
living in Canada surely must rank with the greatest sins of omission in the 
history of this nation. After serving as justice minister and 16 years as 
PM, Pierre Trudeau was - or should have been - aware of the fact that 
people guilty of the most heinous of crimes involving the slaughter of Jews 
were living in Canada. They lived here under false pretences and were 
never charged because it appears that Mr. Trudeau did not want "to 
trouble" the social fabric of Canada. I appointed the Deschenes 
360 Sol Littman, War Criminal on Trial: Rauca of Kaunas (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2nd ed. 1998), at 
140-142. 
361 Matas and Charendoff, supra, at 80. 
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Commission specifically because I believe that Mr. Trudeau had opted for 
"social tranquility" rather than simple justice. It is repugnant to me in the 
extreme to think that criminals and murderers were allowed to enter 
Canada and prosper here, thereby sullying our citizenship, without 
challenge or accountability. For all those years criminals of the worst sort 
found sanctuary in Canada, when evidence of their guilt or their complicity 
was available for the minister of justice or PM if he was interested in 
finding out. 362 
The fourth event was the debates surrounding the repatriation of the Canadian 
constitution to Canada in 1982. An amendment was passed to the Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms which facilitated retroactive legislation to deal with those guilty of crimes 
against humanity. The Criminal Code was accordingly amended to provide for the 
prosecution of war criminals. 
Mulroney's beliefs and politics compelled him to convoke a Commission of Inquiry 
to deal with Nazi War criminals. 
6.8 The Deschenes Commission 
It is the prerogative of the Prime Minister to convoke a commission of inquiry and to 
appoint the chief commissioner. There are no confirmation hearings or special 
legislative measures taken to appoint such a commissioner. Justice Deschenes just 
received a telephone call, inviting him to head such a commission.363 
The Commission was invited to advise the Governor-in-Council as to "what further 
action might be taken in Canada to bring to justice such alleged war criminals who 
might be residing within Canada, including recommendations as to what legal means are 
362 Brian Mulroney, Memoirs (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2007) at 348-9. 
363 Jules Deschenes, "Toward International Criminal Justice" (1994) (2-3) Criminal Law Forum, 249 at 
253-254. 
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now available to bring to justice any such person in Canada or whether and what 
legislation might be adopted by the Parliament of Canada to ensure that war criminals 
are brought to justice and made to answer for their crimes." 
The setting up of the Deschenes Commission of Inquiry into war cnmes ts an 
example of a successful case of interest group or pressure group influence on 
governmental formation of significant legislative and policy changes. The most 
significant interest or pressure group that forced the government to embark on the war 
crimes inquiry was the Canadian Jewish Congress. Behind the Canadian Jewish 
Congress was Simon Wiesenthal, a Nazi hunter since the end of the war. 
On July 4, 1950, Mr. Samuel Bronfinan, the then National President of the Canadian 
Jewish Congress sent a telegram to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration 
protesting the government's decision to admit members of the 14th Grenadier Waffen 
SS Division (Galicia), (Halychyyna SS Division) to Canada. The government, in 
deference to Mr. Bronfinan and the members of the Canadian Jewish Congress, delayed 
approval until further investigations could take place. 
Requested to supply further information, the Canadian Jewish Congress submitted a 
list of 94 Ukrainian names accompanied by a brief description of their alleged offences. 
But the government did not act. Instead the government accepted the Galacia Division. 
Lists of names forwarded by Simon Wiesenthal had consistently gone astray or 
remained unacknowledged. 
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According to Littman, 364 the attempt to identify persons who had allegedly 
committed war crimes was scoffed at throughout the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. The 
RCMP, according to evidence presented to the Deschenes Commission, did not begin 
systematic investigation of war criminals until 1982. From 1945 to 1962, the RCMP 
had no policy of any kind on the identification and apprehension of war criminals. 
Therefore, it did little if anything in this field. From 1962 to 1982, the force's policy 
was negative, namely that it had no responsibility to investigate those accused of war 
crimes. As a consequence, it did even less than before. Had Robert Kaplan not been 
appointed Solicitor General in 1980, perhaps the issue of war criminals would have lain 
dormant a lot longer. 
Kaplan, in a February 1983 interview, said that the RCMP was examining a list of 
approximately 125 names to determine whether there were any cases that would lend 
themselves to the denaturalization and deportation procedures that had been employed 
by the Office of Special Investigations of the U.S. Justice Department. The results, he 
confided, were not very promising. 
The government's ineptitude or its reluctance to pursue the war crimes issue is 
particularly evident in the 1979 correspondence between the Canadian Jewish Congress 
and the Justice Department. That year, the Congress forwarded a short list of twelve 
alleged war criminals to John Roberts, M.P. Roberts, in tum, passed on the list to then 
Solicitor General Jean-Jacques Blais, asking that the list be presented to the RCMP for 
investigation. The RCMP apparently checked the names against the Citizenship registry 
364 Litman, supra. 
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to determine whether these men were, in fact living in Canada. The reply was that the 
Citizenship Department had been unable to find any of them. Yet, it was well-known 
that most, if not all the persons on the list were in Canada and there should have been no 
difficulty in locating them. 
It is therefore not surprising that the Canadian Jewish Congress was one of the four 
pressure groups that were given standing to appear and make representations before the 
Commission. The others were the Brotherhood of Veterans of the 1st Division of the 
Ukrainian National Army in Canada; League for Human Rights of B'nai Brith Canada 
and the Ukrainian Canadian Committee. 
These organizations were represented by very powerful and articulate lawyerly 
"organic intellectuals" to use a gramscian term. The Brotherhood was represented by 
Fraser Berrill, Y.R. Botiuk and Clay Powell. The Canadian Jewish Congress was 
represented by Irwin Cotler, Charles Dal fen, Joseph Magnet, Morris Manning and M.J. 
Silverstone. The League for Human Rights was represented by Susan Charendoff, Jules 
Kronis, Marvin Kurz, Israel Ludwig, David Matas and Bert Raphael. The Ukrainian 
Canadian Committee was represented by Sean Dumphy and John Sopinka, who was 
later appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada. All counsel were highly accomplished 
lawyers or professors of law. Other groups that were not granted standing were also 
allowed to participate in public hearings. They were also represented by highly 
accomplished lawyers and professors. The Government of Canada was represented by 
Ian Binnie, who was later appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada, Judith McCann 
and I.G. Whitehall. 
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The Commission appointed a working group of eight professors and practitioners 
across Canada to report to the Commission on legal problems. Sharon Williams and 
Ronald Bryk were asked to advise on legal questions concerning denaturalization and 
deportation of war criminals. Jacques Bellemare and John Laskin (who later became a 
Judge) were asked to study whether there existed the possibility of criminal prosecutions 
in Canada against war criminals under present legislation, by virtue of some 
international instrument or otherwise. Neil McKelvey and George N euspiel were asked 
to study whether there can exist a legal basis for request for extradition when there is no 
treaty between Canada and the requesting state. Gowan Guest and Michel Proulx were 
asked to study what legislation, if any, should be adopted to allow for prosecution of 
Nazi war criminals in Canada. 
The Commission travelled across the country conducting hearings and collecting 
evidence. Many witnesses from diverse groups and backgrounds gave oral testimony. 
Counsel made oral as well as written submissions. The Commission also benefited from 
extensive commissioned studies. The report is perhaps the most comprehensive report 
on war criminals anywhere. 
After the Commission submitted its report, a special parliamentary committee 
debated the draft government Bill. The end product is the amendments to Section 7 of 
the Criminal Code popularly known as the "war crimes legislation" which defined what 
a "war crime" and a "crime against humanity" is. Subsection 7 (3.76) read in part: 
"Crime against humanity" means murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, persecution or any other inhumane act or omission that is 
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committed against any civilian population or any identifiable group of 
persons, whether or not it constitutes a contravention of the law in force at 
the time and in the place of its commission, and that, at that time and in 
that place, constitutes a contravention of customary international law or 
conventional international law or is criminal according to the general 
principles of law recognized by the community of nations; 
"War crime" means an act or omission that is committed during an 
international armed conflict, whether or not it constitutes a contravention 
of the law in force at the time and in the place of its commission, and that, 
at that time and in that place, constitutes a contravention of the customary 
international law or conventional international law applicable in 
international armed conflicts. 
Subsection 7 (3. 71) confered jurisdiction on Canada over the person if, 
a) at the time of the act or omission, 
I) that person is a Canadian citizen or is employed by Canada in a civilian 
or military capacity, 
ii) that person is a citizen of, or is employed in a civilian or military 
capacity by, a state that is engaged in an armed conflict; or 
iii) the victim of the act or omission is a Canadian citizen or a citizen of a 
state that is allied with Canada in an armed conflict; or 
b) at the time of the act or omission, Canada could, in conformity 
with international law, exercise jurisdiction over the person with respect to 
the act or omission on the basis of the person's presence in Canada, and 
subsequent to the time of the act or omission the person is present in 
Canada. 
6.9 Post-Legislation Prosecution and Litigation 
Once legislation was passed, the political process moved into judicial hands. A forty 
year political struggle did not have auspicious beginnings in the judicial system. The 
Deschenes Commission, including many counsel who appeared before it, favoured 
prosecution in Canada, rather than denaturalization, deportation, and extradition. The 
government itself took initially no steps to follow up the recommendations of the 
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Deschenes Report to improve the Canadian processes of denaturalization, deportation 
and extradition. 
Elizabeth Holtzman365 of the USA had feared that the decision to prosecute Nazi war 
criminals in Canada for their crimes instead of deporting them while having a theoretical 
appeal may actually be counterproductive. Holtzman went on to explain: 
In choosing not to deport but to prosecute, the original wrong may be 
compounded. First, there is no basis for assuming - as the policy of a 
"Canadian solution" does - that Canada's system of justice is better than 
that, say, in France, Holland, or West Germany. Second, there is no 
compelling reason to deny the victims of the Holocaust the right to try 
Nazi war criminals. The evidence and the witnesses are near at hand, and 
the legacy of the Holocaust is part of the victimized nations' 
consciousness. Third, in cases in which there is enough evidence for 
extradition or deportation but not enough to warrant prosecution, the 
made-in-Canada solution would preclude deportation and the Nazi war 
criminals would remain in Canada. In this category of cases, the Canadian 
solution would provide no solution at all, and the continued presence of 
these Nazi war criminals in your country would make a mockery of your 
efforts. Finally, the Canadian solution presumes that juries will be able to 
properly assess the full significance of Nazi war crimes. But if the 
experience in the United States is any example, there are many people, 
particularly younger people, who are badly informed about the Second 
World War and ignorant of the Holocaust. For some jurors, the war 
crimes may be too remote in time and place to have the full weight they 
deserve. On the other hand, the defendant's connections to Canada might 
seem more vivid 
and real in contrast. In a way, then, the cards may be stacked for acquittal, 
and juries may acquit even when there is full evidence of guilt. 366 
Indeed, the very first case of war crimes prosecution ended up negatively for the 
government. The Supreme Court of Canada set such a high standard for the conviction 
365 Holtzman, "Nuremberg and its Legacy", in Cotler, supra, at 32. 
366 Ibid. 
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of war criminals and criminals against humanity that it became virtually impossible to 
prosecute and convict a war criminal or criminal against humanity stemming from the 
Nazi and subsequent eras.367 In Finta,368 the Supreme Court ruled that the prosecution 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had mens rea to commit a war 
crime and crime against humanity and that obedience to superior orders was a defence, 
even though the war crimes legislation removed the defence of obedience to superior 
orders. The Finta case caused the government to abandon its prosecution route in favour 
of revocation and deportation, a route it still follows despite the 2000 amendments that 
removed some if not all of the impediments strewn about by the courts. The amendments 
were brought in to incorporate the Rome Statute that ushered into existence the 
International Criminal Court. 
Denaturalization and deportation has also proved elusive at the present time. For 
example, in the case of Dueck,369 the Federal Court ruled that people who came after the 
Second World War were subjected to security checks and were asked questions pertinent 
to whether they were security risks to Canada and did not obtain Canadian citizenship by 
false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances. Such 
interpretation of the scheme of legislation places a high burden for the government to 
overcome. 
Over the years, the government has had mixed successes and losses in the area of 
revocation and deportation. The establishment of the International Criminal Court in 
367 Raman Venkata, "The Future of the Nuremberg Promise" (1994) 28 CR (4th) 392. 
368 R v Finta (1994), 28 C.R. (4th) 265. 
369 MClvDueck, T-938-95, 21Dec.1998. 
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1998 led Canada to overhaul its war crimes legislation and gave Canada a new lease on 
life to begin to investigate and prosecute war criminals. 
6.10 Conclusion 
After a forty-year political struggle, the Canadian Jewish Congress and allied 
organizations and individuals forced the government to bring in war crimes legislation 
for the prosecution of past and future war criminals in Canada. This is an example of 
successful, albeit lengthy struggle by a pressure group to induce a government to bring 
in specific legislation to address that group's specific concerns. There are currently 
numerous groups pressuring the government to do the same. Other groups have 
pressured the government not for legislation but for compensation. Japanese Canadians 
have been compensated after a forty-five year struggle.370 Japanese Canadians were 
interned and some deported during the Second World War. Ukrainian and Chinese 
Canadians who suffered past injustices also eventually convinced the government to 
compensate them. Aboriginals secured the convocation of a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. 
However, what the political process achieves does not necessarily lead to or mean 
judicial success as well. The failures of the war crimes legislation to achieve the original 
objectives so far, is a case in point. In the context of Canada, it appeared that Canada 
had initially decided to concentrate on Second World War criminals, otherwise known 
as Nazi war criminals. Bernie Farber of the Canadian Jewish Congress has argued in 
370 Roy Miki and Cassandra Kobayashi, Justice In Our Time: The Japanese Canadian Redress Settlement 
(Vancouver et al: Talon Books, 1991). 
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consonance with observed Canadian practice, that "once the remammg Nazi war 
criminals cases are addressed, Canada can apply the lessons learned from dealing with 
Nazi war criminals to hunting criminals from countries such as Rwanda, Sudan and 
former Yugoslavia."371 But awaiting the conclusion of Nazi war criminals prosecutions 
may be too late for justice for other victims and to deal with the impunity enjoyed by 
war criminals from other countries. Canada should not wait for fifty years to prosecute 
or deal with war criminals from other jurisdictions including South African apartheid 
criminals. This chapter perhaps explains why Canada could not have prosecuted 
apartheid criminals between 1948 and 1994 even though as it had jurisdiction to do so. 
This chapter presented a case study of how Canada behaved towards war criminals 
and criminals against humanity from 1945 to 2005. The chapter indicates that despite the 
supposed newly discovered concept of universal jurisdiction, nation states were slow to 
implement it. Along the way apartheid criminals and others got away with impunity. The 
prosecution and conviction of the major Nazi War criminals at Nuremberg in 1945 and 
1946 was perhaps the most singular seminal event in the history of international criminal 
law, which ushered in a paradigm shifting precedent on preventing impunity against war 
criminals and those who have committed crimes against humanity. After this historic 
event there were a few sputterings of prosecutions conducted at Tokyo and by individual 
countries, mainly the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada, for crimes 
committed against their nationals who were involved in the war. By 1950 there were no 
more prosecutions by the United Kingdom, Canada or the US. The Cold War between 
371 James Cowan, "Bring Ageing Nazi Suspects to Justice: CJC" National Post, 7 November 2007 at 18. 
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the West and the East had settled in, a number of war criminals found their way to the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Latin American countries and 
elsewhere372• Some of the war criminals emigrated by invitation by the countries to 
which they emigrated or were undetected by the countries to which they emigrated. It 
has been suggested, "that between 750 and 2,000 Nazi War criminals made their way to 
Canada following the Second World War and only a handful were ever prosecuted."373 
For all practical purposes, all major western countries behaved towards war criminals as 
if the brutal chapter of the criminality of these criminals was closed and would never 
reopen. That was a colossal miscalculation, for the victims had long memories and some 
of the victims who had not been killed also emigrated to these same countries: Canada, 
the US, Australia, the UK, Latin America and elsewhere. A new country, Israel was also 
born to which many victims of Nazi genocide emigrated bringing with them the scars 
and desire to see justice prevail against their tormentors.374 
372 See David Cesarani Justice Delayed; How Britain Became A Refuge For Nazi War Criminals (London: 
Vintage, 1994). 
373See James Cowan, "Bring Ageing Nazi Suspects To Justice: CJC" National Post, 7 November 2007 at 
A8. 
374 See David Cesarani, Eichman: His Life and Crimes (London: Vintage, 2004). 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE EXERCISE OF UNIVERSAL CIVIL JURISDICTION IN CANADA 
DURING THE APARTHEID ERA 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses a form of universal civil jurisdiction nations use to show their 
abhorrence of the practices of another nation. Canada had a very strong anti-apartheid 
constituency that pressured the government to impose several forms of economic, 
military, political and other sanctions against South Africa375 . This went some ways 
against the economic interests of Canada. This chapter discusses Canada's attempt to 
legally enforce the feeble sanctions that were imposed against South Africa as some 
form of exercise of universal civil jurisdiction. It also discusses the political pressures 
that were brought to bear on Canada to impose and enforce economic sanctions. What is 
discussed here applied to all major Western countries in relation to the crime of 
apartheid in particular and to other war crimes situations in general. Corporations with 
government support were at the fore-front in direct or indirect support of the 
strengthening of apartheid by direct investments. Corporations later became targets of 
massive law suits by the victims of the crime of apartheid utilising for example the US 
Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA). This was not replicated in Canada. Could a pressure 
group have forced Canada to prosecute apartheid criminals during the reign of 
apartheid? Is there such a constituency in post-apartheid South Africa to force Canada to 
375 A world-wide anti- apartheid movement is discussed in Tom Lodge, Sharpeville: An Apartheid 
Massacre and its Consequences (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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exercise civil or criminal universal jurisdiction? The possibility of the exercise of 
criminal jurisdiction during the era of apartheid will be discussed in the next chapter. 
7.2 The Taskforce of Churches and Corporate Responsibility 
In May 1981, a Canadian non-governmental organization, The Taskforce of 
Churches and Corporate Responsibility (TCCR), a major Canadian non-governmental 
and anti-apartheid group presented a brief to the Canadian Government containing nine 
recommendations pertaining to South Africa and Namibia. The pertinent ones for this 
study are the following: 376 
6. We ask the Canadian Government to reassess the usefulness of its 
present Code of Conduct 377 with the view of amending it to include: 
(f) Making adherences to the code legally binding and establishing 
penalties for none or inadequate adherence; 
(g) Requiring companies to file an annual report which would 
include comparative data on an itemized basis as well as all contracts with 
South Africa's military or police; 
(h) Establishment of a public review committee to include 
representatives of the Canadian Labour Congress, the churches, and other 
concerned organizations. 
7. We ask that a review of existmg legislation and enforcement 
mechanisms relating to the arms embargo against South Africa take place 
with all possible speed and that tighter enforcement measures be instituted 
and published. 
376 Reproduced in Sheila Kappler, Canadian Governmental Policy, Banks, and Corporate Relations with 
South Africa, (New York: United Nations Centre Against Apartheid, August, 1984) at 8. 
377 The Code Of Conduct Concerning The Employment Practices Of Canadian Companies Operating In 
South Africa. Issued on the 281h of April, 1978. The purpose of this voluntary code was to set out 
guidelines for Canadian companies with respect to employment practices affecting black South African 
workers. The specific areas of concern on which the code of conduct recommended action included: 
fringe benefits; training and promotion; and race relations. See Canadian Policy on Human Rights in 
South Africa, paper presented by the Canadian Government to the North American Regional Conference 
on action Against Apartheid held at the United Nations Headquarters from 18 to 21 since 1984, New 
York: United Nations Centre Against Apartheid, August, 1984 at 2. The code is appended in Joanne 
Naiman, Joan Bhabha and Guy Wright, Relations Between Canada and South Africa, (New York: United 
Nations Centre Against Apartheid, August, 1984) at 57. 
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We further recommend that a Parliamentary Sub-committee be established 
and charged with the supervision of all aspects of the enforcement of 
mandatory arms embargo. 
8. We ask the Canadian Government to reaffirm its commitment and to 
strengthen its adherence to Security Council Resolution 418 378by: 
a. Enacting effective legislation or by announcing comparable 
policy directives regarding the arms embargo against South 
Africa which would include the establishment of stronger 
monitoring and enforcement mechanisms; 
b. Interpreting the terms "arms and related material" as covering the 
transfer of all technology useful to the military and "dual 
purpose" equipment be they undertaken through bilateral, third 
party or through trans-shipment via third country arrangements; 
c. Refraining scrupulously from any nuclear collaboration with 
South Africa. 
d. Dissociating itself from any act on the part of the United States 
which would violate or weaken the mandatory arms embargo 
against South Africa. 
e. Protesting any official or unofficial contact between member 
States or officers of NATO and South Africa. 
These recommendations were made while the liberal government of Pierre Elliot 
Trudeau was in power. The Government rejected all of the nine recommendations of 
the Task Force. In 1984 the Liberal Government was replaced by the Progressive 
Conservative Government of Brian Mulroney. The Mulroney Government became 
quite vocal both nationally and internationally about its abhorrence of the Apartheid 
policy in South Africa. It announced a package of economic and other sanctions against 
South Africa. 
The Progressive Conservative Government's announcements of sanctions against 
South Africa had been received with scepticism, spiced with nods of approval. Linda 
378 United Nations Security Council Resolution 418 of the 4th of November 1977. Reproduced in A/Conf. 
119/15 (part 1) 81h of July 1987 at 31. This resolution imposed an arms embargo against South Africa. 
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Freeman, a keen observer on Canadian policy towards Southern Africa for example had 
observed that we must "give the devil his due. There is no question that whatever their 
shortcomings, the statements and policy commitments of the Mulroney Government on 
South Africa have gone further than any previous Canadian government". 379 Freeman, 
however, notes that Canada's policy towards South Africa was more designed to 
maintain economic and political relations and to preserve the commonwealth club of 
nations than to aggressively push for the dismantling of apartheid from 1948 right up to 
the Mulroney regime in 1985-86 when Canada began to impose economic sanctions. 
Freeman's study, analyzes the "domestic and external structures which produced the 
long continuity in policy and then the strategic conjunctures that precipitated 
change. "38° Freeman documents some changes in Canadian policy towards South 
Africa after the 1977 Soweto uprisings and the 1985-6 Vaal uprising. These uprisings 
like Sharpeville in 1960 gave rise to "moral panics" and therefore gave impetus to 
domestic and foreign policy changes. Freeman's framework seeks to study what 
domestic and external structures were responsible for Canada's policy or lack of policy 
with respect to sanctions and by extension to apartheid criminals, if any. Her view is in 
contrast to that of the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU). It had an 
379 Linda Freeman, "What Is Right With Mulroney? Canada and Sanctions, 1986" (1986) 2 SAR 3. For a 
fuller account of Canadian policy towards South Africa from a historic perspective, see Linda Freeman, 
The Ambiguous Champion: Canada and South Africa in the Trudeau and Mulroney Years (Toronto: U of 
T Press, 1997). 
380 Ambiguous Champion, Ibid at 6. 
172 
office in Toronto and had been more sceptical of the government resolve against South 
The new Mulroney government elected in September 1984 will offer 
nothing more. Two members of the new Tory cabinet, Defence Minister 
Robert Coates and Justice Minister John Crosbie, have been on sponsored 
tours to South Africa. Upon his return in 1977, Coates wrote an article in 
a Halifax newspaper defending the white minority regime, praising the 
"black homeland" programme and calling Namibia "the most refreshing 
experiment in black Africa today." Crosbie, when challenged in the House 
of Commons on his statements sympathetic to the apartheid system, 
replied: "I have gone there and seen, you big loudmouth. Have you been 
there? You keep your mouth shut till you go and learn for yourself you 
professional bleeding heart. 
The South African Congress of Trade Unions was certainly justified in being 
sceptical about the statements of the new Canadian Government. It appeared that all 
previous Canadian Governments had openly condemned South Africa but without 
taking any dramatic or radical steps to implement their policies against South Africa. 
This had been revealed for example in the lack of enthusiasm to implement the 
Canadian Code Of Conduct issued in 1978; the lack of enforcement of the UN Arms 
Embargo against South Africa; the increasing trade between Canada and South Africa 
among others. Thus why should the new Canadian Government be any different? 
The aim of this chapter is to examine what legal regimes the Canadian government 
had been instituted or could have been instituted to enforce its sanctions as well as those 
of international organizations against South Africa. This chapter further inquires into 
381 South African Congress of Trade Unions Solidarity Committee (Canada), Trafficking in Apartheid: 
The Case For Canadian Sanctions Against South Africa, (Toronto: SACTU January, 1985). Quotation is 
at 5. 
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the obstacles both conceptual and practical of legal enforcement of sanctions. It looks at 
the political and economic interests that prevented any move towards practical 
implementation of legal enforcement. Finally it assesses the practical utility of legal 
mechanisms for enforcement of sanctions. Enforcement of sanctions is a form of 
exercise of universal civil jurisdiction. 
7.3 Review of Canadian Policy Towards South Africa 
As already stated, Canada had had a two-track stance on South Africa: strong 
rhetorical condemnation of South Africa while engaged in heavy economic relations 
with it. Leaving alone the rhetorical condemnation of apartheid and concentrating on the 
economic relations between the two countries over the years, it becomes clear why 
many people had been sceptical about the Canadian Government's statements on South 
Africa. In 198 I for example, Canadian-controlled investment in South Africa totalled 
more than I. I billion and the Canadian financial establishments continued to raise 
capital in Canada to finance Apartheid in South Africa. 382 Further, despite the rhetoric, 
trade between the two countries increased over the years. The following table 
exemplifies the true picture of trade in the years I 96 I - I 982 measured in thousands of 
dollars. 
Imports Exports 
I96I I2,645 37,8I9 
I97I 54,590 63,684 
I979 240,478 I07, 700 
382 Ibid at back cover. 
I74 
1980 354,545 201, 992 
1981 402,867 239, 121 
1982 218, 718 215,098 
Source: Statistics Canada, Trade of Canada, Exports by Countries and Trade of Canada, 
Imports by Countries, excerpted from Naiman et al supra at 28. 
Despite the call for international sanctions by many countries and the numerous UN 
resolutions calling for comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa, up to 
1984 Canada had never supported any of these calls or UN resolutions. 
Between 1981 and 1983 for example, Canada only supported one resolution on arms 
embargo against South Africa. In all the others, it either voted against or abstained 383 . 
This clearly shows Canada's head was elsewhere. 
7.4 Canada's UN Votes on Sanctions 
Title of UN Total Votes Votes Vote Vote 
Resolution 36th In Of Of 
Session of General Favour Against Abstain Canada USA 
Assembly 1981 
International Year of 130 8 8 No No 
Mobilization for 
sanctions against SA 
Comprehensive & 109 18 13 No No 
Mandatory sanctions 
against SA 
Condemnation of 119 19 4 No No 
military & nuclear 
collaboration with 
383 Table is from SACTU, supra at 6. 
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SA 
Arms Embargo 138 0 7 Yes Abs. 
against SA 
Oil Embargo against 126 7 12 No No 
SA 
Int'l Conference of 129 2 12 Abs. No 
Trade Unions on 
sanctions against SA 
Academic, Cultural 124 5 14 Abs. No 
and Sports Boycott of 
SA 
3ih Session of General Assembly 1982 
South Africa's 121 3 23 Abs. No 
application for credit 
from IMF 
Concerted 135 3 8 Abs. No 
International Action 
for the elimination of 
apartheid 
Comprehensive & 114 10 19 Abs. No 
Mandatory sanctions 
against SA 
Condemnation of 120 8 16 No No 
military & nuclear 
collaboration with 
SA 
Condemnation of 134 1 9 Abs. No 
foreign investments 
in SA 
Oil Embargo against 125 6 13 Abs. No 
SA 
38th Session of General Assembly 1983 
Sanctions against SA 122 10 18 No No 
Condemnation of 140 1 9 Abs. No 
foreign investment in 
SA 
Oil Embargo against 130 6 14 Abs. No 
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ISA 
The Canadian government like many other governments rationalized its opposition 
to economic sanctions by putting forward a number of arguments 384, that: (I) 
Sanctions will be to the detriment of Canada, (2) Sanctions will cause increased 
suffering amongst South Africa's black population, (3) Economic sanctions would 
cause great hardship for the front-line states, (4) Sanctions will not work, (5) other 
countries have human rights records just as bad as South Africa's, (6) Commercial 
dealings are separate from apartheid. It is not the thrust of this chapter to examine each 
of these arguments, suffice to point out that these arguments were supportive of 
economic relations between Canada (or any other country) and South Africa. 
It was thus to the surprise of many people when the new Progressive Conservative 
Government came out strongly in favour of economic sanctions against South Africa. 
Within a short space of its coming to power in 1984, it announced the following 
measures against South Africa 385 : 
• Strengthened the voluntary "Code of Conduct" concerning the 
employment practices of Canadian companies operating in South 
Africa. 
• Appointed an independent and impartial administrator. 
• Introduced a standard reporting format code made applicable to all 
Canadian companies including those with minority interests. 
384 See Joseph Hanlon and Roger Amond, The Sanctions Handbook, (Penguin Books, forthcoming, 1987) 
part 2. Richard Johnstone and Peter Richardson, Australia's South African Connection: A Case For 
Economic Sanctions Against Apartheid, (Canberra: Australian Council for Overseas Aid, 1986) at 46, 
Dave Moore," Dominant Class Theory as a Theoretical Approach to the Study of Domestic Sources of 
Canadian Foreign Policy: Canadian Policy Towards South Africa", Paper for Department of Political 
Science, York University, 1985 at 6. 
385 Excerpted from Linda Freeman, supra at 6. 
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• Tightened the administration of the United Nations arms embargo to 
end exports of sensitive equipment such as computers to the 
Government of South Africa and its agencies. 
• Applied the voluntary UN embargo on imports of South African arms. 
• Abrogated the Canada-South Africa Double Taxation Agreements. 
• Terminated the use of the Programme for Export Market Development 
(PEMD) for the South African market. 
• Terminated insurance to Canadian exporters to South Africa provided 
by the Export Development Corporation. 
• Issued public guidelines severely limiting sporting contacts between 
Canada and South Africa. 
• Announced termination of toll-processing of Namibian uranium. 
• Introduced voluntary van on the sale of Krugerrand gold coins. 
• Monitored official contacts especially in sensitive sectors. 
• Introduced voluntary ban on new loans to the Government of South 
Africa and its agencies or to the private sector in South Africa. 
• Introduced voluntary ban on the sale of crude oil and refined products 
to South Africa. 
• Applied embargo on air transport (cargo and passenger flights) 
between Canada and South Africa. 
• Set up a National Register of Anti-Apartheid Measures to record 
voluntary actions taken by individual Canadians, other levels of 
government, as well as private organizations and firms. 
• Allocated 7 million for an expanded programme of scholarships for 
the black community to be administered through private channels. 
• Announced appointment of an officer at the Canadian Embassy to 
facilitate cooperation in the labour area. 
• Condemned the use of repression, such as the imposition of a state of 
emergency, and called upon the Government of South Africa to enter 
into an equal partnership with all South Africans. 
• Ended Canadian Government procurement of all South African 
products. 
• Introduced voluntary ban on the promotion in Canada of tourism in 
South Africa. 
• Cancelled non-resident accreditation of the four South African 
attaches to Canada (Science, Labour, Mining, and Agriculture). 
• Closed the Canadian Embassy in Pretoria on Soweto Day, June l 61h, 
1986. 
• Introduced a voluntary ban on new investment or reinvestment of 
profits earned in South Africa. 
• Banned the import of agricultural products from South Africa. 
• Banned Canadian government contracts with majority-owned South 
African companies. 
• Banned the import of uranium, coal, iron and steel from South Africa. 
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• Withdrew all consular facilities in South Africa except for our own 
nationals and nationals of third countries for whom Canada rendered 
consular services. 
The change in Canadian policy towards South Africa was fully supported by Prime 
Minister Brian Mulroney who stated in his Memoirs that 
THE VERY NOTION of South Africa's apartheid was anathema to me, 
and while I was under no illusions about Canada's economic strength in 
the world, I also knew that Canada's role was not unimportant. I viewed 
apartheid with the same degree of disgust that I attached to the Nazis - the 
authors of the most odious offence in modem history. My strong and 
unswerving support of Israel and the Jewish community in Canada was 
based on this view. In both these areas, I was resolved from the moment I 
became prime minister that any government I headed would speak and act 
in the finest traditions of Canada. 386 
Canada's finest traditions that Mulroney was referring to pertained to Prime Minster 
John Diefenbaker. In the wake of the Sharpeville Massacre of 1960 Diefenbaker helped 
forge "a Commonwealth Consensus to oust South Africa because of its inhuman 
policies"387• Mulroney was aware that these policies were insufficient but he believed 
that they were a very solid good beginning388 • 
Indeed these were giant steps for Canada in the direction of economic sanctions. We 
shall examine these measures in the context of the problem of enforcement. Notice 
however the recurring phrases in this package of measures, "introduced a voluntary ban 
on ... ", "banned" and the total lack of any mention of legal, administrative or political 
enforcement mechanisms. For while sanctions could be announced, it is a different step 
386 Brian Mulroney, Memoirs (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2007) at 398. 
387 Ibid at 399. 
388 Ibid. 
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to legally and politically enforce them when corporations, government agencies or 
individuals etc do not adhere to them. 
This chapter examines the conceptual and practical problems that arise when legal 
enforcement is contemplated against corporations and other entities. How can 
economic sanctions be enforced? The crime of apartheid lasted that much longer 
because of economic ties between the apartheid state and Western economic interests 
and the failure to enforce the sanctions that had been imposed. 
7 .5 Sources of Enforcement 
There were two sources of enforcement of sanctions against South Africa: first, the 
enforcement of domestic law and second, the fulfillment of international binding 
obligations i.e. UN Security Council Resolutions in the case of South Africa. Each of 
these sources posed conceptual and practical problems of enforcement. I will examine 
each in tum. 
7.5.1 Domestic Laws 
Linda Freeman has observed that Canadian companies had shown no signs that they 
were prepared to boycott trade with South Africa until compelled by law to do so, 
leaving open large questions about their voluntary compliance with bans requested by 
the government389. Indeed despite the Canadian Government's announcement of 
sanctions against South Africa, there was no direct sanctions law that had been enacted 
389 Supra at 7. 
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and which could be used to enforce those sanctions. Much had been made of the Code 
Of Conduct but as we will show, not much had been or could be achieved by it. The 
Government had also purported to bring sanctions enforcement under an Act, namely 
the Export and Import Permits Act390. It will be discussed below. 
7 .5.2 Code of Conduct 
The Code of Conduct was not a law. It was a set of government requests to 
Canadian Multinational Corporations operating in South Africa to improve working and 
employment conditions of Black South Africans employed in those firms. The Code of 
Conduct was one of the packages of measures on South Africa announced by the 
Canadian government in 1977. This package of measures by Canada was influenced by 
rapid and dramatic changes in Southern Africa as well as Canada's election to the UN 
Security Council in January 1977391 • Canada had to present a good face to the world 
and particularly to African Governments. 
The Code of Conduct for companies operating in South Africa came into existence in 
1979, and was sent to 28 Canadian corporations. In the study conducted by Naiman, 
Bhabha and Wright, it was found that in 1979 and 1980, only five companies issued 
public reports on their implementation of the Code. In 1981, only one company, (Alcan 
Ltd.) did so392• Further, according to The Economist (March 23, 1985), since 1981, only 
390 Export And Import Permits Act, R.S.C. 1970, C. 27. 
391 Naiman et al supra. 
392 Ibid at 4. 
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one Canadian corporation had made any public reports393 • T~e problem was that the 
Code of Conduct was a voluntary package. Companies that did not accept or 
implement the Code would not suffer any penalties. Thus the Code could not be legally 
enforced. 
Suppose codes of conduct were to become legally enforceable laws, would they have 
been effective? It is doubtful whether they would have been effective. As Johnstone 
and Richardson report in their study, Australian Trade with South Africa394 , apart from 
the reluctance of companies in sending back reports, the Codes themselves were 
inadequate and further, they underestimated South Africa's security legislation. 
According to Johnstone and Richardson, even if multinational corporations 
implemented the codes, they would merely have affected the position of the tiny 
proportion of Black South African workers employed in such companies. The Code 
made no impact on the broader and more serious aspects of Apartheid such as migrant 
labour and influx control, citizenship and residential issues, the unequal distribution of 
income and resources particularly education and the severe restrictions on all civil 
liberties in South Africa. They further stated that the Code seemed to assume that 
apartheid was just a matter of discrimination and concentrated on removing the most 
obvious barriers in the work place. Thus the Code completely ignored the fact that 
apartheid was a system of structural racial exploitation backed by a severe legal regime. 
The recommendations of the Task Force took note of these structural conditions of 
Apartheid. 
393 Quoted in Johnstone and Richardson, supra at 38. 
394 
supra. 
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Thozamile Botha, one of the leading Black trade unionists in South Africa was more 
blunt about codes of conduct: 
The codes of conduct are just a sham - they are an excuse for the 
multinational corporations to operate in South Africa, so that they can 
continue the exploitation of the black workers. It is not the quality of life 
that is improving, but the method of exploitation. They propose minor 
reforms. We are not for reforms; we cannot at this stage afford to be 
fighting reforms. 395 
Even U.S. Congressmen perceived the inadequacy of the codes of conduct, while 
advocating for their enforcement in the absence of disinvestments and sanctions at that 
time in 1981 : 
Since divestment is not politically feasible at this time, we think all 
American companies should be required by U.S. law to adhere to a fair 
employment practices code which is strictly monitored by U.S. officials in 
conjunction with black union officials and other concerned South African 
leaders. Any corporate violator of this code should be strictly penalized 
for not carrying it out. However, enactment of this code should not be 
regarded as legitimatising the presence of American businesses in South 
Africa. Nor should it be viewed as a vehicle for bringing about genuine 
reform in South Africa as a whole. Such change can only be brought about 
by the people of South Africa and their Government. 396 
These observations were made after noting that the Sullivan Code of Conduct for 
U.S. Corporations in South Africa, the equivalent to the Canadian Code of Conduct, 
was honoured more in breach than in observance. Further it was noted that less than 
395 Ibid at 38. 
396 
"South Africa: Change And Confrontation, Report of a Study Mission To South Africa", to the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives'', (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1981) at 26, 3-11July1980. 
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half of the 350 U.S. companies operating in South Africa had formally agreed to 
implement the Code's voluntary principles. This shows clearly that without being 
mandatory, those voluntary codes were toothless as they could not be legally enforced. 
A more formidable hurdle in the domestic enforcement of codes of conduct was 
South Africa's security legislation which also extended to multinational corporations 
operating in South Africa. The South African National Supplies Procurement Act, 
1970397 for example gave the Minister of Defence the power "when necessary for the 
Security of South Africa" to order: 
"any person who is capable of supplying, manufacturing, producing, 
processing or treating any goods, or has the power to dispose of, or has in 
his possession or under his control any goods, or is the supplier of any 
service, to manufacture, produce, process or treat and to supply or deliver 
or sell it to the Minster." 
This Act was bolstered by the National Key Points Act, 1980398 which provided that 
corporation whose installations were designated "National Key Points" were obliged to 
organize defence facilities and to set up and pay for white "industrial commandoes". 
Subsidiaries were prohibited from reporting to their parent companies either that they 
were "key points" or that they had undertaken expenditure to comply with the Act. Thus 
multinational corporations operating in South Africa could be taken over by the South 
African Army by law, thus subverting any programmes a particular corporation would 
be undertaking in compliance with the code of conduct. In addition to the above laws, 
the Protection of Businesses Act, 1978399 of South Africa prohibited companies 
397 Cited in Johnstone and Richardson, supra at 40. 
398 Cited in ibid at 40. 
399 Cited in ibid at 38. 
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operating in South Africa from sending business information out of the country without 
the permission of the Minister of Economic affairs. This had the effect that reports sent 
back would be patchy. As Vagts had put it, "it is difficult to see how a firm could 
encounter serious difficulties when it complied with South African laws11400, meaning it 
was more likely that a company operating in South Africa would obey the national law 
there than that of its home country. The company could give the defence of "due 
diligence" if it were prosecuted in Canada for not implementing the Code401 • 
Thus enforcement of the Code had the effect of forcing the company into a "conflict 
of laws" situation. It was more likely that the company would choose to obey the laws 
of the country in which it would benefit most. The choice would even be easier if the 
home country imposed only minimal penalties, for example small fines that the 
company could easily absorb. 
The above discussion leads me to conclude, first, that the Code of Conduct was not 
effective because it was voluntary and non-enforceable. Secondly, that even if it had 
been mandatory and enforceable, it would have been difficult to enforce given that 
South Africa had its own laws to require companies to do or not do certain things. 
Thirdly the Code of Conduct likely favoured companies that would be legitimatised in 
operating in South Africa and reaping profits while seemingly uplifting the standard of 
living of a few South African Blacks. 
400 D.F. Vagts, "Multinational Corporations and International Guidelines" (1981) Common Market Law 
Review 463 at 472, cited in United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations Transnational 
C01porations In World Development, Third Survey (New York: United Nations, 1983) at 124. 
401 The defence of due diligence is available to a corporation charged with a strict liability offence. This 
will be discussed below. 
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7.5.3 Export and Import Permits Act 
The Canadian government seemed to have decided to append the enforcement 
mechanism of sanctions on to the Export And Import Permits Act402• This 1953/54 Act 
seemed to have come into existence to serve several purposes: Canadian security 
interest, and protectionist measures403 • It authorized the Governor-in-Council to 
establish an "Area Control List", an "Export Control List", and an "Import Control List", 
being countries, exports and imports respectively to which and from which certain 
exports and imports could not be sent or received. 
Since the government had directed that enforcement of sanctions against South 
Africa was to utilize the Export and Import Permits Act, it was logical to assume that 
South Africa would be included in the "Area Control List", and goods to and from 
South Africa in the "Export Control List" and the "Import Control List". It would thus 
be a breach of the Act to export or import certain named goods to or from South Africa. 
This is spelt out is ss. 13, 14 and 15 of the Act: 
OFFENCES AND PENALTIES 
13. No person shall export or attempt to export any goods included in an 
Export Control List or any goods to any country included in an Area 
Control List except under the authority of and in accordance with an export 
permit issued under this Act. 
402 Supra at 11. 
403 Export and Import Permits Act, supra, ss. 3, 4, 5. 
186 
14. No person shall import or attempt to import any goods included in an 
Import Control List except under the authority of and in accordance with 
an import permit issued under this Act. 
15. Except with the authority in writing of the Minister, no person shall 
knowingly do anything in Canada that causes or assists or is intended to 
cause or assist any shipment, transhipment or diversion of any goods 
included in an Export Control List to be made, from Canada or any other 
place, to any country included in an Area Control List. 
Unlike the Code of Conduct that imposed no penalty for breach of the Code, the 
Export and Import Permits Act imposed a penalty, as spelled out in s. 19: 
19. ( 1) every person who violates any of the provision of the Act or the 
regulations is guilty of an offence and is liable 
(a) on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars 
or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding twelve months or to 
both; or 
(b) on conviction upon indictment to a fine not exceeding twenty-five 
thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five 
years or to both. 
Of particular interest was the penalty that would be imposed on a corporation in 
breach of the provisions of the Act, the penalty was the same as that imposed on a 
natural person, as the Act provided for the piercing of the corporate veil to get to the 
people who were "directing minds" of the corporation. Section 20 provided: 
20. Where an offence under this Act has been committed by a corporation, 
whether or not the corporation has been prosecuted or convicted, every 
person who at the time of the commission of the offence was a director or 
officer of the corporation, is guilty of the like offence and is liable, on 
conviction, to the punishment provided for the offence, upon proof that the 
act or omission constituting the offence took place with his knowledge or 
consent or that he failed to exercise due diligence to prevent the 
commission of such offence. 
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This provision removed the conceptual problem that usually attended the imposition 
of liability on corporations, as it spelt out clearly that those persons who were in 
positions of authority in the corporation during the commission of the offence by the 
corporation were liable. They could not hide behind the corporate veil. In their defence 
they would have to show that they either did not have the mens rea, which would be 
difficult to show given that the very commission of the offence by the corporation 
attracted liability on the officers of the corporation or that they exercised due diligence. 
In the spectrum of recognized offences in Canada at that time in the 1980s, the 
violations of the Act probably fit well in the category of public welfare/strict liability 
offences. The categorizations of offences in Canada were articulated by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in the case of R. v. City of Sault Ste. Marie404 : 
I conclude, for the reasons which I have sought to express that there are 
compelling grounds for the recognition of three categories of offences 
rather than the traditional two: 
1. Offences in which mens rea , consisting of some positive state of 
mind such as intent, knowledge, or recklessness, must be proved by 
the prosecution either as an inference from the nature of the Act 
committed, or by additional evidence. 
2. offences in which there is no necessity for the prosecution to prove 
the existence of mens rea; the doing of the prohibited act prima facie 
imports the offence, leaving it open to the accused to avoid liability 
by proving that he took all reasonable care. This involves 
consideration of what a reasonable man would have done in the 
circumstances. The defence will be available if the accused 
reasonably believed in a mistaken set of facts which, if true, would 
render the act or omission innocent, or if he took all reasonable steps 
404 R. v City of Sault Ste. Marie (1978), 85 D.L.R. (3d) 161 at 181-2. See also Hany Glasbeek, The 
C01poration As Criminal, at 226-227, Course material at Osgoode Hall Law School, Winter 1987. 
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to avoid the particular event. These offences may properly be called 
offences of strict liability. 
3. Offences of absolute liability where it is not open to the accused to 
exculpate himself by showing that he was free of fault. 
Offences which are criminal in the true sense fall in the first category. 
Public welfare offences would, prima facie, be in the second category. 
They are not subject to the presumption of full mens rea. An offence of 
this type would fall in the first category only if such words as "wilfully", 
"with intent", "knowingly", or "intentionally" are contained in the 
statutory provision creating the offence. On the other hand, the principle 
that punishment would in general not be inflicted on these without fault 
applies. Offences of absolute liability would be those in respect of which 
the Legislature had made it clear that guilt would follow proof merely of 
the proscribed act. The over-all regulatory pattern adopted by the 
Legislature, the subject-matter of the legislation, the importance of the 
penalty, and the precision of the language used will be primary 
consideration in determining whether the offence falls into the third 
category. 
After recognizing the law under which the enforcement of sanctions would be 
brought i.e. through the Export and Import Permits Act and categorizing the offence as 
probably belonging to that of strict liability offence, rather than mens rea or absolute 
liability offence, it is important to address the question of the enforcement of strict 
liability offences. How serious was the public welfare offence? 
By extension, how serious was the breach of a sanctions law i.e. the Export And 
Import Permits Act? One clue already given is that it was probably in the lower range 
judging from the penalties imposed, summary conviction attracting five thousand 
dollars or 12 months imprisonment or both while conviction upon indictment attracted a 
fine of twenty five thousand dollars or five years imprisonment. Given that in most 
cases, corporations that were convicted were asked to pay fines, it would seem that for a 
corporation doing multi-million dollar business with South Africa, five thousand or 
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twenty five thousand dollars fines were a pittance. This would likely not have deterred 
a corporation from continuing its business with South Africa, in the face of sanctions. 
There is a preliminary problem even before one begins to talk about fines and 
imprisonment. There was a problem of prosecuting those who violated the law against 
trading in certain items with South Africa. Who was going to prosecute those who 
violated the law? Did the government have the will to do so? Was the breach of a 
sanctions law morally wrong? Who was offended by the breach? 
These questions could only be answered in relation to the enforcement of the UN 
Mandatory Arms Embargo against South Africa of which Canada had experience by 
virtue of its attempt to live up to its international obligations. There was a problem of 
enforcement even when the law was clear or when international obligations so required. 
7 .5.4 International Obligations 
7. 5. 4.1 International Codes of Conduct 
Just as national governments had promulgated codes of conduct to govern their 
corporations operating in South Africa, intergovernmental organizations had also 
attempted to evolve international codes of conduct to regulate the activities of 
multinational corporations in general and their operations in South Africa in particular. 
We will concentrate on the latter aspect only, i.e. South Africa, without losing sight of 
the general framework within which the codes existed. 
The efforts of national government in promulgating codes of conduct and attempting 
to enact sanctions laws, was in conformity with the international efforts in the same 
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direction. The European Economic Community (EEC) for example, had a code of 
conduct for companies operating in South Africa. The United Nations had called for 
divestment and sanctions against South Africa. Pertinent resolutions on the need for 
multinational corporations to refrain from collaborating with South Africa had been 
numerous. The UN Economic and Social Council Resolution 1981/86405 on "Activities 
of Transnational Corporations in Southern Africa and Their Collaboration with the 
Racist Minority regime in that Area" is worth excerpting in order to emphasize the work 
of international efforts: 
The Economic and Social Council, 
4. Welcomes as a positive step the policies of some Governments to 
bring about an end to the activities of their transnational corporations 
in Southern Africa; 
5. Condemns the racist minority regime in South Africa for its 
perpetuation of the inhuman system of apartheid and the illegal 
occupation of Namibia; 
6. Condemns those transnational corporations which collaborate with 
the racist minority regime in southern Africa, and calls upon all 
transnational corporations to respect the various United Nations 
resolutions concerning southern Africa; 
7. Condemns the actions of those home countries of transnational 
corporations designed to promote and perpetuate investments by their 
transnational corporations in South Africa and Namibia in 
contravention of United Nations resolutions; 
8. Calls upon all home countries of transnational corporations to take 
effective measures to terminate the collaboration of their 
transnational corporations with the racist minority regime in southern 
405 United Nations Economic and Social Council Resolution 1981/86 reproduced in (1982) 11 The CTC 
Reporter 11. 
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Africa, to prevent further new investments and reinvestments and to 
bring about an immediate withdrawal of all existing investments in 
Namibia; ... 
12. Urges all transnational corporations to comply fully with the relevant 
United Nations resolutions by terminating all further investments in 
South Africa and Namibia and by ending their collaboration with the 
racist minority regime; ... 
14. Reaffirms that the code of conduct on transnational corporations should 
include effective measures against the collaboration of transnational 
corporations with the racist minority regime in southern Africa; 
It can be seen from the above quote that corporations operating in South Africa were 
under heavy attack, so were their collaborating home countries. Clause 14 referred to 
the Draft UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations406• Clause 14 of that 
Code dealt with transnational corporations and South Africa. It stated: 
Non-collaboration by transnational corporations with racist minority 
regimes in South Africa: 
14. In accordance with the efforts of the international community 
towards the elimination of apartheid in South Africa and its continued 
illegal occupation of Namibia, 
(a) Should respect the national laws and regulations adopted in 
pursuance of Security Council decisions concerning southern 
Africa; 
(b) Should within the framework of their business activities engage 
in appropriate activities with a view to contributing to the 
elimination of racial discrimination practices under the system 
of apartheid. 
406 The UN Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations has been in the works since the Economic and 
Social Council of the UN by Resolution 1913 (L VII) created the Commission on Transnational 
Corporations in 1974. Included in the Commission's terms ofreference was the preparation of a code of 
conduct on transnational corporations. This code in draft form is reproduced in (1982) 12 CTC Reporter 
3. 
192 
Like national codes of conduct which were voluntary, international codes of conduct 
were also voluntary. The non-effectiveness of national codes of conduct applied to 
international codes of conduct as well. There was a general reluctance in having 
mandatory international codes of conduct. Seymour Rubin, a Professor of Law at 
American University believed that "a mandatory code - one which becomes an 
international binding agreement would require at least national and probably 
international measures to put its provisions into effect; but it seems highly unlikely that 
the (UN) Code will be mandatory in this sense, not least because developing as well as 
developed nations would have considerable difficulty with the enactment of the 
consequently required national legislation. 11407 
Max W eisglas, from the International Chamber of Commerce and an economic 
adviser to Unilever, the giant soap multinational corporation, reflected the thinking of 
international business on codes of conduct. He had stated, on the UN Code that: 408 
The Code should be voluntary. A non-voluntary, legally binding Code 
would require agreement of a detailed, non-flexible international treaty, to 
be ratified in each of the countries concerned. This process would not only 
be time-consuming, but - as treaty practices show - would attract only a 
rather limited number of ratifications. Such an international legal 
instrument could in fact compromise the sovereign right of Governments to 
exercise their legislative powers over vital economic activities, which 
would also include those of TNCs. The Code would, therefore, be to insist 
on its being legally binding. The business world's claim for a voluntary 
status is not a hidden way of escaping from the Code. On the contrary, a 
voluntary Code promulgated with a very large or full degree of consensus 
by a highly reputed intergovernmental organization such as the United 
407 Seymour Rubin, "For A Balanced Code" (1982) 12 CIC Reporter 10 at 11. 
408 Max Weisglas. "International Business And The United Nations Code" (1982) 12 CIC Reporter 16 at 
18. 
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Nations would in practice set standards with a strong, morally persuasive 
character from which it would be difficult for companies of status to 
withdraw without damaging their reputation. Moreover, the agreement 
reached at the fifteenth session of the Intergovernmental Working Group in 
January 1982 on the implementation of the Code provides for annual 
discussions on the code, periodic assessment of its implementation, and a 
review procedure within the Commission on Transnational Corporations. 
This should guarantee that a United Nations Code, provided it is practical 
and realistic, will not become a dead letter. 
There is no statement on what would happen to non-complying corporations. It was 
assumed corporations would comply. Codes were made out to be tools of goodwill. 
There is still argument as to whether the issue was whether the Codes were 
mandatory or voluntary409• Baade challenges the popular assumption that a "voluntary" 
code has no legal effect410 • He contended that an international code of conduct could 
create valid and binding legal obligations, notwithstanding explicit declarations or 
disclaimers characterizing the instrument as "voluntary" or "not legally enforceable". 
The intention of the parties is the key point. Good faith and the intention to create legal 
obligations, rather than the form of the instrument, are the major determinants of the 
legal character and effects of the provisions of a code. Further these codes, which were 
voluntary, could in the long run harden into enforceable settled principles of law. 
Maybe one could also look at national codes of conduct in the same way, Baade agreed. 
Hom, like Baade draws a distinction between the legal character of codes of conduct 
and their effectiveness411 • Home says that was crucial was the follow -up procedures in 
409 The following is summarised in Transnational Corporations In World Development, supra at 121-124. 
410 H. W. Baade, "The Legal Effects Of Codes Of Conduct For Multinational Enterprises" in Legal 
Problems Of Codes Of Conduct For Multinational Enterprises, (Deventer: Kluwer 1980) cited in Ibid; at 
121. 
411 N. Horn, "Codes Of Conduct For Multinational Enterprises And Transnational Lex Mercatoria" in 
Legal Problems ibid., cited in Transnational Corporations, supra at 122. 
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the process of implementation. The effectiveness of a code of conduct depended on the 
political commitment 
of states parties to the undertakings of the code and not on the juridical quality of the 
instrument. 
Pursey, a trade unionist, on the other hand believed in the adoption of tougher 
mandatory regulatory measures on multinational corporations412• According to Pursey, 
codes of conduct should not be undertakings of goodwill. This view was shared by 
Fatouros who was sceptical about multinational corporations complying voluntarily 
with codes of conduct without any governmental constraints413 . Fatouros did not pay 
much attention to the legal form of the instrument, however. He took a more pragmatic 
view. He asked instead: Did the instrument influence the conduct of the party 
concerned in the desired direction? If not, the instrument was ineffective, if yes it was 
effective. Fatouros did not consider why a corporation would want to cooperate in the 
absence of any penalties for non-compliance without cause. 
One key point that had been raised in relation to codes of conduct regardless of 
whether they were national or international, was the crucial role of the national 
government. Did it have political will to enforce the codes or any laws pertaining to the 
proscribed behaviour? We now return to examining how Canada had utilized its Export 
412 S.K. Pursey, "The Trade Union View On Implementation Of Codes Of Conduct" in Legal Problems 
cited in ibid., at 122. See also his "Codes OfTNCs: The Trade Union Experience" (1982) 12 CTC Report 
14. 
413 A.A. Fatouros, "On The Implementation Oflntemational Codes Of Conduct: An Analysis Of Future 
Experience" (1981) 30 American University Law Review 941, cited in Transnational Corporations, 
supra at 122. 
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and Import Permits Act to fulfil its international obligations i.e. the UN Arms Embargo 
against South Africa. 
7.5.4.2 The UN Arms Embargo 
On November 41h, 1977, the UN Security Council, (Canada having joined the 
Security Council in January, 1977) passed resolution 418 which imposed an arms 
embargo against South Africa. Security Council resolutions are binding on member 
nations. The Resolution read in part: 
The Security Council; ... 
Convinced that a mandatory arms embargo needs to be universally applied 
against South Africa in the first instance, 
Acting therefore under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
1. Determines, having regard to the policies and acts of the South 
African Government, that the acquisition by South Africa of arms 
and related material constitutes a threat to the maintenance of 
international peace and security; 
2. Decides that all States shall cease forthwith any provision to South 
Africa of arms and related materiel of all types including the sale or 
transfer of weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and 
equipment, paramilitary police equipment, and spare parts for the 
afore-mentioned and shall cease as well the provision of types of 
equipment and supplies and grants of licensing arrangements for the 
manufacture or maintenance of the aforementioned; 
3. Calls upon all States to review, having regard to the objectives of the 
present resolution, all existing contractual arrangements with and 
licences granted to South Africa relating to the manufacture and 
maintenance of arms, ammunition of all types and military equipment 
and vehicles, with a view to terminating them; 
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4. Further decides that all States shall refrain from any cooperation with 
South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear 
weapons; 
5. Calls upon all States, including States non-members of the United 
Nations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the 
present resolution; ... 
This was the only mandatory resolution the UN Security Council had ever passed on 
South Africa. It thus carried a lot of weight in international circles and was much talked 
about by many people concerned with apartheid. It was thus fitting that in the absence 
of mandatory codes of conduct (national or international) and in the absence of a direct 
national sanctions law, resolution 418 became the rallying cry of the national 
enforcement. Canada had had some experience with the enforcement of Resolution 
418. The Canadian Government was alerted to these infractions414• 
According to the TCCR, this is how the government responded. Government 
responses to alleged infractions were perhaps best demonstrated by the following 
anecdote. When a programme of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation aired 
allegations that Levy Auto Parts of Toronto had shipped reconstituted Centurion tank 
engines and parts to South Africa, the Taskforce phoned the Department of External 
Affairs to enquire whether these allegations were being investigated. Here they were 
told that it was not the responsibility of the Department of External Affairs to launch 
such an investigation, and referred the Taskforce to the Department of Justice. The 
Justice Department said that it was not responsible either; and advised the Taskforce to 
get in touch with the RCMP, Canada's security services. The RCMP Legal Department 
414 The following anecdote is taken from Sheila Kappler, supra at 5. 
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explained that it could only investigate if asked to do so by a department of Government 
and that no such request had been made. In answer to the question whether the public 
could ask for an investigation, the RCMP explained that such a public request would be 
extremely difficult to formulate. Since only regulations under the Export And Import 
Permits Act existed, rather than a specific Canadian law governing the enforcement of 
the South African embargo, it would not be possible to cite an alleged infraction of a 
specific law. Therefore, if members of the public wanted to request the RCMP to 
investigate alleged violations, they would have had to cite an alleged infraction of a 
specific regulation of the Export And Import Permits Act. In the view of the RCMP 
lawyer, such a task without the support of the Canadian Government, would be beyond 
the means of ordinary Canadians. He added that the issue at hand was of highly 
political character, and unlikely to receive much official encouragement. 
We learn many things from the above account. First, the government was central to 
enforcing the Arms Embargo and by extension, any sanction laws against South Africa. 
Secondly, the government may be unwilling to cooperate in the enforcement of the 
embargo. Thirdly, there was no law in Canada which could have been cited as having 
been breached and through which enforcement measures would have proceeded. By 
extension there was no direct Canadian sanctions law against South Africa. South 
Africa may not even have been on the "Area Control List" or "Import Control List" of 
the Export And Import Permits Act. Fourthly, individuals and organizations had no 
standing in the enforcement of any sanctions law. The Government would have to do 
everything related to enforcement. 
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The Canadian government's attitude towards alleged violations, like that of the Levy 
Auto Parts of Toronto case (which seemed to have died without thorough and 
conclusive investigations) led the Taskforce to conclude "that the enforcement 
mechanisms of the Arms Embargo are weak and are carried out with a singular lack of 
enthusiasm "415 . 
Another case where the government lacked enthusiasm was that of the Plessey 
Canada.416 Plessey Canada was exporting military related equipment to South Africa. 
South African Congress of Trade Unions approached the Investigations Division of 
Revenue Canada about the possible violation of the Arms Embargo by Plessey. The 
department agreed to investigate. After a year- long investigation, Plessey was charged 
with failure to apply for an export permit for controlled goods. Note that it was not 
charged with contravening the Arms Embargo. The charge was not carried through. 
The Department informed South African Congress of Trade Unions that political will 
did not exist to carry through prosecution of the Arms Embargo violation charge. South 
African Congress of Trade Unions concluded on the basis of the Plessey case that417 : 
The Plessey case points to a number of serious flaws in the Canadian 
system of enforcement. Canada is a signatory to the 1977 mandatory UN 
arms embargo against South Africa yet there is no definition of "arms" in 
Canada's endorsement of the embargo. In theory, anything on Canada's 
export control list including "dual purpose" equipment (such as tele-
communications systems) requires an export permit before those 
commodities can be legally exported. 
415 Ibid at 6. 
416 This case is examined in SACTU, supra at 27-30. 
417 Ibid at 29. 
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The permit system "coupled with a system of rigorous pre-screening of 
export permits applications and complemented by customs controls at 
ports, airports, and central distribution centres", to quote the Ministry of 
External Affairs, are supposed to ensure that Canada does not arm 
apartheid. There is a loop hole however. If the corporations do not 
cooperate by filing for export permits there seems to be little in Canada's 
enforcement system to identify breaches of the embargo before it is too 
late. This unwillingness to commit resources to enforce the arms embargo 
effectively means that Canada's signature is not worth the paper it is 
written on. One person in Statistics Canada told us there is no revenue to 
be made from exports so Revenue Canada will not spend any money on 
enforcement. 
Even when corporations were prosecuted for violating the arms embargo, the 
penalties were minor. For example after Gerald Bull of Space Research Corporation, 
Canada, escaped liability in Canada for contravention of the arms embargo by selling 
military parts to South Africa, he was charged and convicted in the United States Court 
for the same offence. Bull served four months in prison and Space Research was fined a 
paltry sum of $45,000.00, a very minute fine for a multi-billion dollar business418 . 
Citing the Space Research Corporation case, South African Congress of Trade Unions 
concluded that "the case underscores the ease with which multi-national corporations 
can make a mockery of government embargoes. This is particularly true when the 
government where the corporation is headquartered sees its interests as coinciding with 
those of corporate capital"419• 
Did the interests of the Canadian government coincide with those of corporate 
capital? David Moore thought the interests of these entities were coincidental420. He 
had observed that the articulations on South Africa of public interest groups like the 
418 Naiman, Bhabha and Wright, supra at 19. 
419 SACTU supra at 29. 
420 David Moore, supra. 
200 
Task Force were rejected by the government, while those of the corporate sector had 
been listened to and incorporated in the government's foreign policy towards South 
Africa. The future of economic sanctions looked unsure. 
7 .6 Conclusion 
The imposition of economic sanctions and other measures by Canada against 
apartheid South Africa was a form of exercise of universal civil jurisdiction. It was a 
form of accountability against the condemned crime of apartheid. 
The initiative to get Canada to do anything about the crime of apartheid was to some 
extent induced by pressure groups and the moral persuasion of the international 
community through the United Nations. Pressure groups may be the engine for the 
exercise of universal jurisdiction. To be effective, pressure groups must have receptive 
ears in the decision-makers. Prime Minister Brian Mulroney was receptive but the 
corporate world could not be so easily swayed. 
In 1982, Canada incorporated the State Immunity Act (SIA)421 • This Act prohibits 
civil suits in Canada against foreign sovereign governments and their agents. This rule 
of law was emphatically affirmed in two important cases in Canada under which 
apartheid criminals could conceivably have been privately sued by the victims of 
apartheid analogous to the exercise of universal civil jurisdiction by Canadian courts. In 
Bouzari v Islamic Republic of Iran422 an Iranian national sued Iran in Ontario for torture. 
421 State Immunity Act RSC 1985 S-18. 
422 (2004) 72 OR (3d) 675 (CA), leave to appeal to the SCC refused, [2004] S.C.C.A. No. 410 (Bouzari). 
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Iran did not defend this action. However, the Attorney General of Canada intervened 
arguing that the action was barred by the State Immunity Act. 
A recent case as of 2013 on this same point is the case of the Estate of the Late 
Zawra (Ziba) Kazemi et al v The Islamic Republic of Iran et al423 where the Courts of 
Quebec upheld the principles held in Bouzari424 • These cases, buttressed by the State 
Immunity Act, indicate that civil suits against apartheid criminals would not have 
succeeded then nor could they succeed currently in the absence of a law equivalent to 
the U.S. Alien Tort Claims Act. 
The next chapter examines the question of whether Canada could have exercised 
universal criminal jurisdiction against apartheid South Africa between 1948 and 1994. 
423 No. 500-17-031760-062 (Quebec Superior Court); Kazemi v The Islamic Republic of Iran et al, File 
500-09-021457-114 Quebec Court of Appeal; leave to appeal granted by the Supreme Court of Canada 
Kazemi v Iran Docket 35034 (7 March 2013). 
424 Bouzari, supra. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE CASE, THE EVIDENCE AND POSSIBLE UNIVERSAL CRIMINAL 
JURISDICTION IN CANADA DURING THE APARTHEID ERA 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the problems and prospects of prosecuting apartheid 
criminals in Canada425 between 1948 and 1994. Could Canada have exercised universal 
criminal jurisdiction against apartheid criminals during the Apartheid era? The Canadian 
case in this time period highlights some of the legal issues that arise when universal 
jurisdiction is contemplated or exercised. 
There were no attempts to prosecute the architects and perpetrators of apartheid in 
Canada while apartheid was in existence. Canada could have prosecuted apartheid 
criminals after the enactment of Bill C-71 in 1987. An earlier chapter discussed 
Canada's state of war crimes legislation and activities or lack thereof in the prosecution 
of war criminals between 1945 and 2005. That chapter set the stage and background to 
this chapter. 
As already stated in the last chapter, Mulroney likened Apartheid to Nazism. But his 
government did not take any proactive activities towards the investigation and or 
prosecution of apartheid criminals as the government did with respect to Nazi war 
criminals. 
425 The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (United 
Nations General Assembly Resolution 3068(XXVIII), 30 November 1973, entered into force on 18 
July 1976. As of 2008, there were 107 ratifications). 
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8.2 A Summary of the Legal Basis for Canada's Assumption of Universal 
Jurisdiction Against the Crime of Apartheid up to 1994 
A legal argument could have been made before the collapse of apartheid, that Canada 
had an obligation to prosecute apartheid criminals in Canada based on the following 
legal principles: 
Racial discrimination is outlawed by international law by virtue of the United 
Nations International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 426. This treaty came into force on December 21 5\ 1965. Canada 
became a party to this convention on November 13t\ 1976. As of December 1986, 
124 nations were states parties to the United Nations International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. This overwhelming 
ratification of this Convention attested to the rejection by the international 
community of the principle of racial discrimination as practiced in South Africa and 
elsewhere. Treaty law therefore abhors racial discrimination and thus is binding on 
Canada. 
The principle of non-racial discrimination could be said to have become part of 
customary international law. Customary international law is defined as evidence of 
general practice recognized and accepted as law of a particular nature by the 
majority of nation states. Encouraging racial discrimination is a violation of 
customary international law in this regard. 
426 U.N.T.S., vol. 660, at 135. 
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As evidence of this practice and acceptance, the majority of nation states have in 
their domestic laws incorporated anti-racial discrimination articles, clauses or 
sections. 
Canada has affirmed the principle of non-racial discrimination in its domestic 
laws, particularly section 1 of the Canadian Bill of Rights427; section 15 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and generally the then section 319 of the 
Canadian Criminal Code428 , as amended. That section stipulated that hate 
propaganda is a crime in Canada. Canada also has a human rights code that 
prohibits discrimination including racial discrimination. 
Further because of the massive violations of human rights in South Africa, which 
violations closely replicated those perpetrated by the Nazi regime during the Second 
World War, the United Nations had defined the practices of apartheid as a crime 
against humanity, an international crime, by virtue of the International Convention 
on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid429. The practices of 
Nazi Germany were censured as war crimes, crimes against peace and crimes against 
humanity at the International Military Tribunal in Nuremburg. This was a tribunal 
that tried and sentenced Nazi leaders for the above crimes using the Nuremberg 
Principles. The United Nations recognized the atrocities of Nazi Germany by 
codifying the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
427 R.S.C. 1970, c. 44. 
428 R.S.C. 1985, c.c. 46. 
429 G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVII), 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) at 75, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973). 
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Genocide 430• Canada became a party to this Genocide Convention on December 2"d, 
1952. The Apartheid Convention was modelled on the Genocide Convention and 
went a little further by providing for international jurisdiction for the prosecution of 
official representatives of the South African regime. While Canada has not ratified 
this convention, as of December 1986, 86 nations had become states parties. [There 
are 108 ratifications as of 2012.] This is a strong indication of the international 
consensus against the monstrosity of apartheid. The human rights practices of 
apartheid South Africa had reviled the international community for many years; this 
led to the majority of nations cutting off diplomatic relations with South Africa 
and/or imposing economic and military sanctions of sorts against South Africa. 
The International Law Commission's "Draft Articles on State Responsibility" 
states that an international crime may result from breach of "an international 
obligation of essential importance for the safeguarding of the human being, such as 
those prohibiting ... apartheid." These Draft Articles were generally accepted as 
reflecting customary international law. Hence crimes against humanity are a 
violation of customary international law as well as general principles of law as 
recognized by the community of nations. 
The latter is evidenced by the total outlawing of genocide-like practices in virtually 
all nation states. South Africa engaged in "low level genocide" on its black 
population. 
430 U.N.T.S., Vol. 28, at 277. 
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In Canada, genocide was specifically prohibited and was punishable in 1988 by 
section 318 of the Criminal Code431 • War crimes and crimes against humanity were 
punishable in 1988 under Section 6 (1.91) of the Criminal Code432 • War crimes and 
crimes against humanity were added to the Criminal Code by Bill C-71, 1987. 
Given that apartheid had been defined as a crime against humanity by the 
international community, it came within Section 6( 1.91) of the Criminal Code. 
Canada could therefore have prosecuted apartheid criminals in Canada before the 
demise of apartheid in 1994. 
8.3 Domestic Legislation in Canada 
Bill C-71 433 was proclaimed into force in September of 1987. That legislation has 
now been amended but its essence remains the same. It provided for universal criminal 
jurisdiction in Canada to prosecute individuals accused of having committed war 
crimes434 and crimes against humanity435 anywhere in the world. This enactment 
431 R.S.C. 1985 c.c. 46. 
432 R.S.C. 1985 c.c.46. 
433 An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Immigration Act, 1976 and the Citizenship Act, passed by the 
House of Commons on August 28, 1987. The amendment to the Criminal Code is in S.6 (1.9). The 
Criminal Code part came into force in September 1987 and the other parts were proclaimed in November 
1987. 
434 S.6 ( 1.96) states: "war crime" means an act or omission that is committed during an international armed 
conflict, whether or not it constitutes a contravention of the law in force at the time and in the place of its 
commission, and that, at that time and in that place, constitutes a contravention of the customary 
international law or conventional international law applicable in international armed conflicts. I refer to 
those who have committed war crimes as war criminals. See Q. Wright, "War Criminals" (1947) 39 AJIL 
257. 
435 ibid states: "crime against humanity" means murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, 
persecution or any other inhumane act or omission that is committed against any civilian population or any 
identifiable group of persons, whether or not it constitutes a contravention of the law in force at the time 
and in the place of its commission, and that, at that time and in that place, constitutes a contravention of 
customary international law or conventional international law or is criminal according to the general 
principles of law recognized by the community of nations; I call those who have committed crimes 
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resulted from the recommendations of the Deschenes Commission_of Inquiry on War 
Criminals Report436 .The Commission itself appears to have been the result of a 
sustained political and legal campaign in Canada by various individuals and groups to 
have suspected Nazi war criminals living in Canada prosecuted in Canada or extradited 
to face trials for their alleged participation in the Second World War crimes and for 
committing genocide against the Jewish people437 . 
Prior to the enactment of the above-named statute, Canada did not appear to have 
jurisdiction to prosecute those suspected individuals in Canada 438 • The two statutes 
under which war criminals would conceivably have been tried i.e. the War Crimes Act of 
1946439 and the Geneva Convention Act of 1966 440 did not bestow the requisite 
jurisdiction. The Criminal Code 441 itself seemed to forbid any contemplation of such a 
venture. Nor would have international law broadly defined been of any use, except 
under the caveat introduced by section 11 (g)442 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
against humanity as criminals against humanity. For a history of the concept of "crime against humanity" 
see, Egon Schwelb, "Crimes Against Humanity", (1946) BYBIL 178. 
436 Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals Report..._Part 1, Honourable Jules Deschenes Commissioner 
(Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 30 December 1986). Herein after referred to as 
Deschenes Commission Report. 
437 See Generally David Matas and Susan Charendoff, Justice Delayed: Nazi War Criminals in Canada 
(Toronto: Summerhill Press Ltd., 1987) especially ch. 9. 
438 See discussion in Deschenes Commission Resport supra pp. 111 -133. See also obiter of Courts in 
Federal Republic of Germany v Rauca (1982), 38 O.R. (2d) 705, affirmed by Court of Appeal for Ontario, 
(1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 225. For contrary views see David Matas, Bringing Nazi War Criminals in Canada 
to Justice (Toronto: League for Human Rights of B'Nai Brith Canada, February 1985); Matas and 
Charendoff, supra at 151; Kenneth M. Narvey, "Trial in Canada of Nazi War Criminals: Overcoming 
Certain obiter in Rauca" (1983), 34 C.R. (3d) 126. Extradition was one available remedy. For a useful 
discussion of problems of prosecution in Canada, See Sharon A. Williams and J.-G. Castel, Canadian 
Criminal Law: International and Transnational Aspects (Toronto: Butterworths, 1981) ch. 9. 
439 1946 (Can.) C. 73. See Supra at 17-123. 
440 1964-65 (Can.) C. 44, now R.S.C. 1970, C. G-3. See note 5 at 123-126. 
441 R.S.C. 1970 C. C-34, ss. 5(2) and 8. 
442 Section 11 stipulates: Any person charged with an offence has the right, ... (g) not to be found guilty 
on account of any act or omission unless, at the time of the act or omission, it constituted an offence under 
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Freedoms, 443 which would be shaky by itself. This section of the Charter would 
however have allowed parliament to pass enabling legislation if it so desired for the 
prosecution of those accused of having committed war crimes and crimes against 
humanity and now living in Canada. Parliament had passed the enabling legislation. 
The next step would have been to investigate the alleged criminals and then to 
prosecute444 them or impose other legal remedies. The legislation stated that Attorney 
General of Canada or the Deputy had to consent to any such prosecutions. 
8.4 Prosecution in Canada 
Prosecution in Canada was not the only remedy discussed and available to confront 
war criminals and perpetrators of crimes against humanity in the Apartheid era. There 
were two other routes: extradition445 and denaturalization446 and deportation.447 
Each of these routes had its strengths and weaknesses. The strength of extradition 
was that a foreign government with which Canada had an extradition treaty that 
requested for a particular criminal in Canada was actually interested in prosecuting that 
individual. There may have been evidence in the foreign country to strengthen the case 
for possible conviction. Further, the foreign country would likely have had a closer 
Canadian or international law or was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the 
community of nations. 
443 Enacted as Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, (U .K.) 1982, c. 11. Herein after to be referred to as the 
Charter. 
444 One Imre Finta became the first person in Canada to be charged with war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, see Toronto Star 10 December 1987, at Al. 
445 See discussion in the Deschenes Commission Report supra. For a study of Canadian extradition 
practice see, G. V. La Forest Extradition to andfrom Canada (Toronto: Canada Law Book Ltd., 1984). 
446 See discussion in Deschenes ibid 
447 Ibid. 
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connection than Canada to the crime the particular individual may have committed. If 
an individual was not extradited, Canada was not in a position to prosecute that 
individual. For these and other reasons, extradition has historically been popular among 
some war crimes advocates. However, the most serious shortcoming of the extradition 
option in the Apartheid era was that Canada did not have extradition treaties with the 
then Eastern European nations where most of the evidence against alleged war criminals 
living in Canada existed. Accused individuals would not have been extradited and 
hence would probably never have been prosecuted. 
A solution at the time might have been denaturalization and then deportation, say to 
then Eastern Europe or some other country. No extradition treaty would have been 
required for denaturalization and deportation. However, the individual might never have 
faced any prosecution of any sort in that country. Before the process of denaturalization 
and deportation was completed, complex and lengthy legal proceedings would have 
likely been necessary.448 A government might not have had the legal and or political 
resources and political will to go through with it. Unless it chose to just apprehend the 
individual, denaturalize and then deport that person. As of 1982, this, however, would 
have been subject to a strong legal challenge on the basis of the Charter449 • A 
448 The Rauca case is a good example. 
449 Section 7 would likely be used. It reads; Sec. 7: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of 
the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental 
justice". Section 7 was used successfully in an important immigration case of Singh v Min. of 
Employment and Immigration [1985], 1 S.C.R. 177, 17 D.L.R. (4th) 422. Though the issues are somewhat 
different, this case must send a signal that if a refugee can successfully use that section, a citizen would 
probably use it much more successfully. 
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government would have had to show that the person misrepresented himself or herself 
whens/he entered Canada450 • 
An amendment in 1987 to the Immigration Act, 1976 occasioned by the Bill under 
discussion provided for deportation under subsection 19(1) (j): 
Persons who there were reasonable grounds to believe had committed an 
act or omission outside Canada that constituted a war crime or a crime 
against humanity. 
These persons became members of an inadmissible class of persons, subject to 
deportation. The Citizenship Act had also been amended in 1987 to include the denial of 
citizenship to and exclusion from Canada of persons accused of being war criminals and 
or criminals against humanity. 
If Canada had decided to treat apartheid criminals as persons who have committed 
crimes against humanity, it could have barred these individuals from either entering 
Canada or acquiring Canadian citizenship. Canada could also have deported them if 
they had already entered the country. Because of the newly acquired jurisdiction to 
prosecute these individuals in Canada, extradition, say to South Africa may not have 
been exercised or seen as necessary any more, unless it was Canada's choice not to 
prosecute the alleged apartheid criminal. 
Extradition, deportation and denial of Canadian citizenship to war criminals and 
criminals against humanity were clearly secondary to prosecution at the time in 1987 
450 As provided for in BillC-71 amendment to Immigration Act 1976. 
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within Canada. Many individuals were surprised that Canada chose this route, i.e. 
prosecution, given the fact that the United States of America had made extradition (and 
deportation) the top priority beginning in 1978451 • The United States had more 
experience in dealing with war criminals than Canada. The Bill to prosecute war 
criminals from all over the world in the U.S. never reached the floor of the House of 
Representatives, however. The extradition of war criminals by the U.S. was restricted to 
Nazi war criminals only. Canada could have followed the same route but it did not. 
According to Matas and Charendoff, Canada's choice of not only prosecution within 
Canada, but also to include all war criminals and criminals against humanity from 
everywhere (though this latter aspect is not clear in the Bill or anywhere else), was a 
result of pressure from individuals from Eastern Europe. This constituency did not 
favour individuals being sent to Eastern Europe or Israel where it was feared, they might 
not receive fair trials. They also wanted perpetrators of historic crimes in Eastern 
Europe, e.g., the Soviet famine of the mid-thirties which resulted in the death of 
thousands of people, brought to justice in Canada. Without political pressure, this 
legislation would certainly not have seen the light of the day. It came forty years after 
Nuremberg. Thus if apartheid criminals were to be prosecuted in Canada, it would have 
likely been as a result of political pressure from some constituency. There was a very 
strong sanctions constituency that influenced the Canadian government to impose forms 
of universal civil jurisdiction that was discussed in the previous chapter. There was no 
451 For a good discussion of this see Matas and Charendoff, supra. 
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constituency that urged for the exercise of universal criminal jurisdiction comparable to 
that of the Canadian Jewish Congress. 
8.5 The Debate about Prosecution 
While the choice of prosecution in Canada had been on the overall welcomed, there 
had been some criticisms and some very strong dissenting 452 voices. The first major 
criticism related to the fact that prosecutorial power in the legislation was only 
competent to the federal government453 . The provincial attorneys-general were not 
permitted to prosecute nor were private prosecutions allowed. (All other offences in the 
Criminal Code could have been prosecuted by the provincial attorneys-general). If the 
federal government was unwilling or unable to prosecute, as a result of either political 
pressure or simply inertia, there was no other recourse. The provincial attorneys-general, 
had they been permitted to prosecute, might probably have been willing to prosecute in 
clear cases where the federal government was not. In retrospect, both levels of 
government should have been permitted to prosecute. 
The second criticism was that prosecutions were too slow, expensive and too few and 
far in between; in the long run defeating the whole exercise. 454 It is not clear whether 
those who raised this criticism, such as Sol Littman and Irwin Cotler, preferred 
extradition or deportation. These critics seemed to suggest that the federal government 
would not have been able to do anything at all, and that provision for internal 
452 This is discussed in the next section. 
453 See Matas and Charendoff, supra. 
454 Sol Littman, Address to Osgoode Hall Law School, Moot Court, 28 October 1987; and Irwin Cotler, 
Speech given at York University, Senate Chambers, 6 November 1987. 
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prosecution was merely for public consumption of certain constituencies.455 In 1987, 
Allan Ryan, former Director of the U.S. Justice Department's Office of Special 
Investigations (OSI) - the office that handles war criminals in the U.S. stressed the 
necessary intervention of politics in these matters. " ... what Canada will decide to do 
will be a function of the political process ... it would be a mistake for those who support 
prosecution to assume it will happen ... the right thing doesn't happen just because it is 
the right thing. "456 Political intervention would have been necessary if Apartheid 
criminals were to be tried in Canada. It would not happen on its own just because it 
would have been the right thing to do. 
In 1987, the Chief Justice of Australia, Michael Kirby, expressed a very strong 
dissent to the legislation in Canada and similar legislation in Australia. His reason was 
the passage of time since the crimes had been committed457 . According to Kirby, forty 
years was too long a time to re-open cases and would have been unfair. He himself had 
stopped cases in Australia going back a mere six or more years. Another factor related 
to time according to Kirby was that Canada had agreed to stop prosecutions in 1948 after 
receiving a memo from Britain. Kirby asked, "a government having decided not to 
pursue them to now pursue them?"458 • He noted that the Canadian Charter guaranteed a 
455 Sol Littman ibid. See summary of Littman's speech in Munyonzwe Hamalengwa, "What about 
Canada's Nazis" Obiter Dicta, Osgoode Hall Law School, 2 November 1987 at 1. 
456 
"Ex-hunter links Nazi's fate to politics" Globe and Mail, 6 November 1987 at 16. 
457 Kirk Makin, "Legality of War-Crimes Trials Questioned: Australian Jurist Cites Fairness" Globe and 
Mail 6 November 1987 at 16. 
458 ibid. 
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trial within a reasonable time459, though there were serious divisions within the Supreme 
Court of Canada as to what "reasonable time" entailed460 • 
Chief Justice Kirby's concerns could have been answered in part by pointing out that 
section 11 (g) of the Charter seemed to empower courts to try crimes committed a long 
time ago. As a matter of fact, this section came into being as a result of pressure from 
constituencies that wanted war criminals to be prosecuted461 • Even international law has 
sealed the loophole of time limitations involving war criminals and criminals against 
humanity, by agreeing to have the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory 
Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. 462 Canada is not a party to 
this convention. To address the problem of time limitation and conform to international 
law, Canada could have ratified this Convention. However, since Canada already had 
within its domestic laws a statutory provision addressing the same issue, even though 
not in precisely the same terms, Canada had no statutory limitations involving the crime 
of murder, which was an included offence in war crimes and crimes against humanity 
legislation. The exclusion of statutory limitations to war crimes was also part of 
customary international law binding on Canada. 
459 Section 11 of the Charter states that, "any person charged with an offence has the right ... (b) to be tried 
within a reasonable time". But this refers to trial after one has been charged and not the period between 
the commission of an offence and the charge. That is an entirely separate matter. See Carter v the Queen 
(1986), 26 C.C.C. (3d) 572, 29 D.L.R. (4th) 309, [1986], I S.C.R. 981 and Mills v The Queen [1986], I 
S.C.R. 863, (1986) 26 C.C.C. (3d) 481. There is obiter in these cases that pre-charge delay may be 
relevant under Section l l(d) - To be presumed innocent. The relationship between the presumption of 
innocence and possible prejudice due to a length pre-charge delay was disposed of in Finta against the 
accused. 
460 See Carter v The Queen ( 1986) Supra, ibid. 
461 See discussion by Francois Chevrette, "Protection upon arrest or detention and Against Retroactive 
Penal Law" in Walter S. Tamopolsky and Gerald-A. Beaudoin, The Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell, 1982) at 291-329. 
462 United Nations, Treaty Series vol. 754, at 73. 
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If apartheid criminals were to have been tried, the time factor would not have posed a 
serious problem. The crime of apartheid was a continuous crime during this period. The 
perpetrators could have been brought to trial within a reasonable time before the collapse 
of apartheid. Even if they hid for a long time, they would still be tried whenever they 
were found due to the absence of statutory limitations on the crime with which they 
would be charged, namely war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
Another strong dissent about the desirability of prosecutions in Canada of crimes that 
had happened a long time ago was the alleged unavailability of evidence or if available 
in the then Eastern Europe, the unreliability of this evidence.463 Even the memory of 
those who were persecuted is bound to have faded in years. This dissent largely appears 
to be more against the political systems of the then Eastern Europe than about the 
credibility of the evidence per se. This observation is based on the conclusion of the 
Deschenes Commission which assessed the responses of the various constituencies in 
regard to "foreign evidence": "No problem arose with the possibility of collecting 
evidence in western democracies, but a great debate ensued in connection with evidence 
available in Eastern Europe"464• Soviet-type societies allegedly did not enjoy judicial 
independence, presumption of innocence and the rule of law, or due process of law465 • 
The Deschenes Commission summarized the objections thus466 : 
463 See discussion in supra, and Williams and Castel supra. 
464 Deschenes Commission Report supra at 263. 
465 Williams and Castel, supra at 178. 
466 Deschenes Commission Report supra at 878. 
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a) Soviet supplied evidence cannot be trusted, because of fabrication, 
intimidation, denial of right to independent counsel, lack of full cross-
examination and general disregard for the principles of fundamental 
justice; 
b) Access to Soviet archives 1s severely limited, when it is not totally 
prevented; 
c) The same observation applies to access to sites of crimes and to 
potentially exculpatory witnesses; 
d) The use of Soviet-supplied evidence would constitute a mockery of 
justice and would represent the worst form of McCarthyist witch- hunts; 
e) The U.S.S.R. places no value on the rights of the individual; it is intent 
on attacking any ethnic group which opposes the Soviet State; 
f) By travelling to the U.S.S.R., the Commission would legitimize the 
political claims of the U.S.S.R. on the Baltic States and the Ukraine; 
g) By the same token, the Commission would give legitimacy to the Soviet 
legal system, which is but a pawn in the hands of the Soviet government; 
h) It would be ludicrous to foresee trials in Canada which would depend on 
a wholesale obtaining of Soviet evidence. 
The utilization of evidence from the then Eastern Europe had also received strong 
support which the Deschenes Commission summarized as467 : 
a) The Commission must go where the evidence is; 
b) Documents are in the Soviet archives, or German archives seized by the 
Soviets; 
c) Eyewitnesses are for the most part in the countries where crimes were 
allegedly committed; 
d) Victims of the Holocaust should not be deliberately excluded as 
witnesses and thus doubly victimized; 
e) Soviet motives should not invalidate Eastern European evidence; 
467 Ibid at 878-9. 
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f) Soviet-supplied evidence was used and accepted by the courts at 
Nuremberg and in the Rauca case in Canada; 
g) There is no known instance in Europe or in North America of a Soviet-
supplied document having been falsified or of an Eastern bloc witness 
having perjured himself. 
h) Use of evidence from Eastern Europe will not legitimize the Soviet 
political or legal systems; 
i) Opposition to the use of Soviet-supplied evidence is a declaration of 
non-confidence in the Canadian judicial system and its ability to sort out 
good evidence from bad. 
It will not be necessary for the purpose of this chapter to comment on the 
Commission's responses to the above issues, suffice to say that even with the law to 
prosecute internally, there would likely have been a continuing problem of evidence. 
This background is necessary to keep in mind in any study about the prosecution of war 
crimes in Canada from any country. 
There were reports of the Canadian government entering into agreements with the 
Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and other East European countries for Canadian 
investigators to gather documentary evidence and examine witnesses in those countries 
in accordance with Canadian rules of evidence. Canada had always insisted on those 
countries to agree to the following conditions before it could enter into agreements with 
them468 : 
i) Protection of reputations through confidentiality; 
ii) Independent interpreters; 
iii) Access to original documents; 
iv) Access to witnesses' previous statements; 
v) Freedom of examination of witnesses in agreement with Canadian rules 
of evidence; 
vi) Videotaping of such examination. 
468 Ibid at 890-1. 
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8.6 Canada and International Law in the Apartheid Era 
The Nuremberg Principles were enshrined in the International Convention on the 
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. This convention provides 
universal jurisdiction to states parties to prosecute apartheid criminals, "whether residing 
in the territory of the state in which the acts are perpetrated or in some other state"469• 
Article IV stipulates: 
The States Parties to the present Convention undertake: 
(a) To adopt any legislative or other measures necessary to suppress 
as well as to prevent any encouragement of the crime of apartheid and 
similar segregational policies or their manifestations and to punish persons 
guilty of that crime; 
(b) To adopt legislative, judicial and administrative measures to 
prosecute, bring to trial and punish in accordance with their jurisdiction 
persons responsible for, or accused of, the acts defined in article II of the 
present Convention, whether or not such persons reside in the territory of 
the State in which the acts are committed or are nationals of that State or 
some other State or are stateless persons. 
Article V goes further to stipulate more concretely universal jurisdiction by virtue of the 
acquisition of jurisdiction over the alleged criminal: 
Persons charged with the acts enumerated in article II of the present 
Convention may be tried by a competent tribunal of any State Party to the 
Convention which may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused 
or by an international penal tribunal having jurisdiction with respect to 
those States Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction. 
469 Article 111. 
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Unfortunately however, Canada was not a signatory to the Apartheid Convention. 
Notwithstanding its non-ratification of the Apartheid Convention, Canada was in a 
position to prosecute apartheid criminals on the basis of their having committed crimes 
against humanity as these were now punishable under Canadian law. The prohibition of 
war crimes and crimes against humanity was also part of customary international law 
binding on Canada. 
The international community had been concerned with the issue of torture for a long 
time. In 1955 for example, a United Nations General Assembly adopted what became 
known as the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners470. These served 
as preliminary guidelines on how to treat prisoners in a humane way. In 1975, the 
United Nations General Assembly passed resolution 3452, Declaration on the 
Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Article I defines torture as: 
1. For the purpose of this Declaration, torture means any act by which 
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally 
inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official on a person for such 
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or 
confession, punishing him for an act he has committed or is suspected of 
having committed, or intimidating him or other persons. It does not 
include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, 
lawful sanctions to the extent consistent with the Standard Minimum Rules 
for the Treatment of Prisoners. 
2. Torture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment. 
470 Adopted by the First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders on 30 August 1955 and approved by the United Nations Economic and Social Council on 31 
July 1957. 
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In resolution 32/64 of 8 December 1977, the United Nations General Assembly 
called on all member states to reinforce their support for the 'Declaration against 
Torture' by making unilateral declaration against torture and other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. This declaration would comprise of the 
government's intention to comply with the 'Declaration against Torture' by appropriate 
legislation and other effective measures. Canada was one of the countries that made the 
unilateral declaration on December 18, 1982. 
Other methods had been sponsored to combat the prevalent torture in the 
international community. For example in 1979, the United Nations adopted the Code of 
Conduct for Law_Enforcement Officials471 which forbade torture and related acts and in 
1982 the United Nations adopted the Principles of Medical Ethics472 as guidelines for 
medical and other professions about how to deal with victims of torture and related acts. 
These "soft laws" became hard binding laws in the form of conventions, particularly The 
Convention On Torture. Apartheid was a state that practiced torture and torture is a 
crime against humanity. 
8.6.1 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 
It was not until 1984 that the United Nations adopted resolution 39/46. This 
resolution became the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
471 Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 17 December 1979. 
472 Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 18 December 1982 
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Degrading Treatment or Punishment. However, in 1984, the definition of torture in its 
Article I was similar to that of the 197 5 Declaration. 
The 1984 Convention is much stronger than the 197 5 Declaration. It provided for 
universal jurisdiction to States Parties to prosecute all those who have committed the 
international crime of torture. Article 4 stipulated that "each State Party shall ensure that 
all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law ... ". Article 5(2) stipulates that 
"each State Party shall ... take such measures as may be necessary to establish its 
jurisdiction over such offences in cases where the alleged offender is present in any 
territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him ... ". That person who was not 
extradited was subject to prosecution under Article 7. The Convention also provided 
under Article 8(2) the legal basis for extradition to another country in a case where one 
country had no extradition treaty with that other country. The alleged criminal could 
have even been extradited to a state other than the one where the torture took place. The 
receiving country was able to exercise jurisdiction over the criminal on the basis of the 
offence as provided for by Article 8(4). The Convention prohibited using "higher orders" 
or "exceptional circumstances" as excuses for acts of torture. 
The Torture Convention came into force on 26 June 1987. Not only was Canada a 
signatory to this Convention it had also enacted domestic law dealing with torture in line 
with the stipulations of the Convention. Section 245.4 of the Canadian Criminal Code, 
which dealt with torture, provided for jurisdiction in Canada whether or not the offence 
was committed abroad. The definition of torture in this section was: 
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"Torture" means any act or omission by which severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person 
(a) for a purpose including 
(i) Obtaining from the person or from a third person information or a 
statement, 
(ii) Punishing the person for an act which that person or a third person has 
committed or is suspected of having committed, and 
(iii) Intimidating or coercing the person or a third person, or 
(b) For any reason based on discrimination of any kind, but does not 
include any act or omission arising only from inherent in or incidental to 
lawful sanctions. 
There were no justifications for torture according to this Section: 
(3) It is no defence to charge under this section that the accused was 
ordered by a superior or a public authority to perform the act or omission 
that forms the subject-matter of the charge, nor that the act or omission is 
alleged to have been justified by exceptional circumstances, including a 
state of war, a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public 
emergency. 
The Torture Convention and Section 245.4 of the Canadian Criminal Code should 
have been potentially very potent weapons against apartheid criminals in Canada even 
though Canada had not ratified the Apartheid Convention which clearly stipulated 
apartheid as a crime against humanity and may have been unwilling to recognise it as a 
crime against humanity for the purpose of prosecution under Bill C-71. At least Canada 
would have been able to recognise the systematic torture going on under apartheid in 
South Africa and for it to prosecute the perpetrators should they ever have come to 
Canada. The prohibition of torture as a crime against humanity is part of customary 
international law, binding on Canada. 
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However, torture was a very limited concept in the Canadian case. It was limited in 
terms of the number of people who may be charged. It can include prison officials and 
army personnel who directly participated in the torture. But left out is a broad spectrum 
of individuals who did not directly participate in the torture but were responsible for 
running the entire system under which torture occurred. The charge of torture for 
example would leave out members of the State Security Council in South Africa. 
Torture was further limited under the Canadian Criminal Code to imprisonment for 
fourteen years rather than to life imprisonment. 
8.7 Canadian Law 
War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity in Bill C-71 or Now Section 6(1.9) of the 
Criminal Code as amended were useful vehicles for the prosecution of apartheid 
criminals. 
Because of the limited scope of the cnme of torture, it would be preferable if 
apartheid criminals were charged with crimes against humanity. This is a much broader 
and more serious crime than torture. It encompasses a good deal of the prohibited acts 
under the Nuremberg Principles, Genocide Convention, Apartheid Convention as well as 
the Torture Convention. It stipulated: 
"Crime against humanity" means murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, persecution or any other inhumane act or omission that is 
committed against any civilian population or any identifiable group of 
persons, whether or not it constitutes a contravention of the law in force at 
the time and in the place of its commission, and that, at that time and in 
that place, constitutes a contravention of customary international law or 
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conventional international law or is criminal according to the general 
principles of law recognized by the community of nations. 
While this amendment to the Criminal Code as already stated came about to address 
the question of Nazi war criminals and the debates so far had indicated that it must apply 
to all situations defined as crimes against humanity as well as war crimes, it was not 
clear whether indeed the Canadian Attorney-General would use this amendment as such. 
It is in this regard that it was emphasized and recommended strongly that this 
amendment should indeed be used to prosecute all those accused of having committed 
crimes against humanity from everywhere. Apartheid is defined as a crime against 
humanity and so far 108 nations had ratified the Apartheid Convention which so 
stipulated. This clearly indicates that there is general global consensus on the 
criminality of apartheid of such a scale as to constitute a crime against humanity. No 
other system of government under contemporary conditions had been so labelled as a 
criminal government against humanity. Given the existence of domestic legislation in 
Canada to prosecute those who had committed the 'crime against humanity' as well as 
the 'war crimes' of apartheid, there should have been no hesitation in pursuing apartheid 
criminals when and if they were found in Canada. The existence of domestic legislation 
takes precedence over the ratification of international treaties. Thus Canada could not 
use its non-ratification of the Apartheid Convention to refuse to prosecute apartheid 
criminals. Section 6( 1.9) of the Criminal Code as amended was clear, it applied to all 
those who have committed "war crimes" and "crimes against humanity". In 
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contemporary conditions, of the period from 1948 to 1994, apartheid South Africa was 
at the top of the list in terms of committing crimes against humanity. 
8.8 Defences 
What defences could apartheid criminals have offered it prosecuted in Canada during 
the era of apartheid? 
8.8.1 State Orders 
The most important defence put forward by Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg and in 
other forums later was that they acted under the orders of the state473 . This was in fact 
true, Nazi war crimes and crimes against peace and humanity were committed in 
furtherance of state policies. The perpetrators of the crimes were high state 
functionaries, military, police and intelligence personnel. Refusal to carry out state 
directives would probably have brought about severe consequences, including death. 
The Nuremberg Principles prohibited the defence of acting under state orders or the 
defence that somebody acted as head of state or government. A string of international 
conventions, for example, the Genocide Convention; the Apartheid Convention and 
Torture Convention, has also prohibited the defence of having acted under state orders. 
473 As Fritz Weinschenk reports, "the individuals following these orders ... acted - perhaps in error - at any 
rate, in pursuit of what they had to consider orders by 'Legal' authority. Both army and civil service had 
sworn allegiance to Hitler personally. Theirs was not to question or scrutinize, but to 'follow orders to the 
end'." Weinschenk, "Nazis Before German Courts: The West German War Crimes Trials" (1976) IO Int'l 
Law 515 at 518. See also A.N. Sack, "War Criminals and the Defense of Superior Orders in International 
Law" (1945) 5 Law Guild Rev. 
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What would be the possible defence to charge of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity in Canadian Law? Before the enactment of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, Section 15 of the Criminal Code afforded the defence of acting under state 
orders: 
No person shall be convicted of an offence in respect of an act or omission 
in obedience to the laws for the time being made and enforced by persons 
in de facto possession of the sovereign power in and over the place where 
the act or omission occurs. 
The defence of acting under state orders was still available for certain crimes committed 
abroad. But it was not available against the charge of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity by virtue of the new Section 6(1.94) as amended: 
Notwithstanding subsection (1.93)474 and Section 15, a person maybe 
convicted with respect of an act or omission referred to in subsection 
(1.91) even if the act or omission is committed in obedience to or in 
conformity with the law in force at the time and in the place of its 
comm1ss1on. 
Thus Canadian law had been brought into conformity with the stipulations of 
international law. It appears therefore that all justifications or defences provided for in 
474 Subsection 6(1.93) stated: 
In any proceedings under this Act with respect to an act or omission referred to in subsection ( 1.91 ), 
notwithstanding that the act or omission is an offence under the laws of Canada in force at the time of the 
act or omission, the accused may, subject to subsection 535(6), rely on any justification, excuse or defence 
available under the laws of Canada or under international law at that time or at the time of the 
proceedings. 
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S.s.7(3) and 6(1.93) and elsewhere in the Criminal Code475 as amended were barred with 
respect to war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
8.8.2 Necessity 
S.7(3) of the Criminal Code as amended provided for the defence of necessity. This 
defence somewhat encompassed justifications for the impugned act. Even if this 
defence was available, it probably would not have met the charge of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity for it seemed to be directed to lesser offences. In R. v. 
Perka476, the Supreme Court of Canada discussed the defence of necessity. It can be 
seen from this decision that "imminent peril" "no reasonable alternative" etc. are criteria 
that must be satisfied before the defence can succeed. Dickson J. summarised the 
defence thus: 
(1) the defence of necessity exists in Canadian law as a common law 
defence by virtue of s. 7(3) of the Criminal Code; 
(2) conceptually, the defence is an "excuse" rather than a "justification"; it 
excuses the offender without justifying the offence. "It rests on a realistic 
assessment of human weakness, recognizing that a liberal and humane 
criminal law cannot hold people to the strict obedience of laws in 
emergency situations where normal human instincts, whether of self-
preservation or altruism, overwhelmingly impel disobedience." (at 248) 
(3) the defence requires an "urgent situation of clear and imminent peril 
when compliance with the law is demonstrably impossible;" (at 260) 
(4)"the importance of the requirement that there be no reasonable legal 
alternative cannot be overstressed;" (at 252) 
475 S. 7(3) provided: 
Every rule and principle of the common law that renders any circumstance a justification or excuse for an 
act or a defence to a charge continues in force and applies in respect of proceedings for an offence under 
this Act or any other Act of the parliament of Canada, except in so far as they are altered by or are 
inconsistent with this Act or any other Act of the parliament of Canada. 
476 [1984], 2 S.C.R. 232. 
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( 5) There is also a proportionality requirement: the infliction of a greater 
harm cannot be excused to avoid a lesser harm; 
( 6)it is doubtful that the commission of a crime when the occasion for 
necessity arose will prevent the defence from applying; the accused can be 
punished for the underlying offence, while the subsequent conduct can be 
measured under the necessity defence; 
(7) the accuser's fault with regard to the situation sought to be excused 
under the necessity defence, is relevant to the issue of "emergency"; 
foreseeable conditions are not involuntary in a moral sense as required for 
the defence; 
(8) the onus of proof with respect to the defence is the normal onus on the 
Crown beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Apartheid criminals could not have committed the cnmes of apartheid out of 
necessity to defend against alleged communism and terrorism. It appears therefore that 
in the spectrum of offences recognized in Canadian law as discussed in R. v. Sault Ste. 
Marie477 , war crimes and crimes against humanity probably fit in the category of 
"absolute liability" offences. Absolute liability offences entail conviction on proof 
merely that the defendant committed the prohibited act constituting the actus reus of the 
offence. There need not be any relevant mental element. Thus there is no defence to an 
absolute liability offence. This was disputed in Finta which will be discussed later in 
this thesis. 
The other two categories of offences are mens rea and "public welfare" offences. 
Mens rea offences constitute of some positive state of mind such as intent, knowledge, 
or recklessness. The state/prosecution in such offences is required to prove the requisite 
state of mind. In public welfare offences there is no necessity for the prosecution to 
prove the existence of mens rea; the doing of the prohibited act prima facie imports the 
477 Ibid at 53-4. 
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offence, leaving it open to the accused to avoid liability by proving that (s) he took all 
reasonable care. 
8.8.3 Diplomatic Immunity 
There was a difficulty with prosecuting before the demise of apartheid because of the 
existence of diplomatic relationships between Canada and South Africa. In this instance, 
the defence of diplomatic immunity or state immunity would have been allowed. If for 
example members of the South African State Security Council were to have visited 
Canada, they would have had the benefit of diplomatic immunity or state immunity. 
South African embassy personnel in Canada would have been considered to be on 
official business. Thus at that stage before the end of apartheid the defence of diplomatic 
immunity or state immunity existed.478 Government officials also benefited from state 
immunity laws. 
Diplomatic immunity however is not an indefinite privilege. Article 39 of the Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations 479 of 1961 for example deals with the duration of 
diplomatic immunity. The relevant parts are as follows: 
1. Every person entitled to privileges and immunities shall enjoy them 
from the moment he enters the territory of the receiving State on 
proceeding to take up his post or, if already in its territory, from the 
moment when his appointment is notified to the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs or such other ministry as may be agreed. 
478 See also the case of R v Palacios (1984), 45 O.R. (2d) 269 (C.A.), the case of a Nicaraguan diplomat 
charged with possession of cocaine and weapons. He relied on diplomatic immunity. 
479 (1966) Canada Treaty Series No. 29. Canada incorporated this treaty into its domestic law. See 
Diplomatic and_Consular Privileges and Immunities Act, S.C. 1976-77, C.31. 
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2. When the functions of a person enjoying privileges and immunities 
have come to an end, such privileges and immunities shall normally cease 
at the moment when he leaves the country, or on expiry of a reasonable 
period in which to do so, but shall subsist until that time, even in case of 
armed conflict. However, with respect to acts performed by such a person 
in the exercise of his functions as a member of the mission, immunity shall 
continue to subsist. 
3. In case of the death of a member of the mission, the members of his 
family shall continue to enjoy the privileges and immunities to which they 
are entitled until the expiry of a reasonable period in which to leave the 
country. [Emphasis supplied]. 
The only way to prevent the possibility of the use of the defence of diplomatic 
immunity during the period of the apartheid regime was for Canada to have broken 
diplomatic relations with South Africa. Although some Canadians called for such a 
step480, official policy was against such a move481 • 
Between 1982 when the Charter came into existence and 1994 when apartheid was 
abolished, a pressure or public interest group could have challenged Canada's 
diplomatic relations with Apartheid South Africa by going to court to seek a Declaratory 
Order based on the following legal theoretical opinion or submission as of 1990. 
8.9 A Declaratory Order Requiring the Government of Canada to Uphold the 
Rights of Black Residents of Canada Against the Practices in Canada of 
Apartheid South Africa 
8.9.1 Issues: 
480 
• See Peter Edwards, "Kick out South African Envoys, Carr Urges Ottawa" Toronto Star 5 March, 1988 
at Al6. 
481 Arch Mackenzie, "Clark says now not time to cut ties to Pretoria" Toronto Star 3 March, 1988 at Al. 
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1. Whether given the human rights atrocities committed in South Africa as a result 
of the South African system of apartheid, the presence of the South African 
Embassy in Ottawa with the acquiescence of the Canadian government, which 
presence permits the South African Embassy personnel to propagate in Canada 
ideas supportive of apartheid, leads the Canadian government because of its 
inaction against the propagation of the above ideas to violate the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, particularly sections 15 and 27, of the Criminal 
Code as well as customary international law and general principles of law as 
recognized by the community of nations? 
2. Given the nature of apartheid, is it legal for the Canadian government to maintain 
diplomatic relations with South Africa? Alternatively is maintaining a diplomatic 
relationship with South Africa not violative of customary international law and 
general principles of law as recognized by the community of nations? Is Canada 
complicit in the crime of Apartheid by maintaining diplomatic relations with 
South Africa? 
3. Can diplomatic immunity be a defence against a charge of war crime and/or 
crime against humanity? 
4. Though there is no precedent anywhere in the world to what is being asked of the 
Canadian courts to decide on the matter of South African presence and activities 
in Canada, the general trend around the world has been that of cutting off of 
diplomatic relations with South Africa through the political-decision making 
process. Thus there has not been any need to resort to the law courts. The 
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Canadian government has however refused to cut off diplomatic relations with 
South Africa (or to stop South African activities in Canada) on the pretext that 
Canada's presence in South Africa is required in order to influence developments 
there. Political decisions like this one are now no longer immune to legal 
challenges on the basis of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 482 • 
Maintenance of diplomatic relations is a governmental act coming within the 
ambit of Section 32(1) of the Charter. It is argued here that Canada's 
maintenance of diplomatic relations with South Africa, given all that it entails in 
Canada, is a violation of the rights and freedoms of black Canadians on the basis 
of both the Charter sections 15 "equal protection and benefit of the law" and 27 
"multicultural heritage", it also violates Canada's Criminal Code pertaining to 
hate propaganda. It is also a violation of international law principally customary 
international law and general principles of law as recognized by the community 
of nations. I will proceed from the general, i.e. international law to the specific, 
i.e. Canadian law. 
5. There are now more nations that have no diplomatic relations with South Africa 
than there are those who maintain diplomatic relations. For example, of the 48 
Commonwealth Nations, only three still maintained diplomatic relations: 
Canada, Britain and Malawi. South Africa itself was forced to leave the 
Commonwealth in the early sixties. The lack of diplomatic relations between 
482 See Operation Dismantile v The Queen [1985], 1 S.C.R., at 441. 
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South Africa and the majority of the Commonwealth Countries is evidence of the 
repugnancy of apartheid South Africa as will be shown here. 
6. The reason why the majority of nations had cut off diplomatic relations with 
South Africa is because of the latter's policy of apartheid whose racial basis is 
intense discrimination and extreme repression against the majority of its citizens 
who are black. Eighty percent of the people in South Africa are black. 
8.9.2 Rights Violations in Canada 
7. Because of Canada's diplomatic relations with South Africa, it means there are 
South African diplomatic personnel in Canada ranging from Ambassador down 
to a common employee. The Ambassador is responsible to his country through 
the Foreign Minister. In South Africa, the Foreign Minister is a member of the 
State Security Council (SSC) which is the highest executive decision-making 
body that is responsible for the maintenance of apartheid, hence for the crimes 
against humanity going on there. The South African Ambassador is the external 
outlet for the justification of the crimes against humanity going on in South 
Africa. He is part of or is complicit in the commission of the crime against 
humanity in South Africa. He is also responsible for the justification abroad of 
the policy of racial discrimination in South Africa. He is a criminal against 
humanity. 
8. In Canada, the Ambassador from South Africa and other embassy employees 
promote apartheid and racial discrimination by lecturing on university campuses 
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and elsewhere. Their defence of apartheid in the Canadian media is common 
place. They have also been using advertisements in the media, they have been 
facilitating business and travel contacts between Canadian and South African 
companies and individuals and have arranged propaganda tours to South Africa. 
All these activities have gone on with the knowledge of the Canadian 
government. It stems from Canada's maintenance of diplomatic relations with 
South Africa. 
9. The promotion of apartheid in Canada which is in fact a justification of the 
crimes against humanity which are perpetrated by the policy of apartheid has had 
the effect of threatening and upsetting a great majority of black Canadians and 
many other Canadians who have felt and feel that this promotion constitutes a 
serious threat to the multi-cultural harmony of Canada. Promotion of racial 
discrimination is also a violation of Canadian law. 
10. A great majority of black Canadians, at the head of which is the Jamaican-
Canadian Association, an incorporated body comprising the largest number of 
black Canadians, feel that the promotion of apartheid and racial discrimination, 
and its message that black people are inferior, spreads racial hatred against black 
people in Canada as in Africa. Inevitably this situation fosters insecurity among 
black Canadians. 
11. Because of the lack of intervention by the Canadian government, black 
Canadians feel that their rights and freedoms under section 15 of the Charter --
"equal rights and equal benefits of the law" as well as under Section 27 of the 
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Charter -- "Preservation and enhancement of the multicultural heritage", have 
been denied. Further the lack of government action to stem the dissemination of 
racial hatred against blacks in Canada as in Africa on the part of the South 
African embassy personnel has encouraged the violation of Canada's Criminal 
Code as well as treaty law, customary international law and general principles of 
international law which prohibit discrimination on the basis of race among 
others. 
12. Given that Canada has a duty to act on the basis of sections 15 and 27 of the 
Charter; the Criminal Code; the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination; customary international law and general 
principles of law, Canada by not acting is in violation of this duty to act as 
provided for in these laws. 
8.9.3 Precedents Where Canada Has Acted 
13. The amendments to the Criminal Code brought about by Bill c-71 which 
introduced the crimes of war crimes and crimes against humanity into the 
Criminal Code are aimed at "preventing Canada from becoming or being 
perceived to be a haven for war criminals"483 . But Canada has not prevented the 
dissemination of racial discrimination in Canada by South Africans. Imre Finta 
was the first person to be charged with war crimes stemming from his activities 
483 Statement of Hon. Ramon Hwatyshyn, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, Minutes of 
Proceedings and Evidence of the Legislative Committee on Bill C-71, An Act to Amend the Criminal 
Code, the Immigration Act, 1976 and the Citizenship Act, on August 251h, 1987, at I :12. 
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during the Second World War. Thus Canada has at last acted in the case of Nazi 
war cnmes. 
14. Thus though Canada took forty years to take action, it now recognizes the gravity 
of war crimes and crimes against humanity for it to start prosecuting those 
accused of having committed these crimes. It should similarly act against South 
Africans. 
15. The apartheid government of South Africa is the only country now regarded in 
international law as committing crimes against humanity, which crimes must be 
prosecuted wherever the perpetrators are found. The South African ambassador 
is a representative abroad of a regime that commits war crimes. 
16. The International Military Tribunal which was set up after the first world war to 
try former Nazi officials at Nuremberg, set the international precedent for the 
prosecution of war criminals and criminals against peace and humanity. All those 
accused whose defences including that of "official orders" were found guilty and 
were either sentenced to long prison terms or to be hanged. A good number of 
those who escaped to other countries were later extradited to stand trial in 
relevant jurisdictions. Bill C-71 in Canada enabled war criminals to be tried in 
Canada and Imre Finta is the first to be so charged. 
17. Apartheid is likened to Nazism. It is now recognized that "collaboration with the 
perpetrators of apartheid ought to be as impossible as collaboration with the 
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Nazis"484. Apartheid like Nazism is a crime against humanity. By maintaining 
diplomatic relations with apartheid South Africa, Canada is in advertently party 
to the commission of a crime against humanity. The Canadian government is 
party to racial discrimination against blacks in Canada by virtue of its ties to 
South Africa, which ties permit South Africans to disseminate racial 
discrimination in Canada. 
18. To show its abhorrence of war crimes and crimes against humanity, Canada has 
barred Austrian President Kurt Waldheim, suspected of having committed war 
crimes during the Second World War, from coming into Canada 485 . Waldheim is 
only suspected, he was never convicted of these crimes. Yet he is barred from 
entering Canada. But Canada is silent on South Africans. 
19. On the other hand Canada is maintaining diplomatic relations with South Africa, 
whose regime is committing crimes against humanity and whose embassy 
employees in Ottawa are disseminating racial hatred against blacks in Canada 
and South Africa. 
20. On July 61h, 1986 Canada barred Gerry Adams, a British member of parliament, 
from entering Canada. He has been prevented from coming to Canada many 
times since. The pretext is that he is a convicted criminal. Yet more massive 
crimes against humanity are being perpetrated in South Africa but Canada still 
maintains diplomatic relations with South Africa. 
484 The Archbishop of Capetown, Desmond Tutu, quoted in Bruce McLeod, "Sanctions help prove the 
world is watching" Toronto Star, 7 February 1989 at Al5. 
485 Globe and Mail, 29 April 1987 at Al and A2, Vancouver Sun, 29 April 1987 at AlO, Winnipeg Free 
Press, 29 April 1987 at 1 and 4. 
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8.9.4 Declaration 
21. Since no action or proceedings is open to objection on the ground that a merely 
declaratory judgement or order is sought thereby, and the court may make 
binding declarations of right, whether or not any consequential relief is or could 
be claimed, it is requested that the court should make the following declarations, 
that: 
22. The rights of black residents of Canada to equal protection and benefit of the law 
under section 15 and to non-discrimination in Canada's multicultural society 
under section 27 of the Charter require the Government of Canada to take 
appropriate measures to stop South African officials from promoting apartheid 
within Canada. 
23. Promoting, aiding or supporting apartheid is a crime against humanity within the 
meaning of section 6, Subsection 1.91 of the Criminal Code of Canada. 
24. Diplomatic immunity is no defence against a crime against humanity. 
25. The wilful public promotion of apartheid is a violation of section 319 of the 
Criminal Code of Canada, customary international law as well as general 
principals of law recognized by the community of nations. 
26. By maintaining diplomatic relations with apartheid South Africa, Canada is 
complicit in the crime of apartheid. 
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Such a case was never filed and no court was seized of such an application. Had such 
a case been filed, interesting legal arguments would have ensued. 
8.10 Conclusion 
Canada waited for over forty years before enacting legislation that permitted the 
prosecution, internally, of those who had committed war crimes; crimes against peace 
and humanity. Once the amendments to the Criminal Code were made, Canada could 
have prosecuted apartheid criminals between 1948 and 1994 on the basis of the amended 
Criminal Code or indeed on the basis of conventional international law or customary 
international law. The various domestic and international laws that Canada could have 
used are spelt out in this chapter. The next chapter discusses the possibilities of 
Canadian prosecution of apartheid criminals in the post-apartheid era. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
GETTING THE ST ATE TO ACT: PROSECUTE OR EXTRADITE 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter asks the question: Can Canada assert universal jurisdiction power to 
prosecute apartheid criminals in the post-apartheid era? It also discusses the issue of 
extradition, as it is an aspect of the exercise of universal jurisdiction: prosecute or 
extradite. 
My working hypothesis is that the Canadian Crimes Against Humanity and War 
Crimes Act on its own and as incorporated in the Criminal Code is a very potent tool for 
the prosecution of war criminals and criminals against humanity including apartheid 
criminals and its application would be a useful example to the whole world as how to 
fight impunity for international crimes while according justice to the victims of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. 
9.2 The Legal Context 
Canada's prosecution of war criminals and criminals against humanity can only be 
conducted with the consent of the Attorney General of Canada. The police or the crown 
cannot independently lay war crimes or any international crime (e.g. genocide, torture or 
crime against humanity) charge. Private prosecutions are prohibited. 
As importantly, Canada does not have the equivalent of the civil US Alien Tort 
Claims Act (ATCA) whereby a foreign individual can sue in the US civil courts, 
violators of human rights pertaining to international torts committed elsewhere, as long 
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as the perpetrator is in the United States. Canada does not allow such civil claims for 
international torts that happened elsewhere. 486 
The assertion of universal jurisdiction for the prosecution of international crimes in 
Canada is not self-executing. Prosecutions of war crimes and related crimes have to be 
induced on the government and judiciary of Canada. In the face of governmental 
inactivity and given that only the government of Canada can give the go-ahead to 
prosecute a war criminal in Canada, is the avowed universal jurisdiction accessible to 
victims? Can Canada and its judiciary be induced to prosecute apartheid criminals? 
How can this be done? What have other groups done to get Canada to prosecute Nazi 
war criminals and those who perpetrated genocide in Rwanda? What motivates Canada. 
This chapter discusses all these and other questions. 
In implementing the Rome Statute that created the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), Canada brought in the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act (2000) to 
domesticate the Rome Statute. Canada also introduced an operational implementation 
framework. Canada also already had a Program on Crimes Against Humanity and War 
Crimes. It included personnel from the Department of Justice, the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) to cooperate 
in the investigation, prosecution or deportation of war criminals and criminals against 
humanity. The personnel included lawyers, historians, anthropologists, sociologists, 
and social scientists. The departments have an Interdepartmental Operations Group 
486 Caroline Davidson, "Tort au Canadien: A Proposal for Canadian Tort Legislation on Gross Violations 
of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law", (2005) 38 Vanderbilt J Transnat'l L 1403. See 
also Gib Van Ert, Using International Law In Canadian Courts, 2"d ed. (Toronto: Irwin, 2008). 
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(JOG) that co-ordinates the activities of the separate war crimes units. The aim of this 
program is to investigate and recommend to relevant departments what should happen 
or be done to individuals who are alleged to have committed crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, torture, or other gross and serious violations of human rights anywhere in 
the world on information received from third parties or on the motion of the department 
involved. The recommendation could be to: do nothing, investigate, charge and 
prosecute, initiate an admissibility hearing, revoke permanent residence or citizenship, 
continue to monitor, deport and so on. 
The cases that the War Crimes Program investigates are divided into two groups: (a) 
World War II Crimes and, (b) Modern War Crimes. Until relatively recently, the review 
of the War Crimes Program reveals that there has been an over-concentration of 
investigations, prosecutions, deportations, revocations etc. on the Second World War 
cnmes. 
For the past decade, the War Crimes Program has been publishing Annual Reports. 
It details how many investigations in Canada and abroad have been initiated, how many 
individuals and from which countries have been investigated, recommended for action 
(prosecution, deportation etc) or status revoked and so on. The Annual Reports also 
contain an appendix among other statistics of designated Regimes that are known 
historically to have committed war crimes or crimes against humanity or other serious 
violations of human rights. For example, the following regimes among others are so 
designated: 
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(1) The Siad Barre regime in Somalia of between 1969 and 1991, (2) the 
military regimes of Haiti between 1972 and 1986 and between 1991 and 
1994 except between August and December 1993, (3) The Afghan 
government of 1978 and 1982; ( 4) the Iraq government of 1968 to May 
2003, and (5) the government of Ethiopia from September 1974 to May 
1991.487 
As can be seen, South Africa's apartheid regime from 1948 to 1994, does not appear on 
this list or any other list compiled by the Canadian government relating to war crimes, 
criminal regimes or regimes committing crimes against humanity. As can be seen here, 
the crime of apartheid is missing from the list or from any list in any of Canada's war 
crimes reports since the late 1990s. 
In assessing the new Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act that came into 
being in 2000, Madeleine Schwartz, 488 counsel in the war crimes unit of the Department 
of Justice states that: 
the challenge of prosecuting crimes against humanity is not simplified 
by the new Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act... Crimes 
against humanity are not simple offences. They entail organized, 
criminal action directed towards destroying, at least in part, a civilian 
population. The concern is not with isolated acts that are criminal on 
their own, but with acts that together constitute conduct that threatens 
international peace and security and that shocks the conscience of 
humanity. Any prosecution of an individual for such offences must 
start from the premise that the accused played some part in this broader 
context. 
487 Various War Crimes Reports up to 2008/9. 
488 Madeline J. Schwartz, "Prosecuting Crimes Against Humanity in Canada: What must be Proved" 
(2002) 46 (1) CLQ 40. The foremost authority on war crimes prosecutions in Canada and one who has 
written quite a number of seminal articles and papers, all available on the Internet is Joseph Rikhof, a 
senior counsel in the Department of Justice's Crimes Against Humanity and War crimes section: "Fewer 
Places to Hide? The Impact of Domestic War Crimes Prosecutions On International Impunity", "Canada 
and War Criminals: The Policy, The Programme and the Results" Paper given at the International Society 
for the Reform of Criminal Law Conference, Montreal, August 2004. I have personally talked to Joseph 
Rikhof. He had absolutely no information on any prospects for pursuing apartheid criminals. 
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The legislation does not appear to place such limits on who must or must not be 
prosecuted but is this paradigm being adopted by Canada, the high threshold of who 
must be prosecuted? As reviewed in the previous chapters, particularly chapter one, the 
crime of apartheid should fit the threshold indicated by Schwartz. 
However, each case will depend on its merits, based on the allegations and charges 
and has to be proved independently of the general conditions under which war crimes 
and crimes against humanity were committed. The crown would have to call evidence 
to prove their case. There would also be independent defences mounted by the accused. 
As guidance therefore, as to the actual dynamics that would unfold in a Canadian 
courtroom, it is imperative to look at the only two prosecution cases so far that have 
ever been actually completed in Canada respecting war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, genocide and so on: the Finta and Munyaneza cases. From looking at these 
cases a picture is likely to emerge as to how a trial of an apartheid criminal might 
unfold. 
David Matas states the following in relation to apartheid criminals: "If a South 
African torturer is found in Canada, then Canada has a duty to prosecute that torturer, 
whether South Africa prosecutes or not, whether South Africa grants an amnesty or not. 
Canada has recognized that duty and legislated the offence of torture in its criminal 
code. The law gives Canadian courts universal jurisdiction. A South African torturer 
who committed his crime in South Africa against a South African victim, will be 
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prosecuted in Canada, provided only that he is physically present there."489 Matas goes 
on to state that Canada can on the same basis prosecute South Africa's criminals against 
humanity.490 
Canada, however, omitted the inclusion of "enforced disappearances" and the "crime 
of apartheid" in its definition of "crimes against humanity" in its Crimes Against 
Humanity and War Crimes Act of 2000. According to Fannie Lafontaine in her path-
breaking publication Prosecuting Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes 
in Canadian Courts, 491 this deliberate omission coincides with Canada's failure to ratify 
the international conventions dealing with these subjects namely The Convention on 
Forced Disappearances492 and the Apartheid Convention. Lafontaine suggests, with 
some other authors, that the failure to ratify the Apartheid Convention may be explained 
by its "unease with the grievances of the country's aboriginal population" who were 
essentially confined historically to apartheid-like conditions.493 Apartheid-like 
conditions were imposed on aboriginals also in the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand. 
Britain, France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Portugal had once been colonial 
powers and all these countries maintained strong economic ties with apartheid South 
Africa. None of these countries have ratified the Apartheid Convention. Would these 
countries exercise universal jurisdiction against apartheid criminals. 
489 David Matas, No More: The Battle Against Human Rights Violations (Toronto: Dundum 1994) at 
106. 
490 Ibid at 106. 
491 Fannie Lafontaine, Prosecuting Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes in Canadian 
Courts (Toronto Carswell 2012) at 165. 
492 Doc A/61/488. 
493 Lafontaine, ibid, Note 25 at 165. 
246 
9.3 The Finta Case494 
Finta became the first completed war crimes prosecution in Canada after the 1987 
amendments to the Criminal Code that were discussed earlier. Finta also can be credited 
with derailing the prosecutions of war criminals for a decade because of the judicial 
rulings that led to his acquittal and his successes in various crown appeals.495 Like all 
defendants against the exercise of universal criminal jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of the 
Canadian courts to litigate this case as well as other related defences like: unreasonable 
delay; retroactivity of the legislation under which he was prosecuted; discrimination and 
unfairness of the trial were all mounted. The judges all the way to the Supreme Court of 
Canada rejected the constitutional arguments, challenging the legislation. Despite his 
defeats on the constitutional challenges, Finta still won the all-important acquittal. 
However, Finta was permitted leeway in his interrogation of prospective jurors so 
that the effect was the exclusion of Jews from being on the jury panel, a development 
that has not escaped analysis by a number of scholars.496 Finta was allowed to benefit 
from the judicial interpretation of the legislation which included, that for him to be 
convicted of war crimes, he had to know that his acts had a factual quality that made 
them war crimes. He has had to have a subjective awareness that he was committing not 
a simple crime, but a war crime. Conviction for war criminality carried an added stigma. 
Finta also benefited from the defence of obedience to superior orders and that he had no 
494 R v Finta [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701 (SCC). 
495 This summary borrows from Kent Roach, Due Process and Victims' Rights: The New Law and Politics 
of Criminal Justice (Toronto et al: University of Toronto Press, 1999) at 240 to 243. 
496 Roach quotes both Irwin Cotler and David Matas as writing that Finta's lawyer's cross-examination of 
holocaust survivors invoked sentiments of anti-Semitism and the trial became a "continuation of the 
victimization of holocaust survivors" Ibid. at 241. M. Cherif Bassiouni, the world's expert on war crimes 
and international criminal law was an expert witness for the prosecution in the Finta case in Toronto. 
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moral choice as to whether to follow the orders. He was allowed to put forward these 
defences without testifying including that he mistakenly believed that he was following 
a valid law which was not manifestly unlawful. The court found that there was an air of 
reality to justify putting these defences to the jury in part because of the wartime 
hostility in Hungary at the time towards Jews.497 
David Matas498 criticised the courts' handling of the Pinta case in Canada. Matas, 
asks and answers this question: "The evidence against Pinta [was] overwhelming and 
unanswered .... Yet Pinta was acquitted. How is it possible that Finta could win his case 
when he called no evidence on his own behalf and the evidence against him was 
overwhelming? The answer is a stacked jury and an appeal to racial prejudice"499. In a 
polite critique of the proceedings, Matas states that the judge should not have allowed 
the questions by defence counsel that bordered on racial baiting and hatred. "The 
questions Christie asked were designed to exclude all Jews from the jury and the "judge 
did not correct either adequately or at all"500• The result was that Pinta was acquitted. 
This is an indirect judicial critique. 
The courts also raised the bar for founding a conviction for war cnmes: the 
perpetrator had to have mens rea not only for the underlining offence but the extra layer 
that the offence was a crime against humanity. In no other context does the judiciary 
require mens rea on top of mens rea. 
497 Ibid at 242 
498 
"The Case oflmre Fin ta" (1994) UNBLJ 281. 
499 Ibid at 282. 
soo Ibid at 282. 
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9.4 The Munyaneza Case 
Munyaneza came from Rwanda and was alleged to have been involved in the 
commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and sexual offences. 
Munyaneza was prosecuted under different circumstances and under more negative 
criminal regimes for those charged with genocide, war crimes, torture, rape, crimes 
against humanity and other serious violations of human rights. When the Supreme Court 
of Canada upheld Pinta' s acquittal in 1994, the environment had changed by the time 
Munyaneza was charged in 2005. At that time (1994), the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) had already been established and the 
Rwanda genocide was almost at hand and shortly thereafter the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was born and there was a heightened consciousness about 
war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide at this time. These two tribunals 
began generating important jurisprudence on genocide, war crimes, torture, crimes 
against humanity, etc. National courts now liberally quote these decisions in war crimes 
and crimes against humanity prosecutions as already indicated. In 1998, former Chilean 
dictator Agusto Pinochet had been arrested in England on an extradition warrant for 
having committed torture and other international crimes while he was leader in Chile. 
This marked the first time since World War 11 that an actual former leader of a country 
was arrested using the ambit of universal jurisdiction as a basis for the arrest.501 
During the same year, 1998, the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) had been adopted. Canada incorporated the Rome Statute into its domestic 
501 There are many publications on this topic, among them are publications by Human Rights Watch, 
Amnesty International and hundreds of scholarly publications and references in jurisprudence. 
249 
legislation, namely the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act which came into 
being in 2000. 
The Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act by section 14( 1) addressed the 
issue of superior orders, eliminating the defence of superior orders as follows: 
( 1) In proceedings for an offence under any sections 4 to 7, it is not a 
defence that the accused was ordered by a government or a superior--
whether military or civilian--to perform the act or omission that forms the 
subject-matter of the offence, unless, (a) the accused was under a legal 
obligation to obey orders of the government or superior; (b) the accused 
did not know that the order was unlawful; and ( c) the order was not 
manifestly unlawful. (2) For the purposes of (1) (c), orders to commit 
genocide and crimes against humanity are manifestly unlawful". Further, 
(3) An accused cannot base their defence under the subsection (1) on the 
belief that an order was lawful if the belief was based on information about 
a civilian population or an identifiable group of persons that encouraged, 
was likely to encourage or attempted to justify the commission of 
inhumane acts or omissions against the population or group. 
This subsection seems to be a direct response to some of the defences that were 
successfully deployed by Finta. It can be stated that Finta but not Munyaneza operated 
under favourable criminal conditions. 
Munyaneza's trial commenced in May 2007. Munyaneza was convicted in May 2009 
on all the seven counts on which he had been charged, namely genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and sexually-related offences. He was sentenced to life 
imprisonment in October 2009. He has appealed his conviction and sentence. 502 
502 I am grateful to Richard Perras, Munyaneza's lawyer for supplying me with a lot of appeal documents 
and arguments in this case. Because the case is ongoing, it would be unscholarly to comment on those 
documents given the fact that the eventual outcome of the case is unknown. The documents will be put to 
more thorough and useful use once the appeals are perfected and decisions rendered. The appeal is based 
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There are some interesting issues in the Munyaneza case. The case was tried before a 
judge alone. (Finta was tried before judge and jury.) The Munyaneza trial travelled to 
several countries in order to be in close proximity to the witnesses and evidence: namely 
France, Belgium, Rwanda, Kenya and Tanzania. It would have been unwieldy and quite 
expensive to travel with the jury to all those countries had the trial been before judge 
and jury. However, a video feed could have been used to avoid travelling with the jury. 
The trial took two years and would have been prolonged had there been a jury. Will all 
such trials need to travel to foreign countries to access witnesses and evidence? It 
appears to me that Munyaneza was denied the fundamental right to be tried before judge 
and jury as should be befitting such cases. The trial also proved expensive. How many 
such trials can the Canadian tax-payer afford? Will Canada be embarking on further 
such trials considering the costs? 
The Munyaneza trial was principally based on viva voce live witnesses' testimony. 
Identification evidence was central as was the issue of actus reus. The judgment details 
a lot of factual eyewitness evidence and hardly spends any time on jurisdictional issues. 
The judge quotes the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act whose provisions 
were not challenged. The appeal is based a lot on the issue of identification and actus 
reus. The Munyaneza case is therefore an incomplete record but it establishes a number 
of fundamentals: universal jurisdiction for the prosecution of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity, genocide etc is well established and Canada seems to be committed to 
on both legal and factual grounds. For an analysis of the Muntaneza decision, see Fannie Lafontaine, 
"Canada's Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act on Trial," downloaded from 
http://jicj.oxfordjoumals.org at University Laval on March 17, 20 I 0. 
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prosecuting war criminals and criminals against humanity, when this is feasible. After 
Munyaneza was sentenced to life imprisonment in October 2009, Canada arrested 
another Rwandan for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. 
Munyaneza was tried before an ordinary but not specialized criminal court by a 
Canadian Judge. Other countries are exploring other options for trials of war criminals 
and criminals against humanity in national courts. Uganda, for example, may be the first 
country in the world to hire foreign judges to help diversify the judiciary in the efficient 
prosecution of crimes of an international nature. Indeed Uganda has a special court panel 
dealing exclusively with war crimes cases; no such court exists anywhere else. The 
Principal Judge James Ogoola is quoted as saying that: "we are considering the idea of 
introducing foreign judges in our court. Since we are handling cases of an international 
nature, we think it will improve the quality of judgment and create a good perception 
about our work".503This would indeed be a revolutionary step to take for a country to 
consider diversifying its judiciary that way. Could Canada and other countries do the 
same? 
There is another consideration to .having a diverse judiciary and jury in western 
countries trying war criminals from other countries, cultures and races - to avoid racial 
alienation and the appearance of injustices as so forcefully articulated by Nelson 
Mandela. At his trial in 1964, Nelson Mandela, for example, demanded a different 
constellation of circumstances, had denounced the circumstances under which he was 
being tried in a chapter entitled, "Black Man in a White Court" in his book, No Easy 
503 Taddeo Bwambale, "Uganda: Foreign Judges To Be on War Crimes Court" AllAfrica.com. 29 January 
2010. 
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Walk to Freedom. 504 On the issue of a representative judiciary, he said, "I am a black 
man in a White man's court. This should not be. I should feel perfectly at ease and at 
home with the assurance that I am being tried by a fellow South African who does not 
regard me as an inferior, entitled to a special type of justice. This is not the type of 
justice most conducive to feelings of security and confidence in the impartiality of the 
court."505 This same point was made by Michael Mandel, as dealt within a previous 
chapter, in relation to Africans being tried in European countries in exercise of universal 
jurisdiction while Europeans and Americans are never tried in African courts for the 
commission of the crime of colonialism imposed on Africans by Europeans and 
Americans. Munyaneza had the misfortune of being tried before an all-white personnel 
in Montreal. 506 
9.5 The Defence Side of the Ledger 
It should not be forgotten that the literature on the prosecution of criminals against 
humanity centres on the exercise of universal jurisdiction by the various courts. The other 
half of this equation is also preparing defences against the extraditions or prosecutions. In 
the case of South Africa, the perpetrators of apartheid would need to answer for their 
crimes if prosecuted in Canada. If the apartheid criminals were to be prosecuted criminally, 
the analysis in an earlier chapter in respect of defences would apply equally here as well, 
so I will not repeat them in this chapter. 
504 (London: Heinemann, 1965, 1986 edition) at 125 to 162. 
505 Ibid, at 129. 
506 I had the occasion to observe the trial in Montreal. 
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9 .6 Retroactive Criminal Legislation 
The prohibition against the use of retroactive legislation would be used as a defence 
in the case of apartheid criminals especially. 
The possible retroactive application of the Criminal Code, Immigration Act and 
Citizenship Act was of major concern during the debates on war crimes legislation in 
1987. Deportation of those accused of perpetrating international crimes during the 
Second World War was a major possibility. Opponents of deportation argued that 
suspected war criminals who acquired a Canadian domicile before 1976 for example, 
could not, ex hypothesis be deported for war crimes under the previous immigration 
laws. In other words, it would be retroactive application of the Immigration Act if acts 
that were not grounds for deportation before 1976, could now be grounds for 
deportation. 
To repel the attack on possible retroactive application of Canadian law which could 
lead to deportation, the Deschenes Commission recommended thus: 
51 - To dispel doubts surrounding the construction of certain statutory 
prov1s1ons: 
a) s. 9 of the Citizenship Act, 23-24-25 El. II, c.108 should be amended by 
adding a provision making it declaratory, so as to render it explicitly 
applicable to situations arising under fonner laws on citizenship and 
immigration. 
b) s. 127 of the Immigration Act, 1976, 25-26 El.II, c. 52 should be 
amended by adding a second paragraph, as follows: "This section does not 
apply to a person who has committed or been involved in or associated 
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with a war crime, or a crime against humanity, as those crimes are defined 
in ss. 6 ( 1.9) of the Criminal Code." 
The previous legislations were so repealed. 
The application for permanent residence and Canadian citizenship now includes 
answering questions whether in the past the applicant was involved in war crimes and 
crimes against humanity and or whether a conviction issued as a result of committing 
these crimes. The Immigration Act, 1976 and as severally amended could be read to 
have retroactive application. It goes the same for the Citizenship Act. 
Section 1 l(g) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms was precisely 
brought about in 1982 so as to permit the retroactive application of Canada's criminal 
laws to war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the Second World 
War. Section 1 l(g) reads: 
11. Any person charged with an offence has the right ... (g) not to be found 
guilty on account of any act or omission unless, at the time of the act or 
omission, it constituted an offence under Canadian or international law or 
was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by the 
community of nations. 
This subsection is modelled principally on two international human rights instruments 
which provide for retroactive application of legislation in respect of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity: the European Human Rights Convention and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Section 7 of the European Convention states: 
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7 (1) No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any 
act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national 
or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier 
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the 
criminal offence was committed. 
(2) This Article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person 
for any act or omission which, at the time it was committed, was criminal 
according to the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. 
Section 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: 
15 {l) No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of 
any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under 
national or international law, at the time it was committed. Nor shall a 
heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time 
when the criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to the 
commission of the offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of 
a lighter penalty, the offender shall benefit thereby. 
(2) Nothing in this article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of 
any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was 
committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law 
recognized by the community of nations. 
Except for war crimes and crimes against humanity, retroactive application of 
legislation in penal or criminal offences is prohibited. National legislations and 
international human rights instruments are agreed on that score. The American Human 
Rights Declaration for example provides: 
9. No one shall be convicted of any act or omission that did not constitute a 
criminal offence, under the applicable law, at the time it was committed. A 
heavier penalty shall not be imposed than the one that was applicable at the 
time the criminal offence was committed. If subsequent to the commission 
of the offence the law provides for the imposition of a lighter punishment, 
the guilty person shall benefit there from. 
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The Universal Declaration of Human rights also prohibits retroactive application of 
penal laws: 
11 (2) No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any 
act or omission that did not constitute a penal offence, under national or 
international law, at the time it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty 
be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence 
was committed. 
And so does the African Charter on Human and Peoples 'Rights: 
7 (2) No one may be condemned for an act or omission which did not 
constitute a legally punishable offence at the time it was committed. No 
penalty may be inflicted for an offence for which no provision was made at 
the time it was committed. 
The courts in Canada have also raised serious doubts about the efficacy of retroactive 
application of legislation, especially in criminal matters. In the extradition case of 
Federal Republic of Germany v. Rauca507 the Chief Justice of the High court of Ontario 
denounced the retroactive nature of the law: 
The submission that legislation be enacted to apply retroactively is foreign 
to our concept of justice. Retrospective legislation is rightfully viewed with 
suspicion and when it invades the field of criminal law, it is especially 
repugnant. I do not consider these to be viable alternatives. 
Rauca was however extradited pursuant to the Canada-West Germany Extradition 
Treaty. In any case, by the time these words were uttered, the Canadian Charter with its 
507 (1982), 38 O.R. (2d) 705 at 717 (affirmed in 1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 225. 
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section 11 (g) had already come into existence which did not bode well for Rauca. Given 
that he had been charged with war crimes, he could not have repelled the criminal 
charges on the basis of retroactivity of legislation. 
Apartheid criminals cannot use the defence of retroactive application of criminal law. 
Apartheid was a crime under international law and criminal law of Canada 
9.7 Political Extradition in International Law 
The crime for which the Government of Canada seeks to deport or extradite a South 
African apartheid criminal could be characterized as an offence of a political nature. By 
delving into the political objectives of those who committed apartheid-era crimes, the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission opened the door to the defence of 
the crime of a "political nature". This crime was committed in the context of a political 
struggle within and without South Africa. 
In general no person is to be surrendered if the offence in respect of which his 
surrender is required is one of a political character, or if he proves at any stage of the 
proceedings that the requisition [extradition] for his surrender has been made with a 
view to try or punish him for an offence of a political character.508 
In general, a political offence would be an exception to extradition. This exception 
has sometimes been provided for in extradition treaties between countries. In fact, the 
defence of political offence has generally and so far been argued in the context of an 
existing treaty. 
508 Stephen, F.J, A Hist01y of the Criminal Law of England (New York: Burt Franklin, 1883) at 69. 
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All scholars consulted state that there is no agreed upon or satisfactory definition of a 
political offence. It has been left to the Courts to define in context whether or not a 
particular act is a political offence. Courts have been able to tailor their reasoning in my 
view, like scholars, according to their political predilections. They have sometimes 
narrowed the definition and sometimes broadened the definition according, again in my 
view, to their world outlook. In short, the concept of political offence is highly 
malleable and it exhibits itself in contradictory judgments. Courts themselves admit that 
there is no agreed upon definition.509 Two aspects of the definition of political offence 
however have generally been recognized. 
(a) "Pure political offences" - an unlawful act without an element of the 
common crime and generally directed solely against the sovereign of the power 
structure. The actor acts as agent of the political movement and without malice 
against anyone but the state. Additionally the conduct only affects the political 
structure. Examples include treason, espionage, and sedition. This kind of 
offence is not extraditable. This would exclude apartheid criminals who were 
in the employment of the state. This category applies more to those in 
opposition. 
(b) The "relative political offence"- these are offences that are not fully 
political or wholly common crimes. The offence is in the form of a common 
509See Gregory Chadwick Perry "The Four Major Western Approaches to the Political Offence Exception 
to Extradition: From Inception to Modem Terrorism" ( 1989) 40 Mercer L Rev 709; Nancy P. Kelly "The 
Political Offence Exemption to Extradition: Protecting the Right of Rebellions in an era of International 
Political Violence" (1987) Oregon L Rev 405. 
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crime but has a political objective. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
decided that those who committed crimes in South Africa with a political 
objective for and against apartheid committed political acts and as long as they 
confessed, they could be amnestied. Apartheid criminals could attempt to avail 
themselves of this defence to extradition. 
The first aspect of "relative political offence" is non-problematic. It is the 
second one that scholars' have grappled with. 
Three approaches have been identified in defining what constitutes a (relative) 
political offence: 
(a) Swiss "predominance" test; 
(b) French "objective" test; 
(c) Anglo-American "incidence" test. 
The Swiss test balances the common elements of the crime against the political elements 
involved. To satisfy the political requirement, two requisites must be met: 
(a) The offence must be directly related to the obtainment of or to the promotion 
of the movement or political goal; and 
(b) The political element of the crime must predominate over the criminal element, 
or at least the conduct must be proportionate to the desired political ends.510 
The French test is very restrictive. An offence is political if the actor directly injures 
the state. Thus the nature of the affected target is very important. Also considered in the 
510 See Kelly at 718-721 and cites therein. 
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French test is the crime's common element. But the affected target test 1s 
predominant. 511 
The Anglo-American approach consists of two branches. The English branch 
approach left the definition to judicial interpretation. The 'incidence" test is, however, 
predominant.512 The Castioni case concerned a request for extradition by Switzerland of 
a man who had escaped to England from the country after having committed a murder 
there in the course and in furtherance of an insurrection to overthrow the Swiss 
Government. The Court held that the murder happened as an incident to an insurrection 
thus it was a political offence and as such was not extraditable. 
This again would exclude apartheid criminals in the employment of the state. 
In Re Meune513 the "two party struggle" requirement emerged. "There must be two 
or more parties in the state, each seeking to impose the government of their choice on 
the other" and the offence must be against the other party in pursuit of a political 
objective. Apartheid criminals in the employment of the state would qualify to use the 
stated defence here. 
In Exparte Kilczynsk, 514 the Court stressed that there must be evidence of political 
opposition between fugitive and requesting state. Here English courts considered the 
offence more than the motivation. Extradition was refused. This case and Castioni are 
the only cases where the English courts have held that the offences were of a political 
nature. 
511 See Kelly at 721-723 and cases cited therein. 
512 See In Re Castioni [1984] 2 Q.B. 415. The incidence test emerged in this case. 
513[1984], Q.B. 415. 
514 [1950] 1 Q.B. 540. 
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The American branch has followed generally Castioni "incidence" test. The incident 
is regarded as more important than motive, "incidental to a political rebellion". 
In Re McMullen, 515 extradition was denied on political offence exception grounds. 
McMullen was a member of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) who after committing a 
crime in England fled to the U.S. 
In Re Mackin, 516 the offence was judged political after considering these factors: 
(a) was there a political uprising 
(b) was accused a participant 
( c) was crime incident to an uprising? 
Mackin was not extradited because his offence was judged to be a political offence. 
In Re Doherty517 extradition was also denied on political offence grounds. Doherty 
was a member of the IRA who had committed an offence in Northern Ireland, and then 
fled to the United States. 
Doherty v. Government of the United Kingdom518 also deals with interpretation of 
war crimes and crimes against humanity and the nexus with extradition law. Doherty, a 
member of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was charged with the murder of a British 
Army Captain. He was convicted and Imprisoned but escaped to the United States. On 
arrest there, he claimed a political offence exception to the extradition application. The 
U.S. Court denied the extradition request by the United Kingdom on the basis that the 
515 No. 3 78-1099 (N.D. Ca. 11May1979). 
516 668 F. 2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981). 
517 599 F. Supp. 270 (1984). 
518 (1984) 599 Fed. Supp. 270) (1984) (New York District Court). 
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offence was "political" inasmuch as it had been committed in the course of an armed 
struggle by an organized group aiming at the overthrow of the political regime. 
If the person who is putting a political offence objection to extradition or deportation 
is not a war criminal, chances of succeeding on that front are very strong if it can be 
shown that that person was involved in a political struggle against a government. In the 
case of war criminals, the Judge reasoned that : 
How then is the political exception doctrine to be construed and what 
factors should limit its scope? Not every act committed for a political 
purpose or during a political disturbance may or should properly be 
regarded as a political offence. Surely the atrocities at Dachau, Auschwitz, 
and other death camps would be arguably political within the meaning of 
that definition. The same would be true of My Lai, the Bataan death march, 
Ladice, the Katyn Forest Massacre, and a whole host of violations of 
international law that the civilized world is, has been and should be 
unwilling to accept. Indeed, the Nuremberg trials would have no 
legitimacy or meaning if any act done for a political purpose could be 
properly classified as a political offence. Moreover, it would not be 
consistent with the policy of this nation as reflected by its participation in 
those trials, for an American court to shield from extradition a person 
charged with such crimes. 
The Court concludes therefore that a proper construction of the Treaty 
in accordance with the law and policy of this nation requires that no act be 
regarded as political where the nature of the act is such as to be violative of 
international law, and inconsistent with international standards of civilized 
conduct. Surely an act which would be properly punishable even in the 
context of a declared war or in the heat of open military conflict cannot and 
should not receive recognition under the political exception of the Treaty .. 
519 
Whatever the precise contours of that elusive concept (political offence) may be, it 
was in its inception an outgrowth of the notion that a person should not be persecuted 
519 Ibid at 274 and 275. 
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for political beliefs and was not designed to protect a person from the consequences of 
acts that transcend the limits of international law. 
In the extradition hearings against Demjanjuk520 the District court of the North 
District of Ohio elaborated on the unacceptability of putting forward a political offence 
objection to extradition by war criminals: 
The murder of Jews, gypsies and others at Treblinka was not part of a 
political disturbance or struggle for political power within the Third Reich. 
The murders were committed against an innocent civilian population in 
Poland after the invasion of Poland was completed. No allegations have 
been advanced, or could be sustained, claiming that those Jews and non-
Jews killed were part of an active attempt to change the political structure 
or overthrow the occupying government. Respondent's claim that the 
killing of defenceless civilians at Treblinka was part of the Nazi war effort, 
and therefore is political in character, is frivolous and offensive. The 
crimes alleged are inconsistent with international standards of civilized 
conduct. The murdering of numerous civilians while a guard in a Nazi 
concentration camp, as part of a larger "Final Solution" to exterminate 
religious or ethnic groups, is not a crime of a "political character" and thus 
is not covered by the political offence exception to extradition. 
For war criminals, the political offence exception is not available. It is available to 
others who have committed political offences and are facing the possibility of 
extradition or deportation. Apartheid criminals could not benefit from the political 
offence exception as they would be charged with war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. They would also not benefit from any pardons or amnesty because they had 
520 Israel v Demjanjuk, MTSC No. 83-349, Northern District of Ohio, 15 April 1985, at 49-51. 
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not asked for this in South Africa. Pardons and amnesties may also not be applicable as 
exceptions in international criminal law521 • 
In Queen v. Robinson522 extradition was granted. The court held that an offence is 
political only if the involved crimes occur inside the area over which the participants 
seek governmental control. The court stated there was no uprising in England where the 
offence was committed. In McMullen 523 the court said violence had spread to England. 
There is a link between the offence and the promotion of the political goal in 
American jurisprudence. 
The political offence exception to extradition therefore seems to favour opponents of 
oppressive states and not the perpetrators. 
9.8 Conclusion 
Canada has some experience in the application of universal jurisdiction for the 
prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity that happened elsewhere. It has 
prosecuted to completion as of December 2010 two war crimes cases: Finta and 
Munyaneza. 524 It has also a great deal of experience in dealing with and confronting 
complex legal issues that arise in the immigration and citizenship context involving war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. The prosecution of apartheid criminals or their 
extradition or deportation could be successfully achieved by Canada, if embarked upon. 
In the recent past Canada has unfortunately amplified its preference for immigration 
521 See Theissen, supra. 
522 783 F. 2d 776 (1986). 
523 Supra. 
524 For the Finta and Munyaneza cases see supra. 
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rather criminal proceedings against perceived war criminals. This is because 
immigration proceedings are cheaper and faster than war crimes proceedings. The 
danger is that deported or extradited alleged war criminals may not be criminally 
charged in those countries and will continue to live with impunity. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
THE ROLE OF VICTIMS IN ENFORCING UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the issue of "standing" to prosecute by victims of war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. What is the possible role of victims of war crimes in the 
prosecution of war criminals. So far victims have been accorded a silent voice. The 
exercise of universal jurisdiction often requires the instigation of the victims of 
international crimes or their supporters before the state apparatus (the attorney general, 
the police, and the judiciary) get involved. It is the victims who had previously 
encountered the brutality of the war criminals and it is they who can recognise war 
criminals in various settings525 . Unlike in civil jurisdictional cases where the victims 
can file civil legal suits to initiate the actions, war crimes prosecutions are so complex 
and political that only the state is competent to prosecute them526. 
The lack of a direct role by the victims of war crimes to prosecute the perpetrators 
continued to marginalize the victims whereby the purveyors of war crimes stand the 
potential of living with impunity if the state refuses to initiate investigations and 
prosecutions on the information of the victims. While victims in the domestic setting 
525 Redress, Challenging Impunity for Torture: A Manual for Bringing Criminal and Civil Proceedings in 
England and Wales for Torture Committed Abroad (Surrey: Aldridge Print Group, 2000). 
526 Ibid. The jurisprudence pertaining to standing to sue in Canada and England is comprehensively 
analysed in Law Reform of British Columbia: Report on Civil Litigation in the Public Interest ( 1980).; 
Other than the proliferation and influence of interveners, the jurisprudence on standing has remained 
stationary in the last 30 years. 
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like Canada have acquired tremendous powers and clout over the last 30 years527 
foreign and sometimes domestic based victims of war crimes have little power to force 
governments to act. 528 
10.2 Declaration 
Apartheid was such a public and international issue, which touched the conscience of 
a good part of humanity and qualifies as a subject of sufficient interest of which 
individuals and groups must be accorded standing to sue, should an application be 
brought. The following is a sample of how a suit for standing could be initiated in the 
Superior Court of Justice or equivalent level of court in Canada to compel the Canadian 
government to prosecute or extradite apartheid criminals in contemporary times. 
Declaration that the failure or refusal by Canada to extradite or prosecute 
apartheid criminals in the same manner as what Canada has done or is doing to 
Nazi and Rwandan war criminals violates the rights of the victims of the crime of 
apartheid to equal protection and equal benefit of the law and Canada's 
international legal obligations to extradite or prosecute war criminals. 
10.2.1 Facts 
1. Apartheid was a low intensity genocidal and criminal system of racial 
segregation and governance practiced by the Government of South Africa from 
1948 to 1994. 
527 See Kent Roach, Due Process and Victims' Rights: The New Law and Politics of Criminal Justice 
(Toronto et al: University of Toronto Press, 1999). 
528 For the evolution and status of Victims rights in international law, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
"International Recognition of Victims' Rights" in M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed. 3rd_ Ed. International Criminal 
Law (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008) at 635-701. 
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2. More than 80% of the residents of South Africa during that time were Black. 
3. Under Apartheid, Black residents of South Africa could not vote in elections that 
determined the government. 
4. Under Apartheid, the Group Areas Act restricted the regions that Black residents 
of South Africa could live in; after the proclamation of this Act the Government 
of South Africa forcibly deported thousands of Black people to barren areas 
known as "Bantustans." 
5. Under Apartheid, the Government of South Africa suppressed political 
opposition by conducting widespread torture and killing of Black people. 
6. Apartheid had been condemned as a crime against humanity by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations in its International Convention on the 
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, which Convention called 
for the punishment of official representatives of the South African regime. 
7. The Convention called for the exercise of universal criminal jurisdiction to 
extradite or to prosecute apartheid criminals. 
8. As of 2012 108 nations had ratified the Apartheid Convention, making it 
therefore part of customary international law obligation to extradite or prosecute 
apartheid criminals whether or not the state had ratified the Apartheid 
Convention. 
9. The provisions branding apartheid as cnme against humanity have been 
incorporated into the 1998 Rome Statute that created the International Criminal 
Court. 
10. Canada has incorporated the Rome Statute into its domestic legislation, mainly 
the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act (2000). 
11. Canada has used the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act to 
investigate and prosecute Rwandan war criminals and had previously used the 
older legislation to investigate and prosecute Nazi war criminals. 
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12. The perpetrators of the crime of apartheid have enjoyed unprecedented impunity 
from prosecution in Canada and elsewhere and Canada has enabled these 
criminals to use it as a haven for these war criminals. 
13. Victims of the crime of apartheid continue to be traumatized by the impunity 
enjoyed by apartheid criminals and the failure or refusal by Canada to extradite 
or prosecute these criminals. 
A Declaration is therefore sought that pronounces that: 
1. The refusal or failure to extradite or prosecute apartheid criminals is a 
violation by Canada of the constitutional rights of the victims of apartheid 
to equal protection and equal application of the laws of Canada and its 
obligations under international law. 
2. Canada must perforce provide suitable remedies pursuant to section 24(1) 
of the Charter and various international conventions and customary 
international law to the victims of apartheid without delay. 
This chapter discusses the issue of standing to sue the state for purposes of 
compelling it to exercise the warranted universal criminal jurisdiction against war 
criminals and criminals against humanity. To sue the state, one has to pass through 
another apparatus--the judiciary and courts. Which means, in effect that it is at the 
discretion of courts to accord standing. The doctrine of "standing" can be used to restrict 
or to expand access to courts. Standing is mainly allowed to resolve concrete disputes 
among individual litigants or parties to an issue. This is the narrow compass of standing. 
However, if the doctrine allows the courts to engage in the exposition of constitutional 
norms, through public interest litigation, standing necessarily becomes expansive and for 
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the better. The courts have discretion in Canada as elsewhere to accord broad and 
compassionate standing. 
10.3 General Requirements for Standing 
The general requirement for standing is that the Plaintiff must have a sufficient 
private or personal interest in the subject matter529• According to Brian A. Crane, 
historically the right to become a party differed according to the relief sought. In 
general terms, standing was given in cases of mandamus only where a party was 
aggrieved or had a special interest in the outcome. The position was similar where a 
declaration was sought. A court however, might more readily grant standing where 
certiorari or prohibition was sought. 530 Since there is a very strong connection between 
standing and the requested remedy, it is necessary to define some of these remedies. 531 
Mandamus is a writ used to compel an inferior tribunal to exercise the authority 
conferred by statute. Certiorari is a writ issued by a superior court to quash a decision 
already taken by an inferior tribunal. Prohibition is a writ to restrain a tribunal from 
taking a certain action. Declaration (or declaratory judgement) asks the court to declare 
and define whether some act taken or proposed by a tribunal is beyond its powers or is 
violative of some enshrined rights. 
Victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity and their supporters would be 
seeking mainly mandamus to compel the government to exercise universal criminal 
529 Finlay v Minister of Finance [1986], 2 S.C.R. 607. 
53° Crane, "Procedural Developments in Administrative Law" (1988) The Advocate Quarterly 22 at 26-27. 
This has not changed since. 
531 These definitions are taken from Kenneth Kemaghan, "Judicial Review of Administrative Action" in 
Kenneth Kemaghan, ed. Public Administration in Canada 5th edn. (Toronto: Methuen, 1985), at 358; see 
also S.A. de Smith, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 2nd edition, (London: Stevens 1968), at 
422-432, 525-526, 571-574. The ambit of these remedies have not changed. 
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jurisdiction and secondarily a declaration that their rights have been violated by the 
state's failure or refusal to exercise universal jurisdiction. 
In constitutional law cases where it is not necessarily required that a party has some 
direct interest, certain criteria have been established as required for standing in the 
famous Supreme Court of Canada cases of Thorson v. A.-G.Can.;532 NS. Board of 
Censors v. McNei/533 and Minister of Justice of Canada v. Borowski534 thus: 
(a) there must be a serious constitutional issue. 
(b) the issue must be justiciable. 
( c) there must be no reasonable alternative means to test the validity of the 
statute (which will usually include an express or implied refusal by the 
Attorney General to act)535 
These cases broke new ground in the doctrine of standing but it is not clear to what 
extent the criteria they set are applicable to non-constitutional, administrative law 
context.536 Since war crimes prosecutions involve domestic criminal law and 
international criminal law, I will be discussing mainly standing in criminal law as well 
as in international criminal law. The subject of standing to compel the state to exercise 
universal criminal jurisdiction has not received any attention at all in legal scholarship. 
Most constituencies embark on lobbying and pressuring the state to engage in criminal 
prosecutions as discussed in an earlier chapter. 
532 [ 1975], 1 S.C.R. 138. 
533 [1976], 2 S.C.R. 265. 
534 [1981], 2 S.C.R. 575. 
535 Crane, supra at 27. 
536 J.M. Evans, et al (eds.) Administrative Law: Cases, Text and Materials 2nd edn., (Toronto: Emond 
Montgomery Publications Ltd, 1984), at 791. 
272 
In all three cases mentioned above, the Attorneys General or the Officers of the 
Crown refused the requested "relator" proceedings by the individuals who initiated the 
actions. In administrative law, it is not usual to persuade the Attorney General to accept 
relator proceedings, unless strong public interest is established not to. Some areas e.g. 
environmental questions involving a large public interest would probably more readily 
attract acquiescence by the Attorney General to relator proceedings than others. 
However, the Attorney General has discretion to act or not to act. 
The three cases mentioned above however, while broadening the criteria for standing, 
reinforced a very important existing baseline for standing -- which is that standing is 
always within the discretionary power of a court to grant. This is to allow judicial 
control of the process. This has far-reaching implications. The major one is that the 
presiding judge may exercise his discretion to deny standing, not because a litigant does 
not qualify, but because of the issue or remedy being brought. The judge may simply 
not like the issue before him or her. A judge could also characterise it as non-justiciable 
when in fact it may be. Admittedly one may appeal the ruling or seek another forum. But 
this may not always be feasible. Thus as Dale Gibson correctly says, the three decisions 
"did not guarantee a right of standing to anyone"537 
Canada has had no litigated case compelling the Attorney General to prosecute a war 
crimes case or to engage in civil litigation in the public's interest. This should be 
537 
"Enforcement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms", in W.S. Tamopolsky and G.A. 
Beaudoin (eds.) The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Commentary (Toronto: Carswell, 1982), 
at 496. 
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attempted if there is a compelling case. I have provided a sample of how this could be 
framed at the beginning of this chapter. 
The United States Courts have had some experience in the question of granting 
standing to individuals and groups who wanted to enforce U.S. laws on sanctions or 
otherwise against South Africa538 • The Southern Africa Project of the Lawyers' 
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, a Washington, D.C.-based public interest 
group, spearheaded most of the case law in the U.S. courts.539 These were all civil cases. 
Domestic cases litigated by the project have (1) challenged the publication by The 
New York Times of want-ads for employment in South Africa which expressed directly 
or indirectly racially discriminatory criteria for employment540 ; (2) challenged an order 
of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) which authorized South African Airways to 
serve a new route between Johannesburg and New York on the grounds that the order 
violated the Federal Aviation Act which prohibited the CAB from issuing a permit to a 
foreign air carrier which discriminated among its passengers on a racial basis541 ; (3) 
sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prohibit the import of seal furs from Namibia 
in violation of UN security Council Resolutions542 ; (4) challenged the U.S. Commerce 
Department practice of sending special trade missions to Namibia543; (5) challenged on 
behalf of the United Mine Workers and the State of Alabama the importation of South 
538 For a comprehensive review of these cases see Goler Teal Butcher, "South African Issues in United 
States Courts" (1983) 26 Howard LJ 601. This article is reprinted by the Lawyers' Committee for Civil 
Rights Under the Law Project as a booklet. 
539 The next paragraph is excerpted from the introduction by the Project to the Butcher article at (i.). 
540 ACOA v The New York Times quoted in Ibid. 
541 Diggs v CAB quoted in Butcher, supra. 
542 Diggs v Richardson quoted in ibid. 
543 Diggs v Dent, ibid. 
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African coal into the United States on the grounds that it violated the Tariff Act of 1930 
which precluded the importation of goods that had been produced by forced or 
indentured labour544; and (6) intervened twice in proceedings before the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, to challenge the issuance of a license to export sizeable 
quantities of highly enriched uranium for use in South Africa545 . 
Canada did not experience the U.S. litigation explosion against apartheid. Thus one 
could argue that an advance on standing had been achieved in the U.S. More important 
perhaps than anything else was the enormity of publicity that surrounded some of the 
cases. The publicity heightened political consciousness against apartheid in the U.S. It is 
difficult though to assess what impact the political consciousness generated. It probably 
led to deterring corporations from publicly flaunting sanctions or other laws. The 
publicity may also have led to the promulgation of codes of conduit like the Sullivan 
Principles and other measures of corporate responsibility. In the 1980s these challenges 
including political pressures led the Reagan administration to impose economic 
sanctions. If governments were unwilling to enforce sanctions, individuals must be 
accorded standing to enforce the laws. 
In the U.K., a man who brought a string of cases to court over a period of time to 
require the government to enforce its laws was accorded standing.546 This kind of 
544 Butcher, ibid. 
545 Butcher, ibid. 
546 R v Commissioner Of Police Of The Metropolis, ex parte Blackburn, (1968), 2 Q.B. 118 (enforcement 
of gaming laws by the police); R v Police Commissioner, ex parte Blackburn, (1973) QB 241 
(enforcement of pornography laws by the police); R v GLC ex parte Blackburn (1976) 1 WLR 550 
(enforcement of censorship law by GLC). 
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allowance may even encourage people to develop more confidence in the legal system. 
There is a dearth of this pertaining to international law. 
In accordance with the three famous standing cases in Canadian constitutional law: 
Thorson, McNeil and Borowski, one may argue that the public interest, the constitutional 
issue and the engagement of international law at stake are so fundamental that any 
remedy would be appropriate. 
In the case of Prime Minister of Canada et al. -and- Khadr 547 the Supreme Court of 
Canada declared that the Canadian government's treatment of Khadr who was in 
detention outside Canada, violated the constitutional rights of Khadr but the court was 
powerless to order that Canada must ask for Khadr' s repatriation to Canada as a result of 
Canada's violation of his constitutional rights. The court reasoned that the separation of 
powers prevented the court from issuing a mandatory order on the government. The 
Canadian government refused to entertain the repatriation of Khadr from the United 
States' Guantanamo Bay Detention Centre on the pretext that he is facing serious 
criminal and terrorism charges in the United States.548 The case stands for the 
proposition that the court has powers of declaration. After such a declaration, the issue 
can become a political issue depending on the character of pressure applied on the 
government. 
An empowering decision for the victims of war criminality and cnmes against 
humanity was made on July 20th, 2012 by the International Court of Justice in the 
Hague. Belgium had brought a suit against Senegal for Senegal's failure to prosecute or 
extradite Hissere Habre, a former dictator of Chad, who was domiciled in Senegal after 
he was deposed from power. The International Court of Justice ordered Senegal to 
547 2010 sec 3. 
548 National Post, 4 February 201 O; "PM drops ball in Khadr case" Toronto Star 5 February 2010, at A22. 
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either prosecute or extradite Habre, otherwise it would be a violation of Senegal's 
international obligations549. So far no country has commenced a suit to compel South 
Africa to prosecute or extradite its apartheid criminals. At least there is now an 
emerging duty, pronounced authoritatively by the International Court of Justice to 
prosecute or extradite war criminals. 
10.4 Conclusion 
The rights of victims of war cnmes and cnmes against humanity are not well 
protected by the states or the courts when the states or the courts are unwilling, unable or 
incapable of extraditing or prosecuting the perpetrators of international crimes. Only the 
Attorney General of Canada is given competence to initiate prosecutions of war crimes 
and crimes against humanity. He is not compellable in the laws of standing to prosecute 
when he does not want to. There is no case law in Canada so far in which a remedy has 
been sought in the courts to compel the Attorney General to act in the matter of 
prosecuting a war criminal. A scenario for a declaration is proposed in this chapter 
should an occasion arise in the future. 
All the chatter in the world about victims' rights and the existence of universal 
jurisdiction by the domestication of international law principles is hollow if victims 
cannot access justice directly when the attorney general is reluctant to prosecute. Canada 
could adopt the practices of some European countries where victims can go directly to a 
judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of a war criminal if the state does not take a 
549 Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite: Belgium v Senegal, No. 144, ICJ 20 
July 2012. 
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proactive initiative.550 In some European jurisdictions, the state's refusal to pursue a war 
criminal is judiciary reviewable, and the state can also be compelled to act, while in 
Canada such a decision is not reviewable and the attorney general is not compellable.551 
Reform in this area is therefore much needed as is reform in providing avenues for civil 
actions and stripping war criminals and criminals against humanity of some of their state 
acquired immunities. 
550 See REDRESS, Legal Remedies for Victims of "International Crimes": Fostering an EU Approach to 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction. March 2004 
551 Ibid for a survey of the European practices. 
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11.1 Introduction 
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
CONCLUSION 
Thus far we have spoken primarily about bringing apartheid criminals to account for 
their actions. There is a further dimension to the study. Should the victims of these 
crimes be eligible for some sort of reparations? Surely, serious considerations of the 
reparations issue in the case of apartheid criminals could not occur without those 
criminals first having been brought to account. However, in considering the need and 
possibilities of bringing such criminals to account, it is reasonable to think through what 
might come next. In this case, as in so many others, reparations is one answer. 
This chapter looks forward to the reparations issue. It deals with it in general terms 
focusing on the justifications offered and the legal and other strategies employed by 
those seeking reparations. The discussion of reparations in this case is limited to actions 
taken thus far in the United States with respect to slavery. Briefly I link the situation in 
the United States with that of South Africa. I offer several models or strategies that 
might be employed to seek reparations. I conclude by saying that, in order to reach the 
reparations stage, let alone holding apartheid criminals to account, there needs to be a 
paradigm change, and suggest that, despite its timidity in general on such issues, Canada 
is a good place to locate such a paradigm change. 
The premise of this dissertation has been that there is an overwhelming need for a 
comprehensive, sustainable and truly independent and impartial international or foreign 
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criminal justice system to start to effectively addressing the vast legacy of apartheid-era 
violations committed in South Africa. At present, thousands of perpetrators continued to 
enjoy impunity for war crimes, crimes against humanity and torture, committed during 
the apartheid-era in South Africa. Either through inability, incapacity or unwillingness, 
the South African government has been rendered impotent to provide justice to the 
victims internally. Foreign jurisdictions like Canada's have a role to play in ending 
impunity in South Africa. 
The justification for the application of universal jurisdiction is to seal the observable 
legal gap in both South African domestic criminal law and international criminal law 
with respect to the treatment of "apartheid criminals."552 The prosecution of apartheid 
criminals in South Africa has been characterized as an unfinished business but there 
appears to be receding prospects of any further prosecutions. There has been little or no 
activity either with respect to domestic civil reparations or other remedies. The issue of 
apartheid war crimes committed by South Africa in neighbouring countries like 
Namibia, Zambia, Mozambique and Angola remains unaddressed553 . The only civil 
remedy that has been undertaken, as already stated, is the application of universal civil 
jurisdiction in the United States where corporations but not individuals that aided and 
abated apartheid have been sued albeit against the initial opposition of the South African 
552 For a balanced and comprehensive study on the South African prosecution status, see Harvard Law 
school's International Human Rights Clinic, Prosecuting Apartheid- Era crimes: A South Africa Dialogue 
on Justice (Cambridge, MA, June 2008). 
553 See Marlene Burger and Chandre Gould, Secrets and Lies: Wouter Basson and South Africa's 
Chemical and Biological Warfare Programme (Cape Town: Zebra, 2002). Grey Zulu, who served in 
various portfolios in the Zambian government during South Africa's military incursions in Zambia has 
compiled reliable data about South Africa's criminality in Zambia, see Memories of Alexander Grey Zulu 
(Lusaka:Times Printpak, 2007) Chapters 25 to 32. 
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and US governments. There are no apartheid prosecutions in foreign countries or 
international tribunals. There is no international tribunal created to address the question 
of prosecuting apartheid criminals. How long are South African apartheid criminals 
going to get away with impunity? 
The international criminal tribunal route is only feasible if one is created. At present, 
no international ad hoc or special tribunal have been created to try apartheid criminals as 
have been the case with the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda or Sierra Leone, Cambodia 
and East Timor. South Africa, a signatory to the Rome Statute that created the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) has not referred any apartheid criminals for 
prosecution by the ICC as has been done by Uganda, Equatorial Guinea and Rwanda nor 
has the United Nations Security Council on its own motion referred an apartheid 
criminal to the ICC as it did in the case of the Darfur crises in the Sudan. South Africa 
by its own actions, behaviour and statements will not support the creation of an 
international tribunal. Belgium brought Senegal before the International Court of Justice 
for the ICJ to compel Senegal to prosecute Hissene Habre, a former leader of Chad for 
war crimes and crimes against humanity. But no country has brought any suit against 
South Africa before the ICJ to compel South Africa to prosecute apartheid criminals. 
Foreign jurisdictions are not clamouring to investigate, deport or prosecute apartheid 
criminals as they have done with respect to Nazi war criminals and those accused of war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide from Rwanda and former Yugoslavia, for 
example. There have been investigations, deportations and or prosecutions involving 
Nazi war criminals by Israel, Canada, the U.S and Britain, and Rwandan war criminals 
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in the UK, Belgium, France, Australia, Spain, Canada and Switzerland. Apartheid 
criminals have not been so pursued. Post-conflict leaders have been prosecuted in 
Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Brazil, Peru and other places to the point of near finality and 
showing results of accountability554, but in South Africa, even the government, as well 
as victim groups, non-governmental organizations and lawyers' groups have continued 
to amplify the reality of the unfinished business in South Africa with respect to the 
conflict of the past. The South African government has adopted the position by words, 
actions and behaviour that the TRC process was accountability enough. 
Victims of apartheid have not been as active as the victims of Nazi, Rwandan, 
Chilean and other war criminals in compelling governments to initiate criminal 
prosecutions against apartheid criminals. They have only been busy in the civil law 
context in the US. It is suggested that they should expand their advocacy and litigation 
to compelling governments to embark on criminal prosecutions. The evidence is 
massive. The perpetrators are known and available. The TRC uncovered massive 
evidence and named names. Universal jurisdiction is available as surveyed in this study. 
The issue of the criminality of apartheid will not go away as cases surveyed in this study 
demonstrate. 
Unresolved conflicts of the past have a way of echoing into the future and sowing the 
seeds for future genocide as in Rwanda or mini-genocides as in Zimbabwe. Historic 
injustices continue to affect the body politic as in the unresolved consequences of 
554 Ellen L. Lutz and Caitlin Reiger (eds), Prosecuting Heads of State (New York: Cambridge University 
press, 2009). 
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slavery and race relations and other causes in the US555 ; native grievances in the US, 
Canada , including sexual and other abuses of natives in residential schools which have 
led to the institution of a Truth Commission in Canada, an apology in Australia556 and 
New Zealand; The Canadian-Japanese internment case557 ; the Chinese Head Tax case in 
Canada 558 ; The Armenian genocide by Turkey; the Nazi Holocaust against the Jews by 
Germany; sex slavery of Chinese and Korean women by the Japanese; the slavery and 
colonialism issue of Africans by the Europeans, to name just a few historic injustices 
that continued to bedevil nation states and international relations centuries or decades 
after the injustices were committed. 
South Africa has the potential of future implosion because of the racial basis of the 
historical injustice to develop into a festering US-type of grievance society with dire 
long-term legal and political consequences. Zimbabwe already provides a cross-border 
precedent of what could potentially happen when historic injustices, especially based on 
race are perceived not to have been addressed. It is important to digress here and 
compare the U.S. with the possible developments in South Africa as a result of the 
failure of reparations for slavery and apartheid respectively. 
11.2 Historic and Modern Parallels Between the U.S.A. and South Africa 
555 See Michael T. Martin and Marilyn Yaquinto, Redress for Historical Injustices in the United States 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2007). 
556 James Grubel, "Australian Says Sorry to Aborigines" Reuters,_www.uk.news.yahoo.ocm accessed on 
02/19/2008. 
557 Roy Miki, Redress: Inside the Japanese Canadian Call for Justice (Vancouver: Raincoat Books, 2004 ). 
558 Matt James, "Recognition, Redistribution and Redress: The Case of the Chinese Head Tax" (2004) 
37:4 Can J Pol Sc 883. 
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Historically and in the contemporary period, the similarities in racial politics between 
the U.S.A. and South African are eerie. In March 2012, you could still find newspaper 
headings titled, "In a Divided City, Many Blacks See Echoes of White Superiority" and 
statements like "Apartheid left deep scars that still demarcate [South Africa] Cape 
Town".559 
In relation to the U.S.A., journalists can still end their articles with analysis like 
"Racial politics is embedded deep in America's DNA. And a post racial nation is still a 
distant dream. "560 
It is the entanglement of racial injustices perpetrated over a prolonged period of time 
that complicates the resolution of the historic racial divides in both South Africa and the 
U.S.A. and that makes this a compelling case for comparison and to emphasize the need 
to deal with the impunity of apartheid criminals. This state of race relations informed 
American (and western) responses to the crime of apartheid between 1948 and 1994. 
Apartheid South Africa reflected or mirrored its own historical and ongoing practices. 
It is important to examine the weaknesses and strengths of the various models that 
have been used, attempted or suggested for the resolution of the demand for reparations 
for the historic crime and injustice of slavery and its vestiges like colonialism, the 
holocaust, apartheid, poverty of the subject peoples and racial discrimination. These 
models are not mutually exclusive. I will concentrate on the reparations debate as it has 
unfolded in the United States of America involving African-Americans. The debate has 
been most vigorous there. At the same time, it has met its most silent neglect and defeat 
559 New York Times 23 March 2012 at A9. 
560 Margaret Wente, "Racial Politics: Why Did Trayvon Die" Globe and Mail 27 March 2012. 
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there. I will point out what I consider to be the most effective model for effectuating 
reparations for slavery. Could any of these models be useful in post-Apartheid South 
Africa which is threatening to mould itself into a post-civil rights America with its 
unresolved racial dynamics and unrequited demands for reparations for historic 
injustices. Before I discuss the various models, I survey the state of the debate in the 
U.S. to date. 
Reparations for slavery has been variously urged as "a matter of justice"561 or as a 
settlement of a humongous "debt".562 
11.3 An Historic Injustice 
It has been pointed out that slavery has been recognized as a crime against humanity 
by several international instruments for example the Convention Against Slavery, the 
United Nations Charter, the Genocide Convention, the Apartheid Convention, the 
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and others. 563 According to Robinson, "Anywhere 
from ten to twenty-five million Africans died in slave ships en route from Africa to the 
Americas. A lifetime of bondage awaited those who survived the passage. This massive 
crime against humanity - the enslavement and exploitation of tens of millions of human 
beings - is an American holocaust"564• Robinson goes on to state that "the Black 
holocaust is far and away the most heinous human rights crime visited upon any group 
561 Lord Anthony Gifford, "The Legal Basis of the Claim for Reparations", paper presented to the First 
Pan-African Congress on Reparations, Abuja, Nigeria, April 27 - 29, 1993. 
562 Randall Robinson, The Debt: What America Owes to Blacks (New York: Dutton, 2000). 
563 Gifford, supra, Robinson, at 33. 
564 Robinson ibid at 33. For a quick study of the impact of slavery and its modus operandi, see S.E. 
Anderson, The Black Holocaust for Beginners (New York: Writers and Readers publishing, Inc., 1995). 
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of people in the world over the last five hundred years."565 Slavery was "the ultimate 
crime against humanity, to deny human status to a vast section of humankind", and for 
centuries. 566 The numbers of the dead due to slavery are staggering. The duration was 
agonizingly counted in terms of centuries. 
Slavery proper is estimated to have lasted in the range of 300 years and continues in 
various manifestations to the present day.567 
In terms of South Africa, Andrea O'Shea states that "the non-whites of South Africa 
suffered one of the longest periods of oppression by one government in the 20th century 
history. "568 
Boris Bittker, in his book, The Case for Black Reparations 569, makes the argument 
that "slavery, Jim Crow, and a general climate of race-based discrimination in America 
had combined to do grievous social and economic injury to African Americans"570. 
This analysis continues to be made in relation to South African Blacks as well, due to 
the legacy of apartheid. 
Reparations are aimed at redressing the injustice of slavery and its vestiges. At the 
international level, debt relief is touted as the appropriate vehicle for reparations. 
Coretta Scott King, the late widow of the prominent civil rights leader in the U.S., 
Martin Luther King, Jr. stated the following in relation to debt relief as partial reparation 
for slavery: "African countries face more than 370 billion dollars in foreign debts, 
565 Robinson supra , at 216. 
566 Gifford, supra. at 4. 
567 Anderson, supra , Robinson, supra . 
568 Andreas O'Shea, Amnesty For Crime in International Law and Practice {The Hague: Kluwer) 
(2001 ;98-101) at 295. 
569 Boris Bittker, The Case for Black Reparations (New York: Vintage, 1973). 
570 Bittker, supra, quoted in Robinson, §.upra at 202. 
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which consume much of their budgets. Canceling these debts is the morally right thing 
to do - partial reparation for the tragic history of slavery, colonialism and exploitation 
that brought famous wealth to the United States and Europe on the backs of African 
people. No amount of money can right the injustices of slavery. But even a 
conservative estimate of the fair-market value of the unpaid labour of slaves and the 
ruthless exploitation of Africa's resources would put the U.S. several hundred billions of 
dollars in debt to Africa."571 The South African government as will be seen is advocating 
for broad-based economic empowerment for all South Africans to redress the economic 
injustices and legacy of apartheid rather than instituting individual reparations. The 
victims of the crime of apartheid, however, prefer to be given reparations individually as 
recommended by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). 
Within the U.S., it is proposed by Robert Westley among others that a "private trust" 
be established for the beneficiary of African Americans and given out on the basis of 
educational and economic need.572 In the U.S., the direct victims of slavery and the 
perpetrators are long dead; in South Africa, a great many of them are still alive in 2013. 
A tax on white wealth has been variously proposed in South Africa, but has been 
rejected. 
11.4 Justifications for Reparations 
571 Corretta Scott King, "U.S., not Africa, Owes the Greater Debt" USA Today, October 6t\ 2000 at 25A. 
572 Robert Westley, "Many Billions Gone" Boston College Law Review (June 1999) quoted by Robinson 
supra, at 244. 
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According to Mari Matsuda and others, reparations serve a multitude of purposes. 
The decision to award reparations is an act of contrition and humility that can ease 
victims' bitterness and alienation. Reparations recognize the personhood of victims. 
Lack of legal redress for racist acts [or the crime of apartheid] is an injury often more 
serious than the acts themselves, because it signifies the political non-personhood of 
victims. The grant of reparations declares: "You exist. Your experience of deprivation 
[or injury] is real. You are entitled to compensation for that deprivation [or injury]. 
This nation and its laws acknowledge you." This recognition is an important pre-
requisite to the victim's political participation. Finally, reparations are said to be 
trans formative. They recognize the crimes of the powerful against the powerless. 573 
Despite these noble justifications for reparations, why is it that thus far, according to 
Martha Minow, none of the claims for reparations "on behalf of African-Americans has 
yielded political or legal success ... the process of seeking reparations and facing 
rejection [thereby] creating new wounds for individuals affiliated with victimized 
groups".574 This question is being raised in south Africa as well because the post-
apartheid government did not live up to the promise of reparations. 
Rhonda Magee explains that in the context of the U.S., "conscious and subconscious 
racial motives must explain why some form of reparations policy has never been 
573 Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998) Chapter 5; Mari 
Matsuda, "Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations" in Kimberle Crenshaw et al, 
(eds.) Critical Race Themy The Key Writings That Formed the Movement (New York: New Press, 
1995) at 63 - 80. 
574 Martha Minow, ibid, at 101. 
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implemented as an explicit remedy in the legislative or judicial arenas"575 • Randall 
Robinson concludes after enumerating all groups that have received reparations 
throughout history and the world that, "only in the case of black people have the claims, 
the claimants, the crime, the law, the precedents, the awful contemporary social 
consequences all been roundly ignored ... America accepts responsibility for little that 
goes wrong in the world, least of all the contemporary plight of black Americans"576. 
Anthony Gifford states that the political and economic power centers of the world have 
evidenced a ruthless lack of conscience when it comes to black and African peoples' 
demands for reparations. Gifford has confidence however, that if the power centres in 
the world are compelled to recognize that the rights of non-white peoples are founded in 
justice, they will relent. 577 
In the case of South Africa, as late as March 2012, more that 200 members of the 
human rights group Khulumani were still handing a memorandum to the office of the 
President in Pretoria saying the delay in granting reparations to victims of apartheid was 
''untenable". Khulumani said reparations had yet to be paid to thousands of people who 
had endured gross human rights violations, or their families under apartheid. The group 
represents about 65,000 victims of apartheid atrocities. It is also questioning what is to 
become of the more than I billion Rand that is meant for victims of apartheid and which 
is sitting unused in the President's Fund. 578 
575 Rhonda V. Magee, "The Master's Tools, From the Bottom Up: Responses to African-American 
Reparations Theory in Mainstream and Outsider Remedies Discourse" (1993) 79 Virginia L Rev 863 at 
907. 
576 Robinson, supra , at 221 and 222. 
577 Gifford, supra at 2. 
578 International Bar Association Brief, Issue 472, 26 March 2012, at 5, quoting Cape Times. 
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11.5 Waves for Reparations Demands and Debates 
By the beginning of the 21st century, the global power structure should have been 
convinced that the demands of blacks for reparations for slavery is firmly rooted in the 
principles of justice, both nationally and internationally. Especially since the same 
governments have made reparations to Japanese-Americans; Jewish claimants for 
suffering and enslavement under the Nazi regime; Native Americans; Native Hawaiians 
and other groups. 579 Professor Derrick Bell has suggested that the real reason why the 
power structure would never support reparations is because to do so would operate 
against its interests. 580 Rhonda Magee offers that the groups that have received 
reparations have had political or economic or other leverage.581 Randall Robinson has 
also espoused this thinking. 582 Blacks have had no or little leverage of any kind, in the 
U.S. or elsewhere in relation to the question of reparations and or other issues of the 
moment. 
These and other explanations for lack of redressing the issue of reparations for 
slavery particularly in the United States are supported by the length of the period by 
which the demand for reparations has been on the table. All other demands for 
reparations and coincidentally which have been met, are of recent vintage point. The 
South African conundrum threatens to be of long duration. 
579 See Robinson, supra, at 221. 
580 Derrick Bell, "Dissection of a Dream" ( 197 4) 9 Harv C R - C L L Rev. 156. 
581 Magee, supra . 
582 Robinson, supra . 
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Rhonda Magee has traced the history of the demand for reparations for slavery in her 
article.583 She identifies 3 periods: the first serious calls for African-American 
reparations were made shortly after the fires of the civil war ( 1861-65) ceased. It 
appears that that first initiative was the most successful. Blacks were promised "40 
acres and a mule" each: Some blacks had even been given some land. Legislation had 
been initiated to deal with a broad-based plan of reparations. However, the initiative and 
nascent reparations were nipped in the bud by the presidency of Andrew Johnson who 
succeeded Abraham Lincoln who was assassinated in 1865. The second wave of 
demand for reparations for slavery came on the heels of the civil rights movement, 
whose heyday was from the mid-fifties to the late sixties. This second wave which 
Magee calls the era of the Black Manifesto, a name which comes from the name of the 
document by the same name authored by one Jam es Forman in 1969. This wave 
according to Magee was triggered as a result of the heightened expectations of Blacks 
for the redress of the racial wrongs following the legislative gains of President Lyndon 
Johnson's "great society policies."584 
The third wave is the modem Congressional Reparations Proposal.585 An African-
American democratic congressman, John Conyers from Michigan, introduced 
reparations legislation in the House of Representatives in 1989 and 1991. This 
legislation was modeled on the previous legislation that had been passed to compensate 
Japanese-Americans. 
583 Magee, supra. 
584 Ibid, at 883. 
585 Ibid, at 876 - 877. 
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All these initiatives came to nothing. The U.S. political, economic and judicial 
establishments have not been moved. The reasons for this have already been advanced 
above. 
There have been other waves demanding reparations for slavery after the ones 
identified by Magee above. There has been firstly an international movement based in 
Britain, Africa and the U.S.A. for the internationalization of the demand for reparations. 
For the first time in history, under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) (now named the African Union - A.U.), the first Pan-African conference on the 
subject of reparations was convened in Abuja, Nigeria in April 1993. This conference 
issued a declaration which read in part that the OAU, "calls upon the international 
community to recognize that there is a unique and unprecedented moral debt owed to the 
African peoples which has yet to be paid - the debt of compensation to the Africans as 
the most humiliated and exploited people of the last four centuries of modem history."586 
Will there be similar demands for reparations for the crime of apartheid? This is 
important to keep remembering because of the already noted historical and 
contemporary similarities on racial politics between the U.S. and South Africa. 
The most recent wave demanding reparations for slavery is what I call "The Debt" 
wave, and is represented by Randall Robinson in his path-breaking and wide-ranging 
586 
"Declaration" First Pan-African Congress on the Subject of Reparations, Abuja, Nigeria, April 27 -
29, 1993. 
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book called, The Debt: What America owes to Blacks581 • The calls for debt relief 
globally in part attaches reparations for slavery as an underpinning justification.588 
Just like the previous waves demanding reparations have been ignored, so have the 
latest calls. The calls for reparations have continued and will continue. The next section 
discusses the various models that have been used or proposed to deal with the issue of 
reparations. 
11.6 Models for Prosecuting Reparations for Slavery 
It is already self-evident from previous sections what reparations proponents have 
been attempting to do to secure reparations. For clarity I identify the major models here. 
These models are not mutually exclusive. The models can be identified as: (1) the 
domestic litigation model; (2) the legislative model; (3) the international tribunal 
litigation or settlement model; (4) the diplomatic model, and (5) the political "moral 
panic" model. Are these models useful to settle the issue of reparations for post-
apartheid South Africa? 
11.6.1 Domestic Litigation Model 
This model seeks to litigate reparations for slavery in domestic courts of the country 
or countries concerned. This has been more prevalent in the United States. In terms of 
African-Americans, three suits are known to have been filed in California in the early 
587 Supra. 
588 See Coretta Scott King, supra. 
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1990s. They came before the same judge who proceeded to dismiss all of them giving 
identical reasons for the dismissal. The judge reasoned that these cases were time-
barred. He however stated in helpful obiter that "the moral weight of the plaintiffs 
charges cannot be gainsaid ... and are morally compelling." The judge went on to state 
that "congress is a far more promising arena than the courts for advancing such 
claims. "589 
Indeed it has been pointed out by Reggie Oh and Frank Wu that litigating historic 
injustices in U.S. Courts is untenable, especially when it comes to African-Americans.590 
It is shown by Oh and Wu that each case that has been taken to court on the issue of 
reparations and affirmative action has failed and in terms of the latter, the courts have 
been backtracking considerably. 
To minimize the losses in the courts, Bittker in his book, The Case for Black 
Reparations argues for the litigation of more recent injuries.591 The statute oflimitations 
would not have run out. If slavery is a crime of humanity, then there is no limitation 
period. Magee argues that though unlikely to succeed in the courts, reparation claims 
should be processed first in this forum for their symbolic value in the struggle for 
affirmative legislative response. 592 
589 Lloyd v US.A,_, No. C94-01192CW, 1994 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7869; Jackson v U.S.A., No. C94-01494 
CW, 1994 U.S. Dist. Lexis 7872; Lewis v U.S.A., No. C94-01380 CW, 1994 U.S.Dist. Lexis 7868 (all by 
Judge Claudia Wilken of the United States District Court for the Northern District of California). 
590 Reggie Oh and Frank Wu, "The Evolution of Race in the Law: The Supreme Court Moves From 
Approving Internment of Japanese-Americans to Disapproving Affirmative Action for African-
Americans." ( 1996) I Mich J Race & L 165. 
591 Bittker, supra. 
592 Magee, supra. 
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It is possible that if there is a massive coordinated legal suit for reparations for 
slavery, accompanied by appropriate legal research and backed by reputable individuals 
and organizations, this suit may go a long way in paving the way for a serious judicial 
consideration. Even if such a well-coordinated legal suit fails, a political response may 
be gained or opened up. This model has tremendous potential. Could the victims of 
apartheid use the domestic litigation model? The future will tell but at present this has 
not worked or happened. 
11.6.2 Legislative Model 
This is another way the reparations debate can be advanced. However, a legislative 
response has to be preceded by a lengthy unprecedented political organization and 
pressure. The legislation that enabled the reparations to Japanese-Americans was 
preceded by many years of political pressure by Japanese-Americans. 
In the case of African-Americans, the Bills sponsored by Congressman Conyers were 
not preceded by any unprecedented political pressure and were not pursued relentlessly, 
year after year. African-Americans also lack political and economic clout. 
To influence the legislature, Randall Robinson proposes the launching of "a Year of 
Black Presence": amassing factual evidence; precedents; serious scholarship; 
demonstrations and so on. This should make the political decision makers take notice.593 
Reparations in the U.S.A. are impossible without legislature intervention. Can the post 
593 Robinson, supra, at 24 7. 
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apartheid state entertain a legislative solution gtven its reluctance and inability to 
willingly embark on a reparations strategy? The future will tell. 
11.6.3 The International Tribunal Litigation or Settlement Model 
Anthony Gifford argues that for reparations to Africans everywhere to succeed, an 
international tribunal ought to adjudicate the issue. There is at present no such court or 
tribunal competent enough to adjudicate this issue. 594 This is despite the fact that the 
first international tribunals were created to adjudicate the crimes of slavery. 595 
The already mentioned Declaration by the First Pan-African Congress on Reparations 
seems to lean in this direction as well. The Congress called the international community 
to pay attention to this issue and work towards its resolution. 596 
There are now new international tribunals being set up for specific functions, for 
example former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and so on. It is very possible that if 
the issue of reparations acquires the necessary international visibility, especially in 
tandem with the pressure for debt relief, an international tribunal may very well be set 
up. It is however, a remote possibility. 
There is also an increasing avalanche of scholarly literature on emerging international 
tribunals, particularly the punitive ones, but also those related to reparations for previous 
historical injustices.597 This literature may raise the requisite international consciousness 
594 Gifford, supra at 10. 
595 Martinez, Jenny S., The Slave Trade And The Origins Of International Human Rights Law (Oxford: 
OUP, 2011). 
596 First Pan-African Congress on Reparations, supra. 
597 See Elazar Barkan, The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices (New 
York: W.W. Norton, 2000); Gary Jonathan Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War 
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to set up an international tribunal to deal with reparations for slavery and related causes. 
An international tribunal could be ripe for the crime of apartheid. So far this does not 
appear possible given the stance adopted by the South African government. The victims 
of apartheid have not proposed such a model. The AU ha not called for the creation of 
such a regional or international court 
Reports from national commissions like the South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (T.R.C.) have received favourable endorsements and could provide models 
in the international forum. 598 The U.S. has never convened a commission of inquiry into 
slavery or its reverberating consequences. The T.R.C. of South Africa recommended 
prosecutions and reparations which have not been adopted by the South African 
government. This route is bleak. 
11.6.4 The Diplomatic Model 
The diplomatic model has been helpful in pressuring or nudging parties to settle 
amicably. For example most litigation for reparations for Jewish experience of the Nazi 
holocaust were settled in the final analysis after legal suits were filed, by the intervention 
of U.S. political and judicial muscle.599 
Crimes Tribunals (Trenton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and 
Forgiveness, supra. 
598 See Minow, supra, for extensive discussions of national reconciliation commissions. 
599 See Burt Neubome, "Preliminary Reflections on Aspects of Holocaust-Era Litigation in American 
Courts" (2002) 80 Wash ULQ 795. 
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The diplomatic model, espoused by Anne-Marie Slaughter and David Bosco is aimed 
at curtailing damage to diplomatic and foreign relations between nations as well as 
preventing courts from overriding sovereign prerogatives. 600 
Could apartheid victims' civil suits in the U.S. compel the U.S. government to 
engage in diplomatic pressure on the South African government to engage in a 
reparations exercise internally for the victims? The future will tell, but this route is 
unlikely to be pursued for fear of treading on the sovereignty of nation states. 
11.6.5 The Political "Moral Panic" Model 
Given the intransigence of the world's political and economic power structures to the 
call for reparations for slavery, some scholars have called for triggering some form of 
"moral panics" to nudge the system into action. Moral panics are also triggered by the 
behaviour of governments in reaction to certain events. 
In reference to reparations, the specter of triggering a "moral panic" has been raised 
by Professor Derrick Bell.601 Bell states that: 
[S]hort of a revolution, the likelihood that blacks today will obtain direct 
payments in compensation for their subjugation as slaves before the 
Emancipation Proclamation, and their exploitation as quasi-citizens since, 
is not better than it was in 1866, when Thaddeus Stevens recognized that 
his bright hope of "Forty Acres and a Mule" for every freedman had 
vanished "like the baseless fabric of a vision."602 
Bell argues that: 
600 Anne-Marie Slaughter and David Bosco, "Plaintiffs Diplomacy" (September/October 2000) Foreign 
Affairs 102. 
601 Bell supra. 
602 Ibid at 157. 
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Even if Professor Bittker had devised a fool-proof legal theory for black 
reparations litigation, few judges or legislators would be moved in the 
absence of some dramatic event, major crisis, or tragic circumstance that 
conveyed the necessity or at least the clear advantage of adopting a 
reparations scheme ... 
. .. Legal analysis cannot give life to a [remedial program} that must 
evolve from the perceptions of those responsible for the perpetuation of 
. . h. 603 racism m t is country. 
The election of the first black president, Barack Obama in 2008, did not resuscitate the 
debate for reparations. Derrick Bell's thesis is amply supported by the history of the 
gains obtained by blacks in the U.S. Only the massive demonstrations, boycotts, riots 
and rebellions that accompanied the civil rights movements of the fifties and sixties 
compelled the U.S. government to accede to some demands of African-Americans, like 
the Civil Rights Act of 1965, voting rights and affirmative action programs. Once the 
government got the handle of the moral crisis accompanying the civil rights movement, 
the legislative impulse wavered. The courts maintained the momentum for a decade or 
so and then also began to backtrack. 
Further, the first legislative wave after the civil war of the early 1860s was triggered 
by the moral crisis of the war and accompanying black demands for reparations. 
Whether the issue of reparations is framed in terms of "justice" or "debt", the U.S. 
has shown its disdain by absolute silence. Nor has it shown any concern that it has made 
reparations to other communities except to African-Americans. Nor that it has forced 
other countries to make reparations to certain groups for historical injustices perpetrated 
603 Ibid at 165. 
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on these groups by those countries. This double standard has not escaped the glare of 
African-Americans. Randall Robinson notes that compensation to African-Americans 
would have been accomplished if it was "sought with the same vigour that Under-
Secretary of State Stuart Eizenstat demonstrated on behalf of Jewish survivors of the 
Nazi holocaust, inducing sixteen German companies under pressure from the U.S. to 
establish a fund of 1. 7 billion dollars to compensate mainly Jews used as slave laborers 
during the Nazi era."604 
It is in this historical and comparative context that I propose that the moral panic 
model will probably do more than others to compel the U.S. government to accede to 
reparations for slavery. Could this be the model to redress the crime of apartheid? What 
kind of moral panic could be triggered? The same thinking applies in the international 
arena. A combination of models will more likely also compel the governments to act. 
The future will tell. 
11.7 Paradigm Shift 
In light of German reparations for Jewish slave labour during the holocaust with 
the critical intervention of the U.S., Elazar Barkan sees an important silver lining and 
paradigm shift for African-Americans. Could this also be attempted in the case of the 
crime of Apartheid? Barkan states the following and I quote him at length: 
Germany's Slave Labor - An American Predicament 
Following the successful litigation with the Swiss banks for plundering 
money from World War II victims, the attention of victims and lawyers 
604 Robinson supra, at 245. 
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was directed to German companies that had benefited from slave labor 
during the war. Early discussion suggests that there will be ample 
apologies and not insubstantial payments involved. In pursuing the Swiss, 
various branches of the U.S. government, from the federal government 
through the judicial branch to the state and local governments, were at the 
front of the moral crusade. For politicians, it seemed a win-win issue. But 
what will be the impact of this restitution for slave labor in the United 
States? If there was little explicit analogy between lost bank accounts in 
Switzerland and African American suffering, the situation changes 
dramatically when the discussion shifts to slave labor. If U.S. courts 
support the payments to compensate slave labor in Germany, it is hard to 
imagine how they could deny a voice to African Americans. If pursuing 
payments for slave labor beyond the statute of limitations is "legal" in the 
German case, presumably doing the same in the name of the descendants 
of American slave labor would also be legal as well as moral. It hardly 
makes strong moral sense to claim that just because the victims died, the 
perpetrators (in this case the U.S. government and the states in the South) 
should profit and not be held responsible. Prima facie, the revival of the 
question of slave labor in Germany may tum out to have more of an impact 
on the United States than on Germany.605 
It is however too soon to predict what German reparations for Jewish slavery will do for 
reparations for African slavery or for the crime of apartheid. This will be the subject of 
further research based on concrete developments in the debate on reparations for slavery 
and the crime of apartheid. The suggestion is that a combination of legal and political 
strategies, nationally and internationally, could be used to compel the prosecution of 
apartheid criminals, and for reparations for the victims of apartheid. 
In history, paradigm shifts as well as moral panics, have been the engines for change. 
11.8 Universal Jurisdiction Model 
605 Barkan, The Guilt of Nations at 300. 
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The exercise of universal jurisdiction is partly designated to cure the deep wounds of 
historic crimes. Canada is well positioned to lead the universal jurisdiction crusade. 
According to Fannie Lafontaine, "Canada now poses as a champion of the fight against 
impunity on the international plane. Its principled positions on accountability and the 
modifications of its legal landscape through the War Crimes Act, arguably facilitating 
the criminal prosecution of war criminals found on its territory, are to be welcomed."606 
Even with this evaluation, Lafontaine is aware of Canada's "rather timid willingness to 
prosecute war criminals."607 No less a person, however, than a Supreme Court of 
Canada Justice has tremendous hope for Canada's role in the vindication of international 
justice by the exercise of universal jurisdiction: "Canada was a leader in the movement 
to establish the ICC and was a vocal advocate for a strong and independent court ... it 
has become a leader in the global fight to hold perpetrators of atrocities and human 
rights abuses accountable. Canada has become more effective at bringing war criminals 
living at home to justice. Indeed, the era of Canada acting as a safe haven for war 
criminals is now over."608 
The recent past has however, demonstrated that Canada is backtracking on its limited 
zeal of war crimes prosecutions by its emphasis on deportation rather than prosecutions. 
One of the tools that could still be explored to address the impunity of apartheid 
criminals is universal jurisdiction. 
606 Fannie Lafontaine, "Think Globally, Act Locally: Using Canada's Crimes Against Humanity and War 
Crimes Act for the 'Sustainable' oflntemational Criminal Law" (Ottawa, 19 October 2007), at 9 
607 Ibid., at 10. 
608 Justice Marie Deschamps, "Moving Forward in the Prosecution of War Crimes: International Criminals 
and the Canadian Experience" at 4 and 10. Open source on the web. Downloaded on 26th June 2010. 
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Of those states incorporating the Rome statute into domestic law, only those adopting 
temporal mandates stretching back in time [and which provided for universal 
jurisdiction, if there was no other country connection] could conduct prosecution of 
South Africa's apartheid criminals. This is because the Rome statute's temporal 
mandate is prospective only, from 2002 forward. Many states have only created 
prospective jurisdiction, thus narrowing the number of states able to prosecute South 
Africa's apartheid criminals These latter states if they become imbued with political 
will through politicization can re-amend their legislations to apply retroactively as 
Canada did with section 11 (g) of the Charter of 1982 or they can simply ratify the 
Apartheid Convention of 1973 which would confer them jurisdiction to prosecute 
apartheid criminals. These countries could also rely on the Torture Convention of 1984, 
should they have ratified it. 
11.9 Conclusion 
There were great prospects on the basis of an analogous international law precedent 
of Nazi prosecutions, the enthusiastic advocacy of the victims of apartheid, and the 
United Nations that apartheid criminals would be prosecuted on the demise of apartheid. 
On the basis of the practices of apartheid as detailed in Chapter One, the United Nations 
and the victims of apartheid branded apartheid as a crime against humanity. All that 
remained was total victory against apartheid in order to embark on the prosecutions as 
happened after the defeat of Nazi Germany when high commanding individuals, groups, 
organizations and institutions were prosecuted at Nuremburg. 
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In South Africa, however there was no outright defeat of the perpetrators of 
apartheid. Instead there was a negotiated solution to the crime of apartheid as discussed 
in Chapter Three. The lesson of Nazi Germany could therefore not be applied to post-
apartheid South Africa. The Nazi prosecution precedent is not applicable to South 
Africa. The lesson of Nazi Germany is simply this: There is victor's justice whenever 
one of the protagonists is defeated. There are hardly any prosecutions when there is no 
outright victor party. In South Africa the compromise led to the convocation of the TRC 
which the post-apartheid government eventually and conveniently, because of lack of 
political will, claimed to have performed the role of ensuring accountability for the 
crime of apartheid. The TRC had recommended prosecutions and reparations. The few 
prosecutions that took place were not prosecutions based on the crime of apartheid as a 
crime against humanity or as a war crime, but merely as ordinary crimes. The most 
significant prosecutions failed. 
The Apartheid Convention had envisaged the setting up of an international tribunal to 
prosecute apartheid criminals. No tribunal was set up precisely because there was no 
outright victor in South Africa. Most if not all specialized or ad hoc tribunals are set up 
after there has been a victorious party as evidenced by the tribunals of the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, following the Nuremberg tribunal. This is discussed in 
Chapter Four. 
This dissertation explores the possible use of universal jurisdiction where 
prosecutions are based on national legislations. This tool has tremendous potential as a 
few cases discussed in Chapter Five demonstrate. However, those who have been 
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prosecuted under this jurisdiction in vanous countries represent some of the most 
abhorred of crimes. They are also prosecuted by highly motivated regimes for political 
and not necessary legal ends. Most importantly, the lessons they teach is that national 
jurisdictions are highly selective in who they choose to prosecute utilizing the tool of 
universal jurisdiction. 
In order to demonstrate the politics and law of war crimes prosecutions utilizing 
universal jurisdiction, a case study of Canada has been chosen. Chapter Six is a concise 
history of Canada's war crimes prosecutions. It discusses the impact of highly 
motivated constituencies in effecting government policy on prosecutions. The exercise 
of universal jurisdiction requires multiple pressures on the government to prosecute. 
Canada did not prosecute any apartheid criminals before or after the demise of 
apartheid. It however, applied economic sanctions as an aspect of universal civil 
jurisdiction. This was possible because there were various political constituencies 
pressuring the government to impose economic sanctions and various measures as 
discussed in Chapter Seven. There was also a receptive political environment under the 
leadership of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney who additionally provided the same 
political environment that enabled the enactment of legislation that made it possible to 
pursue Nazi War Criminals in Canada. 
The Mulroney government was not pressured to prosecute apartheid criminals despite 
the presence of legislation which it used to prosecute Nazi war criminals. This is 
discussed in Chapter Eight. It is not known whether the Mulroney government would 
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have prosecuted apartheid criminals if there was an active constituency. International 
law as well as domestic legislation were available for use if there was political will. 
The Canadian government showed political will to prosecute Rwandan war criminals 
as discussed in Chapter Nine. This step was preceded by high pressure from the victims 
of the Rwandan genocide. The most important lesson, it seems, is that governments may 
criminally prosecute war criminals from other countries when those other countries are 
involved in prosecuting their war criminals domestically. Rwanda is prosecuting its war 
criminals, so Canada felt justified in prosecuting Rwandan war criminals. It goes the 
same for the ICC. It is mainly pursuing African war criminals from countries that have 
either referred these war criminals for prosecution or these countries are also prosecuting 
their war criminals. 
In the end, the organizational strength and status of the victims of war crimes, as well 
as the legal avenues available to the victims in the host countries, and the receptivity of 
host governments, dictate the state of prosecutions of war criminals as discussed in 
Chapter Ten. Governments ought to allow victims leeway to either criminally and 
privately initiate war crimes prosecutions or to sue under civil jurisdictions. The 
combination of criminal and civil suits against war criminals might help in limiting 
impunity for war criminals. 
This project is an incomplete and therefore on-going project. Preliminary interviews 
of government officials in Canada and South Africa as well as some victims, judges and 
scholars disclose that the issue of the application of universal jurisdiction to apartheid 
criminals has neither crossed their minds nor have they given it much thought 
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whatsoever. Canadian War Crimes Reports contain nothing about the cnmes of 
apartheid despite Canada having placed criminal regimes on these lists going back to· 
1969. 
Apartheid criminals therefore continue to enjoy impunity both in South Africa and 
abroad. The next stage is to engage South African victims and officials, as well as 
government officials elsewhere in interviews about possible use of both criminal and 
civil universal jurisdiction to end the impunity enjoyed by apartheid criminals. 
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